# PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXV. No. 92 JANUARY 1950

## THE HUMAN PERSON IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY[1]

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

1. IN the early part of the sixth century A.D. Boethius defined the person as "an individual substance of rational nature" (*rationalis naturae individua substantia*). This definition, which became classical and was adopted by, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, obviously implies that every human being is a person, since every human being is (to employ the philosophical terms of Boethius) an individual substance of rational nature. If one cannot be more or less of a human being, so far as "substance" is concerned, one cannot be more or less of a person. One may act as a human person ought not to act or in a way unbefitting a human person; one may even lose the normal use of one's reason; but one does not in this way become depersonalized, in the sense of ceasing to be a person. According to St. Thomas, a disembodied soul is not, strictly speaking, a person, since a disembodied soul is no longer a complete human substance; but every complete human substance is always and necessarily a person.

If in the philosophy of Aquinas the emphasis is laid on the human substance, consisting of rational soul and body, the emphasis was laid by Descartes on self-consciousness, on the self-consciousness of the spiritual substance, the whole essence of which is to "think." With Descartes the human person tends to become a self-enclosed consciousness. (I use the word "tends" because one could scarcely state without qualification that the person, for Descartes, is simply a self-enclosed consciousness.) Moreover, it is true to say, I think, that in what one may call, in a very wide sense, the idealist current in

[1] This paper represents a lecture given at the Royal Institute of Philosophy in February, 1949. The section on the personalism of M. Mounier was made the basis of an (unprinted) broadcast talk.

modern philosophy the tendency has been to look on consciousness, or rather self-consciousness, as the chief characteristic of personality. In the system of Hegel, for example, we find the progress of mind or spirit consisting predominantly in the advance of self-consciousness, though self-consciousness did not mean for Hegel precisely what it meant for Descartes.

But in the case of the modern thinkers whose philosophies of personality I wish briefly to discuss the emphasis is laid on freedom rather than on self-consciousness. Freedom becomes recognized as the chief characteristic of the human person. Perhaps, however, it would be preferable to say that human freedom is regarded as the efficient cause of personality, or at least as its necessary condition, for personality is looked on as something to be won, something to be created and maintained with effort. In the eyes of certain thinkers one can become a person and one can cease to be a person; one can descend, for example, into being a mere "individual" or a mere "self." I shall return to these distinctions; but I mention them now in order to show that the philosophers whom I propose to discuss do not use the word "person" in precisely the same sense that a thirteenth-century Scholastic would have used it. For them it is not equivalent to "human being"; it frequently has a moral connotation and denotes what a mediaeval philosopher might have thought of as a person who not only exists as a person but also lives and acts and chooses as a person, that is, in a way befitting a person. Aquinas would, I suppose, have regarded it as absurd to talk of a human being becoming or ceasing to be a person or becoming more or less of a person; but if the word "person" is understood in the sense given it by certain groups of modern thinkers, then such a way of talking could hardly be called absurd. It is as well to draw attention to this point, as some terminological confusion may thus be avoided.

The philosophers whose views on personality I want to discuss are the personalists, the existentialists and Professors Lavelle and Le Senne. The personalists in the narrow sense are Emmanuel Mounier, editor of *Esprit*, and his circle; but one can speak, I think, of all these thinkers as belonging to a personalist movement in modern philosophy, even if their views are by no means identical. That such a movement should have arisen is, of course, easily understandable. The personalist type of philosophy tends to recur as a protest or reaction against the recurrent forms of monism or "totalitarian" philosophy which are felt to threaten the dignity, independence and individual value of the human person. One might call it the periodic protest of the personal against the impersonal. It should be added, however, that the use of the words "protest" and "reaction" is not meant to imply that the personalist type of philosophy is simply negative: on the contrary, it involves the

positive affirmation of the person and positive interpretations of personality.

2. One scarcely needs to recall to mind the fact that Kierkegaard, the father of modern existentialism, rejected the Hegelian conception of the Absolute, which seemed to him to reduce the individual human person to a mere moment in the life or self-unfolding of the Absolute. Kierkegaard drew attention to the category of the "individual" and ridiculed the absolute idealist who forgets himself, the individual thinker, and tries to become impersonal, abstract thought or mind. "The thinker who can forget in all his thinking also to think that he is an existing individual, will never explain life. He merely makes an attempt to cease to be a human being, in order to become a book or an objective something, which is possible only for a Munchausen."[1] "If a thinker is so absent-minded as to forget that he is an existing individual, still, absent-mindedness and speculation are not precisely the same thing."[2] I am certainly not prepared to defend up to the hilt Kierkegaard's interpretation of Hegelianism and in any case the reaction against Hegelianism was only one of the factors which influenced him in the formation of his idea of the "individual." However, regarding Hegelianism, rightly or wrongly as involving moral irresponsibility and the substitution of speculation or thinking about the Absolute for a personal attitude to God, Kierkegaard emphasized the individual's act of free submission to the moral law and his free acceptance or choice of his personal relationship to God. A man becomes an "individual" (contemporary thinkers would say "person") by the exercise of his free choice, by freely giving form and direction to his life.

An analogous development can be observed in the case of Gabriel Marcel. While discarding empiricism, Marcel found himself unable, owing to his "sense of the concrete," to accept the absolutist philosophy of Bradley; and his study of experiences like belief led him to lay emphasis on the individual, concrete subject, which is neither identical with the empirical ego nor a moment in the subjectivity of a transcendental ego. "I can honestly say that I arrived at it (this position) by myself, for it was before I had read Kierkegaard, in whom I might so easily have found it."[3] Again, Marcel speaks with disparagement of what he regards as the modern functionalization of life, the tendency of the individual "to appear both to himself and to others as an agglomeration of functions."[4] Marxism functionalizes man in one way, Freudianism in another; in either case the spiritual freedom and uniqueness of the human person is overlooked. But the same sort of thing can be seen, according to Marcel, in ordinary life. A man is a ticket-puncher on the Underground, for example. That

[1] *Unscientific Postscript*, p. 85.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 108.
[3] *The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 89.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

is his function; and all other functions, sleep, eating, recreation, and so on, are subordinated to this main social function. In modern life a man is not primarily a human person; he is an embodied function, a railwayman, a clerk, a civil servant, a schoolmaster, a trades-union official, or whatever it may be. When he retires, he is still regarded and regards himself in terms of his function; he is a retired civil servant, a retired doctor, a retired detective.

Marcel is a convinced Christian; but a like theme is emphasized by Camus, who is an atheist, and, to a certain extent, by Sartre. Against this functionalization of life Sartre sets the free man, creator of values, Marcel the unique human person, capable of a spiritual relationship to other persons and to God. For Sartre the human person transcends his "function" in virtue of his complete freedom; for Marcel he transcends it in virtue of his "openness." For both philosophers man is more than an embodied social function, just as he is more than a mere biological urge.

But, well before Sartre and Camus, Jaspers had spoken of the "anti-bourgeois" character of the existentialist movement, that is to say, of its opposition to the crowd mentality and to superficiality of outlook: in place of man as a mere member of the social complex existentialism sets the individual human being, aware of his personal freedom, his potentialities and the incommunicable and unique in himself. I do not think that the reason why existentialists tend to dwell, not only on man's liberty, but also on his fragility as a finite, contingent being and on the constant menace of "unauthentic existence," is simply a love of the sensational and morbid or a desire to scandalize the "bourgeois," though this desire may, of course, be operative. The desire to draw attention to what it actually means to be an individual human person is also operative, even if Sartre is inclined to do this by administering a shock to what is termed, probably unhappily, the "bourgeois" mentality and spirit.

However, opposition to this spirit is by no means the only factor which helps to explain the rise of the contemporary personalist philosophies. There is also the reaction to positivism to be taken into account. In his preface to the volume of essays entitled *Personal Idealism* (1902) Henry Sturt spoke not only of the neglect of personality by some of the leading thinkers of his day but also of the attack made on it by the naturalists. "One adversary tells each of us: 'You are a transitory resultant of physical processes'; and the other: 'You are an unreal appearance of the Absolute.' Naturalism and Absolutism, antagonistic as they seem to be, combine in assuring us that personality is an illusion." The personal idealists and the pragmatists reacted against both positivism and absolutism. For example, the American philosopher Borden Parker Bowne (d. 1910) published a work entitled *Personalism*, in which he developed a

personal idealism under the influence of Leibniz and Lotze; and William James, the famous pragmatist, who had been strongly influenced by Charles Renouvier, employed the word "personalism" to express his philosophy. That Kierkegaard and Marcel reacted against absolute idealism has been already noted. It is also true that existentialism expresses a reaction against positivism, a reaction which may be characterized as personalist in a wide sense, even if the existentialist slogan is "existence" rather than "person."[1] The existentialists depict man as existing in a literal sense, as standing out from the background of nature; and they emphasize the difference between the human person and the things of nature which man uses. For the existentialist there is a sharp difference between the *Umwelt*, the world of things or objects, and the *Mitwelt* or world of persons. Thus, in a manner rather reminiscent of Fichte, Heidegger represents the world of things as the field of action of the human person. Again, Jaspers insists on the peculiar character of the human being, on his liberty or power of "self-transcendence," which is the peculiar foundation of human personality. Moreover, both Heidegger and Jaspers, I think, maintain that, since man can raise the problem of being in general, the metaphysical problem, he thereby shows that he transcends the sphere of immediate vital needs and impulses to which the animal is confined. Even Sartre, who has been accused, probably with justice, of materialism, makes a sharp distinction between the sphere of the human, the self-conscious, and the non-human.

I have tried to show, in a rather sketchy manner, how the personalist movement, so far as the existentialists are concerned, has arisen; but perhaps I ought to have made it clearer that the theistic current in existentialism emphasizes man's openness to the Transcendent. This emphasis can be seen in the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Marcel, Berdyaev, and in certain other philosophies like those of Lavelle and Le Senne, which can hardly be classed as existentialist philosophies though they show certain affinities with existentialism. From the negative point of view one can regard this emphasis on man's openness to the Transcendent as partly a reaction against positivism and, in some cases, as partly a reaction against the reduction of religion to social morality. From the positive point of view one can regard it as a rediscovery of the Transcendent through a consideration of personal experience and its implications and, in the case of a thinker like Lavelle, as involved in the re-assertion of a metaphysical philosophy of being.

3. Turning now to the personalists in a more restricted sense (I refer

[1] With Marcel the idea of person is, I should say, much more in evidence than that of existence. But then Marcel resigns himself to being called, rather than claims to be, an existentialist.

to Emmanuel Mounier and his circle) one is confronted with the distinction between "individual" and "person." The term "individual" is used in a pejorative sense: it is used to denote man considered as a centre or spring of egotistic desire; the individual is the purely egocentric man. According to Mounier, the individual is "the diffusion of the person on surface of his life and his satisfaction in losing himself therein."[1] "Matter isolates, cuts off. . . . The individual is the dissolution of the person in matter." The individual thus corresponds to the man who stands on the lowest level of the Spinozistic ethic; he is the man who regards himself as the only pebble on the beach, the man who, from a practical point of view, absolutizes his own ego. At least this is one of the aspects of the "individual" as described by the personalists. One might also say that he is man considered on the biological level, the man in whom the biological urge to self-preservation is all-dominant. He is not unlike the atomistic individual depicted by Thomas Hobbes, in abstraction from society. The individual is also the practical materialist, as well as the man who has no sense of moral vocation: he is the man who has no moral or spiritual independence, the superficial man, the man who lives as a mere member of the crowd, who has no inner life of his own. Thus according to Denys de Rougemont the individual is "a man without destiny, a man without vocation or reason for existing, a man from whom the world demands nothing."[2]

The "person," on the other hand, is conceived by the personalists in close connection with the idea of moral vocation. According to M. Mounier, the person is "mastery, choice, formation, conquest of self": the person can be described according to its three dimensions, "vocation, incarnation, communion." In his personalist *Manifesto* M. Mounier declares that, while no rigorous definition of the person can be given, a "sufficiently rigorous" definition is as follows. "A person is a spiritual being constituted as such by a manner of subsistence and of independence in being; it maintains this subsistence by its adhesion to a hierarchy of values, freely adopted, assimilated and lived, by a responsible self-commitment and by a constant conversion; it thus unifies all its activity in liberty and develops, moreover, by means of creative acts, its own unique vocation."[3] Denys de Rougemont also links together the ideas of person and vocation, interpreting "vocation" in a frankly Christian manner. Person and vocation are possible "only in this unique act of obedience to the order of God which is called the love of the neighbour. . . . Act, presence and commitment, these three words define the

[1] *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, p. 67.
[2] *Politique de la personne*, p. 56.
[3] *Manifeste au service du personnalisme; Esprit*, October, 1936.

person, but also what Jesus Christ commands us to be: the neighbour."[1]

The personalists make a great point of applying their doctrine of personality in the social and political field. In political theory we find two extreme positions. First, there is extreme individualism which makes the private interests and purposes of the individual supreme. I suppose that a representative theory of this type would be that of Herbert Spencer, according to whom the state exists simply in order to enable individual human beings to pursue their private interests in peace. The individual is everything, and the more the importance of society or of the state is minimized the better. Secondly, there is extreme collectivism or totalitarianism. This may take various concrete forms; but in essence it means the complete subordination of the individual to society and of the private interests of the individual to the interests of the group, whether the group is conceived as the state or the economic class or as the race.

It might appear that we are forced either to choose between these two extremes or to attempt a synthesis. According to the personalists, however, both individualists and collectivists are agreed in looking on man as an "individual," in the personalist sense of the term, and not as a "person." Both individualists and collectivists look on man simply as the biological man, the man who is no more than an individual member of the species. For, according to the personalists, man, considered as an "individual" and not as a person, is no more than a part of a greater whole. Individualism absolutizes the "individual"; it endeavours to make absolutes of the parts at the expense of the whole—just as though an individual cell in an organism were to assert itself at the expense of the organism. Collectivism, on the other hand, represents the organism's reassertion of its own greater value and importance against the undue self-assertion of the cell or the part. In other words, in so far as man is considered simply as an "individual," collectivism or totalitarianism is truer than atomistic individualism. But man is not simply an "individual," a member of the group; he is also a "person," an independent being with a spiritual nature which surmounts the biological and economic levels. It follows that both atomistic individualism and totalitarianism are wrong, since neither allows for the person's moral and spiritual nature and vocation.

The personalists may sometimes tend to give the impression that they mean by "person" and "individual" two separate things: and it might appear to follow from this that personalism is an anti-social philosophy or that it at least belittles objective social institutions like the state. However, the apparent separation of

[1] *Politique de la personne*, pp. 52–3. De Rougemont is, incidentally, a Protestant, while Mounier is a Catholic.

"individual" and person must not be taken literally: as one personalist has explained, they denote two aspects of one human reality, aspects which should not be separated as though they denoted two things nor confused as though there were no real distinction between the aspects. It is not a question of choosing between the aspects but of uniting them hierarchically. The person is a social being; but at the same time he is more than a mere member of the group. He is orientated towards society, but not like a cell in an organism; he is orientated towards a society of persons, and a society of persons is a society of free, morally responsible human beings, no one of which is completely absorbed in or exhausted by his social relations. Mounier insists, therefore, that if personalism is opposed to Marxism this is not because Marxism is anti-individualist but because it tends to interpret man simply in terms of its initial economic categories. For example, the Marxist, as Marxist, is bound to regard religion as escapism or as clerical politics, because he insists in interpreting all levels of experience in terms of his initial politico-economic categories.[1] But, though Mounier rejects Marxism as a system, he regards his own doctrine as the very antithesis of individualism and capitalism. Indeed, his dislike of individualism, coupled with his desire for a concrete, non-utopian attitude towards the contemporary political and social situation, has made him in recent years somewhat surprisingly sympathetic towards the Marxists.[2]

Somewhat similar ideas about "individual" and "person" have been propounded by the Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain. Accepting the Thomist notion of matter as the principle of individuation he describes individuality as "that which excludes from oneself all other men" and as being "the narrowness of the ego, forever threatened and forever eager to grasp for itself."[3] Personality, on the other hand, is "the subsistence of the spiritual soul communicated to the human composite": it is interiority to self, but it is characterized not by grasping for self but by the giving of self in love and freedom. Individual and person are not, however, separate beings; it is absurd to cry "Death to the individual, long live the person!" The human being is a unity, and if, as an individual, he requires society to satisfy his private needs, he requires it, as a person, for "communication," to give or to overflow. The person is, then, a social being, and human society is, or should be, a society of persons. But it can degenerate. "Only yesterday, across the Rhine, we saw

[1] *Equivoques du personnalisme* and *Tâches actuelles d'une pensée d'inspiration personnaliste; Esprit*, February, 1947 and November, 1948.

[2] In attempting to understand the well-meant efforts of certain French Christians to find a bridge between Christianity and Marxism one must, of course, bear in mind the difference between the French and English political scenes, however one may finally evaluate these efforts.

[3] *The Person and the Common Good*, p. 27.

to what atrocities a purely biological conception of society can lead." In Maritain's view "bougeois individualism," "communistic anti-individualism" and "totalitarian dictatorial anti-communism and anti-individualism" all disregard the person in some way or other and substitute simply the material individual. When this has been done, the common good must be subordinated to the private, egotistic interests of individuals or individuals must be submerged in the collectivity. The only way of escaping this dilemma is to recognize man as person and society as a society of persons.

4. It is interesting to notice the hostility felt by personalists like Mounier and Thomists like Maritain for what they call "bourgeois individualism" and, indeed, for the "bourgeois" spirit in general. It seems to me rather difficult to define what is meant by "bourgeois" in this connection; but it is clear that the word is used to denote a certain spirit rather than membership of any precise economic or social class. In this hostility to the "bourgeois" spirit the personalists show an affinity with the existentialists. The existentialists regard man as capable of what they call "authentic existence" but at the same time as ever menaced by the tendency to "unauthentic existence." The personalists regard man as capable of becoming a "person" but at the same time as threatened by the tendency to surrender either to egocentric individualism or to submersion in the totality. But though there are affinities between personalism and existentialism, there are also considerable differences. In the latter one can discern a tendency to belittle objective social institutions. It can hardly be denied, I think, that in Kierkegaard's philosophy there is a marked individualist trend, and M. Sartre has had to defend his doctrine against the charge of being anti-social. Jaspers and Marcel certainly lay great emphasis on "communication," but one receives the impression, perhaps wrongly, that this means for them primarily an intimate relationship between kindred souls. The personalists, however, emphasize the person's orientation towards society; and some of them appear to go as far as they can with the collectivists, stopping short at the point at which the person's spiritual nature is either obscured or denied. Perhaps one reason for this difference between existentialists and personalists is, as M. Mounier has suggested, that the former tend to describe authentic existence in negative terms. It involves a tearing oneself away from the mentality of the crowd, a separation, a refusal. For the personalists, however, the person and the society of persons are taken as the positive standard: the "individual" is simply a degraded condition of the person, just as the totalitarian state is a degraded form of the true state.

Both personalists and existentialists possess a sense of the dramatic aspects of man's existence, the former insisting that personality, the

latter that authentic existence is something constantly to be won and maintained, that it is forever threatened. The theme of self-creating is common to them both; and "self-creating" is the achievement of freedom. As I said earlier in this paper, in the contemporary theories of man which I am discussing there has been a shift of emphasis from self-consciousness to freedom as the chief characteristic of personality. (I do not mean to imply, of course, that the thinkers in question envisage freedom without self-consciousness.) I have already indicated some reasons for this change of emphasis. One might go on to recall the heralds of this change within the field of philosophic thought. One could recall, for instance, Fichte's insistence on freedom or Maine de Biran's substitution of *Volo, ergo sum* for Descartes' *Cogito, ergo sum*; one could recall the doctrines of philosophers like Ravaisson, Guyau, Boutroux or Bergson. The latter actually spoke of "self-creating." But I wish rather to keep to the idea of freedom as found in the philosophies of the existentialists, the personalists and thinkers like Lavelle and Le Senne. I will say at once that in my opinion the main division is between those who look on freedom as orientated and on man as having a moral and spiritual vocation and those who deny objective values and who refuse to recognize in freedom any teleological function. This division cuts across the lines of demarcation between personalists and existentialists. For example, Marcel would have to be grouped with Mounier, and also with Lavelle and Le Senne, whereas Sartre would fall outside this group.

5. I am very doubtful if any strict definition of freedom can be given which would give a clear idea of it to anyone who was not already experimentally acquainted with it. One might, of course, describe the conditions of freedom, or some of them, and one might say what freedom is not; but it would seem that a definition of freedom must either presuppose some awareness of freedom or misrepresent it by defining it in terms of what it is not. However, most upholders of human freedom speak as though it is something which man is capable of exercising, not as something which characterizes all man's actions or as something which is identical with man. But M. Sartre assures us that freedom is the being of man. His actual words are difficult to interpret. "Freedom is not *a* being: it is the being of man, that is to say, his not-being."[1] Self-consciousness, which, as I have said, M. Sartre, under Cartesian influence, strongly emphasizes, means presence to oneself; therefore distance from oneself. But what separates oneself from oneself is nothing. Man, as *pour-soi*, perpetually "secretes" his own nothingness; by his very structure he is perpetually torn away, as it were, from what he was and what he is: he is a perpetual movement

[1] *L'Être et le Néant*, p. 516.

away from what he was to what he will be. We can never say of him, without qualification, that he *is*; he is perpetually constrained to make himself; he is *projet*. Now, freedom is precisely the nothingness which is at the heart of man and which "constrains the human reality to *make* itself, instead of *being*." "For man, to be is to choose oneself: nothing comes to him either from within or from without that he can receive or accept. He is entirely and helplessly abandoned to the insupportable necessity of making himself be, even down to the least detail."[1] So far as one can make sense of these assertions, it appears that Sartre regards freedom as identical with man's being (or the "not-being" which is his being), that it is unconditioned and that it extends to all man's acts. It is understandable that Marcel accuses Sartre of debasing and cheapening freedom by flooding the market with it.[2] M. Sartre speaks of an original gushing-up (*jaillissement*) of freedom in each human being, an initial free determination of the man's ultimate direction of will. "It is, then, the determination of my ultimate purposes which characterizes my being and which is identical with the original gushing-up of my freedom."[3] Values are not recognized by man but determined by him: I am the being by whom values exist. Freedom is thus unorientated, in the sense that there is no objective value correlative to the human will. This point of view is perhaps not altogether consistent with what Sartre has to say on "authentic existence," which seems to be presented as something objectively valuable. In any case, Sartre's doctrine of freedom, taken in itself, seems to me to be nihilistic in character and to make of the human person a kind of monster in the world of being, in the sense in which a grossly deformed human being is called a "monster." The human person is "the baseless basis of values."[4]

Marcel takes a different line. He distinguishes the ego (*le moi*) or self-enclosed consciousness, the "individual," that is, man considered simply as a member of the anonymous "one" (*l'on*) from the person. The person is characterized by commitment. "I affirm myself as a person in the measure that I assume the responsibility of what I do and what I say. But before whom am I or before whom do I recognize myself as responsible? . . . both before myself *and* before others; this conjunction is characteristic of personal commitment."[5] Effective commitment is an act of freedom; but though the ideas of freedom and commitment are emphasized by both Marcel and Sartre, the former does not regard freedom as irresponsible or as total. Although the person realizes himself as person only in commitment (in a work, an action, in the course

1 *L'Être et le Néant*, p. 520.
2 *The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 63.
3 *L'Être et le Néant*, p. 520.
4 *Ibid.*, p. 76.
5 *Homo viator*, p. 26.

of a life), it belongs to the essence of personality not to be exhausted in any one particular commitment, because it participates in Being, its beginning and end.[1] In other words, personal freedom is an orientated freedom, orientated towards others and, finally, to God: it is founded in Being and is orientated to Being. For Marcel, the ideas of person, commitment, community, Being, go together and must be apprehended together. Sartre seems to be, to all intents and purposes, a materialist: at least his philosophy seems to be deeply influenced by the materialism of the French Enlightenment, in so far as the latter was materialistic in spirit: but Marcel interprets personality in the light of a philosophy of spiritual being. On this point he is at one with Mounier. There is, indeed, a difference between Marcel's philosophy and personalism in the narrow sense; but it seems to me to be a difference in the respective interests of the philosophers concerned rather than in their actual tenets. The personalists concern themselves extensively with problems arising out of the present conditions of society, particularly with the relation between the person and the common good, whereas Marcel is concerned rather to show how one "becomes" a person by transcending one's self-enclosedness in love for other persons and in the free acceptance of a personal relationship to God. If Marcel does not interest himself particularly in the political problem, this is not because the person, as conceived by him, is self-enclosed.

Marcel is a Catholic; and one may receive the impression from reading his books that he presupposes Christian doctrine. As a matter of fact, however, he does not presuppose it in the sense of explicitly assuming its truth; and he had developed the main line of his thought before he became a Christian. On the other hand, he insists that Christianity is an historical datum (which is obviously true) and that "it favours the development of certain ideas which we might not have conceived without it."[2] We can no more be expected, he says, to reason to-day as if there is no such historical datum as Christianity than we can be expected to pretend, when discussing the theory of knowledge, that there have not been some centuries of positive science. But, just as positive science does not supply a philosophical theory of knowledge, though it may act as a fertilizing principle, so Christianity, considered as an historical datum, may act as a fertilizing principle in regard to certain lines of thought, even though it does not supply the philosophical ideas and theories themselves.

There are other philosophers, however, who are, in certain respects, what one might call trenchantly Christian. Thus the late Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev, who looked upon himself as a true

[1] *Homo viator*, pp. 32–33.
[2] *The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 30.

existentialist, declared not only that "spirit is freedom," but also that "apart from Christianity there is no freedom, and determinism is supreme."[1] For Berdyaev, freedom is not natural to man; it is something to be won; and it is to be won only by entering into an order of being which is superior to the natural order. I do not agree with Berdyaev's statement that "apart from Christianity there is no freedom" (unless "freedom" is understood in a very special sense); but I have mentioned him in connection with Marcel in order to illustrate the religious orientation of a large section of personalist thought. This religious direction of thought is, I think, only to be expected. An anti-positivist movement tends, by its natural impetus, to reintroduce a metaphysic; and, in particular, to reintroduce the idea of transcendent being. One can see this happening not only in the case of someone who, like Marcel, is actually a Christian, but also in the case of Karl Jaspers. (No doubt exceptions can be found; M. Sartre is one of them; but the question might be raised, of course, how far M. Sartre has really freed himself from positivism.) But in an anti-positivist philosophy which proceeds to transcendent being not so much by way of metaphysical argument in the traditional sense as through consideration of the "openness" and free commitment of the person the idea of transcendent being will naturally tend to become the concrete idea of God rather than to remain a purely abstract notion. It is true that Jaspers has stressed the tension between religion and philosophy; but the way in which he speaks about the Transcendent suggests a religious attitude far more than the attitude of purely abstract thought. This is inevitable in view of the fact that, for Jaspers, the apprehension of the Transcendent is a matter of personal faith, not of "objective" thought. It may be "philosophic faith"; but it is faith of a kind; it is not the sort of thinking whereby Aristotle concluded to the existence of an unmoved mover. There is nothing to be surprised at, then, in the fact that Jaspers now seems to speak habitually of "God."

6. This religious orientation of thought is implicit also in the philosophies of two French thinkers, Lavelle and Le Senne, who are both, I think, professors at the Collège de France. Lavelle emphasizes freedom as the characteristic of the person: it is "the heart of myself and the act by which I make myself . . .":[2] it is creative initiative or the power of creative initiative. But freedom is something received. I am responsible for the exercise of freedom; but a potentiality for this creative initiative is presupposed, and it is something given, received. Further, freedom is orientated. First of all, it is orientated to society, that is, a society of persons. Passing

[1] *Freedom and the Spirit*, pp. 117 and 121.
[2] *De l'Acte*, p. 189.

over the metaphysical reasons for the existence of a plurality of persons, one may mention Lavelle's argument, which reminds one somewhat of Fichte's teaching, that the existence of a moral order demands the existence of a plurality of persons or free beings. "Duty cannot be fully realized by any one of them, but only by all."[1] Moreover, "I have need of other freedoms because my freedom can take as object only another freedom. We are well aware that it is truly exercised only in presence of a free being and not at all in the presence of a thing. It is the encounter with a freedom which is not mine that obliges my freedom to question itself, to become deeper and even to actualize itself."[2] But though different freedoms or free beings are discontinuous and, in a sense, mutually exclusive, they enjoy a mutual solidarity in virtue of their common relation to "pure Act," the transcendent free Being. Freedom is, then, by its very nature, directed towards the creation of a society of persons; and, beyond the society of persons, it reaches out to the plenitude of being, to pure Act or, to use a more concrete term, to God.

Lavelle's doctrine of the person and of human freedom is thus dependent on his metaphysic of being. It would not be relevant to the theme of this paper, were I to discuss this metaphysic; but it is as well to draw attention to its primacy in Lavelle's thought, in view of its influence in determining the character of his interpretation of human personality and freedom. Whereas in the philosophy of Sartre the "human reality" is an unexplained *monstrum*, in that of Lavelle human freedom is interpreted as a "participation" in infinite creative freedom. Therefore, while for Sartre freedom is neither received nor directed towards any objective value, for Lavelle it is received and also orientated. In other words, the philosophy of Lavelle belongs to what one may call, in a generously wide sense, the Platonic metaphysical tradition.

If Lavelle lays emphasis on the two ideas of being and of participation, Le Senne emphasizes the idea of objective values. Personality is "neither a substance, or a state, nor a category; it is existence, as it is formed by the double cogito, hindered by obstacles, elevating itself by and towards value."[3] According to Le Senne, personality grows in proportion as the self apprehends or discovers value and in proportion as it freely realizes value. "In the measure that value triumphs" consciousness "personalizes itself."[4] In other words, personality is something to be won; it grows together with the apprehension and realization of value, in proportion, that is to say, as the moral consciousness overcomes

[1] *De l'Acte*, p. 185. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Obstacle et Valeur*, p. 321. The "double cogito" refers to the *moi public* and the *moi intime*.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 322.

the obstacles to its discovery of value and to its free moral activity. One can speak, then, of the existence of personality as an existence "in suspense"; it exists only on condition that it constantly makes itself, though it cannot complete itself in such a way that no further effort is needed in order to maintain itself.[1] It thus involves constant effort, and a person who ceases to make any effort towards further self-personalization "immediately ceases to make any effort at all."[2] Moreover, this effort must take the form not merely of moral self-culture but also of realizing in the objective world particular intentions based on the intuition of value. Le Senne thus interprets personality in terms of moral vocation. But he does not remain within the sphere of determinate values, for he insists that determinate values depend on the principle or ground of value, the good as such or value as such. "Bradley has shown definitively that every judgment has reference to the Absolute. The Absolute is value."[3] Moral experience and moral achievement are the ways in which men experience "the presence and the activity of God," value being "the existential relation between God and myself."[4]

7. I am only too well aware that some of the ideas I have mentioned must appear extremely vague and lacking in precision. On some occasions, of course, the immediate difficulty is predominantly terminological in character. For example, if a writer speaks of "freedoms" confronting one another he is obviously speaking of persons considered as free. At other times, however, it is really very difficult to understand precisely what meaning a given statement is intended to convey; and I can well imagine some British philosophers rejecting many of the theories which I have narrated as meaningless nonsense. But I think that it would be a mistake to allow one's natural impatience with vague or unfamiliar language to lead one into rejecting the modern continental philosophers unheard, that is, without one's making many real attempt to understand what they are getting at. Of course, it is possible to adopt a criterion of significance which will exclude, from the outset, a great many of the characteristic utterances of these continental philosophers from the rank of significant propositions; but does this procedure amount to much more in the end than showing that, if one philosophy is true, another philosophy is false, in so far as it differs from or is opposed to the first? If one is willing to investigate what Mounier, for example, means by his distinction between "individual" and "person" and if one is content to ask whether there is anything in human experience which is relevant to the formation of these ideas, I think that one will see that these ideas

[1] *Obstacle et Valeur*, p. 321.
[2] *Traité de morale générale*, p. 481.
[3] *Obstacle et Valeur*, p. 194.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 345 and 344.

are not devoid of significance. It might, indeed, be preferable not to make this dichotomy between "individual" and "person"; but it could hardly be maintained, I think, that there are no types of human behaviour which are relevant to the formation of the ideas expressed by these words.

One should also take into account the possibility that the philosophers whom I have discussed find difficulty in discovering appropriate words and phrases for certain ideas rather than that they are merely playing with words. It may be said that, if they cannot express their ideas linguistically, they have no ideas. But I am doubtful whether the conclusion necessarily follows. Unless these thinkers wish to invent words, they will have to use words already in existence. But terms already in use have an already accepted meaning or set of meanings. To invent new terms, just as the scientist may invent terms like "photon" or "positron," would have serious disadvantages and would not be of any great utility, for the philosopher would then have to go on to explain what he meant by these terms, unless he were prepared to leave this task to future commentators. But if the philosopher, eschewing the invention of new terms, tries to draw attention, by means of terms already in use, to something which he thinks has not been expressed before, adequately at least, his statements will inevitably be involved in a certain vagueness or ambiguity. "Existence," for example, as commonly understood, does not mean what the existentialist means by it; nor has the term "individual," as commonly employed, always the precise pejorative sense given it by the personalist. In this case the philosopher might perhaps be expected to explain as carefully as possible the precise sense in which he is using a word which is ordinarily used to denote something else. Unfortunately this is not always done. When it is not done, one can either decline to make the effort to distil his meaning, because one has other things to do or because one thinks, for reasons good or bad, that the effort so expended will not be adequately recompensed, or one can set oneself patiently to discover the intended meaning. If one can discover no meaning, then one may decide that the meaning is "beyond one" or one may decide that the words have no meaning. But to decide from the outset that there is no discoverable meaning, simply because the writer uses more or less familiar words in an unfamiliar sense, would be a rather high-handed procedure.

These reflections are not meant to indicate that I feel in a position to elucidate all the statements of these continental thinkers; still less that I agree with all of them. It would scarcely be possible to agree at the same time with both Marcel and Sartre, for example. But I think that the general direction of thought in what I have called the personalist movement (including, that is to say, the existen-

tialists) is fairly clear. The philosophers of this movement endeavour to draw attention to the particular aspects of the human personality which seem to them to differentiate it most sharply from all that is non-personal. All of them, as we have seen, agree in stressing freedom, the person's free "self-creating," and most of them stress also the person's orientation towards other persons, his need of other persons not only in order to receive but also in order to communicate or give. To deny that orientation in favour of atomistic individualism is to neglect one of the most important aspects of man. On the other hand, as the personalists and at any rate the theistic existentialists (including Jaspers) would maintain, the human person's potentialities are not exhausted in his social relationship; he can discover and accept his relationship to the Transcendent, showing thereby that he is more than a mere member of society, a mere part of a whole. It follows that to interpret the person as a mere part of the state or of the race or of the class or even of humanity is to misinterpret him.

One may or may not agree with such statements; but I do not think that they are meaningless or even that they are very difficult to understand. I would also suggest that they are not without some practical relevance. It is always open to man, of course, to analyse himself into a series of fleeting phenomena; but the picture suggested by such a procedure is, to my mind, somewhat comical.

# VALUES IN SPEAKING[1]

PROFESSOR J. N. FINDLAY

I AM addressing you this evening in a somewhat unfamiliar theme: that of "logical values" or "values in speaking." I do so since the points I want to raise come up very constantly in contemporary discussion, and yet are seldom made the object of explicit reflection. There are, it is plain, a large number of qualities which appeal to us in our utterances, whether in the setting forth of our notions in words, or in the weaving of such words into sentences. And they may be said to appeal to us in a peculiar manner, and to satisfy a special set of interests in us, which we may group together as the "logical side" of our nature. Thus most people would say that clarity, relevance, coherence, solid significance and simplicity were merits in speaking, and that so also was truthful conformity to the facts of experience, whether in their general outline or their concrete detail. And everyone would admit readily that such excellences "belonged together," that they were somehow akin, and that they differed profoundly from such virtues in speaking as poetic felicity, practical helpfulness, or moral and religious inspiration. And most people would also be willing to say, with a great deal of obscurity and most puzzling conviction, that the appeal of such qualities wasn't "merely momentary and personal," but had something "solid" and "universal" about it, that a man would be *foolish* not to value such qualities, and that he couldn't *help* valuing them if he only thought of them sufficiently. And we should recommend such qualities to the approval of others with an air of earnestness and authority, setting them on a level, in this respect, with those other excellences that are called "ethical" and "aesthetic." But while we could back our recommendation in the last two types of case with a great deal of systematic doctrine, built up in centuries of reflection, we should have little to bring forward in the former case, since the excellences that I want to call "logical," though often acknowledged, have seldom been made the objects of systematic reflection. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the "true" has generally been ranged alongside of the "good" and the "beautiful" as a species of "ultimate value." Now "truth" is a word which readily carries with it a connotation of mere agreement with something, of passive registering of whatever comes before us, of situations where our use of terms is fixed, and we wait upon experience

[1] An inaugural lecture delivered at King's College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, on February 10, 1949.

to determine us what to say. And truth, so spoken of, becomes a thing beyond the range of human preferences and valuations, and therein quite unlike our moral and aesthetic values, which have the closest connection with our likes and preferences. And by this stress on truth, as *all* that is logically admirable and desirable, we may be brought to forget entirely that we adopt statements confidently (and call them "true") for a large number of *other* reasons than that they agree with experience, or agree with anything. We adopt statements for their perspicuity and definiteness, we adopt them for their economy and simplicity, we adopt them because they gather facts together in a unified manner. And though we say, of *any* statement we accept and adopt, that it "agrees with reality," it isn't *on account of* any such agreement that we accept it or value it. We want therefore to sort out all those qualities in our diction which could be said to yield us "logical satisfaction," and we want also to characterize, as simply and as generally as we can, the precise *sort* of satisfaction that they yield us. We are, in short, trying to build up a conceptual model in terms of which a large number of important human attitudes can be classified and graded. And we shall regard such a characterization as successful to the extent that it enables us to make plain just *why* a given quality in our speech *is* logically satisfactory. We are, in short, embarking on the same sort of simplifying work in logic, that has been carried on for centuries in ethics and aesthetics.

Before we go further, we must, however, make plain just what we mean by speaking of the *values* of diction. Now recent thought has emphasized strongly, in my opinion rightly, that all statements of value should be regarded as expressing emotion in ourselves, and also as expressing the endeavour to evoke similar emotion in others. We can't genuinely understand what is meant by saying such things as "That is a right way of acting," "That is an admirable picture," "That is a well-conceived and well-developed theory" without either feeling (or feigning) satisfaction with the objects in question. And we also shouldn't normally utter such statements, without wishing to communicate our attitudes to others, so as to influence them in their feelings and their practical life. Quite plainly, too, we *learnt* the meanings of the value-words in such statements, when those around us evinced emotional attitudes in our presence, and managed to evoke the same attitudes in ourselves. Remove the emotional background to our value-terminology, remove all wish to communicate our attitudes to others, and I should say that all such terms lose their function entirely, and become idle impediments in the stream of language. It is true, of course, that we may acknowledge things to be worth-while or the contrary in some wholly cool and detached mood, much as we might acknowledge the dode-

cahedron to be the one regular solid with pentagonal sides. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and while this eating, in the case of geometrical objects, consist in processes of construction, comparison, superposition, reasoning from axioms and the like, which can be carried out in the same detached manner as our final judgment, the proof of a value-statement inevitably involves a stirring-up of some satisfaction or dissatisfaction in ourselves, without which we should be quite unable to give it either meaning or validity. We may, if we like, say that men come to *see* or *apprehend* or to *intuit* certain values—there is nothing reprehensible in such phrases—but we should only say so if we are willing to make the readiness to experience certain emotions "of the essence" of such processes. Without this willingness, we can only use such terms in a wholly empty and misleading manner.

But the modern conception of value-statements as expressive of emotion, has generally gone together with the view that *no* value-statement can be either justified or unjustified, that all are on a level, like the emotions behind them, and that we can only hope to alter other people's judgments of value by working *irrationally* on their sentiments and feelings. In such irrational evocation, it may indeed be possible at times to waken some desired attitude by calling attention to unnoticed aspects of fact. But all appeals to fact may prove utterly unavailing, and, in the last resort, emotional attitudes and their corresponding judgments, whether weakened or strengthened by suasion, must "fight it out" blindly in the soul of the individual. There can, however, be nothing further from the psychological realities and linguistic proprieties than the depressing notion we have just outlined. For human emotions are nothing if they aren't states in which we are *ready*, and *feel* ourselves ready, to respond in some more or less definite way, to some more or less definite sort of situation. They may involve bodily disturbances of different sorts, and their accompanying sensations, they may involve various barely describable trends of feeling, but we certainly shouldn't regard them as instances of this or that emotion, if they didn't seem to point to a certain style of action, in the face of a certain sort of presumed situation. As Titchener said, very paradoxically, in criticizing the Lange-James theory, the essence of an emotion lies in a *logical meaning*[1] which is put upon or carried by a certain bodily condition: the state or pose of our body signifies

[1] Many will doubtless be shocked by the "intellectualistic" suggestions of this phrase, but it is my view, which I cannot here defend, that however much "dynamism" we may admit in our actions, or in the *objects* of our experiences, we must still give a purely *cognitive* analysis of those experiences themselves. To *feel* an emotion is, in short, to *perceive* (whether clearly or marginally) that we are ready to behave in certain ways.

(for us and others) a certain policy of action or inaction, in the face of certain presumed circumstances. That Titchener thought such a meaning quite beyond the province of psychology, is nothing to the point. He showed that, without such a signified policy, or such presumed circumstances, there would be nothing to distinguish any given emotional disturbance from countless other disturbed states of mind and body. In anger we are plainly out to destroy some object that offends us and obstructs us, in fear we are plainly in retreat from something menacing and dangerous, in surprise we feel ourselves at a loss before something wholly unexpected, and so on in every other case one might care to analyse. Quite plainly we have only "picked out" certain emotional attitudes, and distinguished them in our language, on account of certain communities of policy in the face of certain presumed similarities of situation. And both policies and presumptions are part of what we normally *mean* in speaking of the emotions in question. Empirically, too, it is obvious that our various types of response are adjusted to the properties of objects, that they are strengthened by the discovery that an object really *has* some property, or weakened by the discovery that it really hasn't got it. And not only high-grade ethical and aesthetic emotions are subject to such "norms," but even the commonest stirring of envy, or the most disreputable attack of malice or disgust or sexual lust. Thus envy tends to vanish if we find that our envied person is really an inferior, malice if we find that one we hate is only a fellow-sufferer devoid of ill-will to ourselves, disgust if a seeming drop of spittle proves to be a rare jewel, and sexual interest if some seemingly artless, lovely young woman proves, on a closer scrutiny, to be a scheming, ageing and bedizened harlot. There are, of course, occasions where we go on responding in a certain manner regardless of the ascertained or ascertainable circumstances, but we mark our sense of the unusual character of these cases by speaking of them as "abnormal," "pathological" or "neurotic." Now it is doubtless thinkable that our impulsive responses might *all* have been of this unbiassed type, in which case what is now a pathological phenomenon would have been the human norm. Men might have been so made that they shrank from *anything* whether helpful or offensive, or were sexually moved by *any* object regardless of its shape or species or dimensions. In such a case we should have built up our language quite differently: names for impulsive responses would have signified only certain policies of action, and not a presumed set of properties in the objects of such policies. And philosophers with their talk of a boundless variability in the objects of our ethical and other emotions, have in fact adjusted their language to this wholly imaginary situation, instead of to the real emotions of actual human beings. We, however, prefer to adjust

our language to phenomena that actually exist, and so to include an orientation to a given type of object in the very meaning of our names for emotional attitudes. We shall, accordingly, speak in the manner of Brentano, who founded his "phenomena of love and hate" upon the more basic phenomena of judgment and idea. And all this implies that an emotional attitude can be justified or the reverse according as the assumptions it is built on prove true or otherwise.

We suggest, therefore, that, even if our statements of value are only expressions of emotions in ourselves, they may none the less express emotions which are justifiable or unjustifiable, and so themselves be fitly spoken of as (in a sense) justifiable or unjustifiable statements. They will be justified whenever the properties whose presence they presume are actually there, unjustifiable when this is not the case. And so when we sketch the character of a given emotional attitude, we must not be content to say what sort of *response* it inwardly represents, but also what sort of *object* it outwardly requires, whose presence would *justify* the emotion in question. And we must now try to do this in the difficult case of "logical demands" and "logical satisfactions." Now some would object, from the outset, to our whole enterprise, on the ground that there isn't necessarily any single standard reaction covered by each name for an emotional attitude, but that each stands for a vast "family" of quite different reactions, linked together by a large number of distinct affinities, and not truly exemplifying any single "common nature." And they would regard it as the typical philosophic, or Platonic error to imagine otherwise. And they would doubtless think such an error particularly heinous in the case of so vague and artificial an assemblage as the "logical emotions." We, however, see no way of dealing profitably with a vast host of disparate cases, except by ranging them under certain conceptual models,[1] rather more simple and "typical" than the majority of cases that we meet with, and then treating all such cases either as "normal" or as "undeveloped" or as "deviating" instances of this model. If this is Platonism, then such Platonism should be consciously cultivated. And if ordinary language is as deeply unplatonic as some modern thinkers suppose, then ordinary language stands in grave and constant need of philosophic correction.

What then shall we say is the policy pursued in our logical emotions, and what are the characteristics required in their objects? They are, very plainly, forms of "cherishing" or "valuing," of states where our policy is to keep objects in existence or to keep them in view, or, contrariwise, to banish them from existence, or from the range of our vision. This much may be simply taken over from

[1] In this idea I have been influenced (not perhaps in a way he would approve) by Stevenson's use of "working models" in *Ethics and Language*.

the very competent accounts of valuation put out by certain modern analysts. But we may say, further, that they are all forms of *impersonal valuation*, of states where we recommend objects both to ourselves at future times and to the world at large, and where we *claim* tacitly that the things valued by us will also attract us reliably in the future, and will prove attractive to all genuinely reflective and unbiassed persons. Plainly the valuations in question are the fine fruits of that sympathetic interaction of persons in a civilized society, which leads them to look on their own individuality as a trammel, and to desire nothing more passionately than to think and feel after a universal pattern.[1] And lest this whole desire should seem vain and chimerical, I shall emphasize at this point that there are laws governing human desires and satisfactions which ensure that there *must* be certain very general, higher order objects which will appeal reliably to all reflective persons. For men are creatures whose desires can lose their cruder urgency, and yet, mysteriously, retain an influence over action: we can plan meals when we aren't hungry, and marriages when we aren't sexually inflamed. And human passions, unlike metals, are extremely malleable in their cooler state: they can be bent and twisted in most various directions by whatever seems practicable or likely, and they can be welded and alloyed into most complex schemes and policies which yield us great and many-sided satisfaction. And men are also creatures who can throw themselves imaginatively into the situations of others, and who can then weld the interests of a group of persons into comprehensive plans and policies. All this is part of what one ought to mean by calling men "rational," and would scarcely be worth mentioning were it not now so constantly forgotten. And, for beings constituted as we are, there must *of necessity* be certain very general, formal objectives, which will appeal reliably and upon unbiassed reflection. We may not agree in our basic, first-order interests—though God knows we are similar enough in respect of these—but it is sheer tautology to maintain that we *must* agree in our unbiassed and reflective admiration of such higher-order abstractions as "integrated and successful living" (whether personal or social), or of "rare and difficult achievement" whether in art, knowledge, skill or practical life. The concrete content of the "good life" may be personal and private, but its form is necessary and universal: here as elsewhere it is merely nonsense to think men can vary in a limitless manner.

We shan't, however, spend more time upon this difficult theme of our impersonal valuations: we must say how the valuations called "logical" differ from *other* impersonal valuations. Here we have

[1] I am influenced here by the great, strangely neglected work of Adam Smith.

hardly any traditions to go on, since our field hasn't been worked over through the centuries like the fields of ethics and aesthetics. If we were trying to characterize our ethical emotions we might follow reputable traditions, and say they were feelings of approval or disapproval concerned with voluntary conduct, and with such conduct in so far as it bore upon the interests of persons, and might secure some adjustment or impartial equalization of such interests. And we might then go on to show how such an account made it understandable that we should react ethically to this or that line of conduct, or experience this or that obligation. And we might then also show how certain reactions, commonly called "ethical," which couldn't readily be squared with our account, could be treated either as undeveloped or distorted forms of ethical feeling. By so doing we might not only achieve a better *understanding* of our ethical reactions, but might also succeed in changing them into simpler and more rational forms. And we could likewise carry out the same sort of clarifying work in the case of our aesthetic feelings. For these might be fitly characterized, on lines following tradition, as states where we approve or disapprove the "sensuous look" of objects, and this to the extent that such a look "brings out," as tellingly and unconfusedly as possible, some surface form or character of objects, or some deeper notional meaning. And we might then show how our account covered the wide ranges of aesthetic appreciation, and how cases that it didn't readily cover could be classed either as rudimentary or perverted variants. But in the logical field we have nothing to go on, and must start our clarifying work from the beginning. We may therefore say, at a venture, that the emotions covered by the word "logical" are concerned with symbols and *symbolic structures*, and this to the extent that such symbols yield us *mastery* over the detail offered by the senses, and reconstituted in thought. And we may say, further, that they concern such symbols as yielding us another sort of mastery: that over all those minds who have access to the same empirical material, and can thereby share the same references. Plainly we have certain satisfactions *not* concerned with states of things, but with the *way* in which such states are spoken of or formulated. And there are some such satisfactions not concerned with any effect our words may have on people's conduct, nor with their telling expression of some single form or meaning, but solely with the *hold* they give us over all the dark masses of particularity, as well as over all those fellow minds who fish conceptually in the same dark waters. In calling such satisfactions "logical," we aren't deviating far from established usage, and we are gathering together, under one conceptual model, feelings connected with such diverse qualities as clearness, truth, coherence, adequacy, lack of empty verbiage, plausibility, simplicity

and the like. And the success of our characterization will lie in our ability to show that just these qualities (or some supplemented and amended list of them) must necessarily attract seekers after that linguistic mastery which is (for us) the essence of the "logical." To such a demonstration we address ourselves.

Our task will, however, be simplified, if we distinguish from the outset between *two* kinds of symbolic excellence, corresponding to the traditional distinction of the "form" and "matter" of our discourse. There are things which satisfy us in our formulations, which are, as it were, features of their manner alone, in the sense that it isn't important on *what* content that manner has been used. And there are other features in our ways of speaking which satisfy us on account of the content (whether directly or derivatively empirical) to which those ways of speaking are applied. Our speech may be said to have formal excellences, treated as a well-made instrument applicable to anything, but it also has material excellences, as an instrument adapted to the actual course and content of experience. To these formal and material excellences we now turn ourselves.

What then shall we pick out as the first and most important formal merit of speaking? We shall be recognizing a virtue much sought after in the traditional logic, as well as in its modern mathematical successors, if we make our first virtue "definiteness." A good form of speech must be one that never lands us in situations where we become lost in linguistic hesitation, or are torn between the impulses both to say and not to say something. For situations of hesitation and conflict are situations of linguistic impotence, and of inability to communicate our meaning to others. And if our attitude is approvingly oriented to linguistic mastery, we must necessarily dislike such situations. This need for definiteness underlies the traditional demand that we should try to offer *definitions* of all but the simplest terms in our language, an obligation that we can't always readily fulfil, since ordinary speech pursues only that degree of definiteness and mastery which is necessary for practical purposes. And this requirement also underlies that standard use of the term "not" which is embodied in our laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle. We so contrive our speech that we shall always have *something* definite to say, either that such and such is the case, or that it is *not* the case. And we so lay down the meaning of "not-such-and-such" that it precisely covers *every* possibility but the one covered by its positive counterpart, so that the same conflict felt between saying and not saying something, is now felt between saying something *together with* its negative. Obviously the ideal here indicated is one to which ordinary language only very distantly approximates. For there are countless situations where our ordinary speech

leaves us hesitant and torn between conflicting impulses, and must be helped out by arbitrary rulings. At what precise point in some fatal illness shall we say of a man that he is dying? And shall we say that dragons are or are not fire-breathing reptiles, in view of the fact that there aren't really any dragons? We may note at this point that our requirement of definiteness isn't bound up with that scheme of *bifurcated* possibility associated with our standard use of "not." We could speak with perfect definiteness, even if we used "p" and "not-p" of two non-exhaustive fields of possibility, and kept a third phrase for an intermediate set of cases, *provided* only that we were never in doubt as to *when* we should apply each of these ways of speaking. There is nothing logically sinful in that use of "not" which leads us to say, in a Scotch mist, that it is both raining and not raining, or even that it is neither raining nor not raining: sin only enters when the Scotch mist confuses us, and ties us up linguistically, so that we don't know clearly *what* we ought to say. And this, be it noted, is the genuine logical wickedness in the Hegelian dialectic, as well as in its Marxist derivatives. For there is no harm at all in saying of this conflict-ridden, often nebulous and changeable world, that it abounds in contradictions: this is, in fact, a very common sense of "contradiction." But the true evil enters when we abrogate the plain rules of speaking, without setting up new principles which will tell us what to say in given circumstances. And despite talk about the "cold march of necessity," or the rigorously "scientific" character of certain deductions and predictions, everyone knows that it is often nothing but the most arbitrary inspiration which decides the dialectical speaker what to say next. No game so played can yield us that linguistic mastery which we require both in theory and practice: hence the tragedy of a situation when populations are reared, and communities run on a logic so distorted. All this doesn't mean that definiteness is the only logical virtue, and that there aren't times when its unmeasured pursuit may not lead us into antinomies or profound falsifications. We shouldn't, for instance, try to speak too definitely of the shape, size or position of a stomach-ache, and *perhaps* similar reservations should be made in regard to the doings of electrons or the future actions of men. Nor should we question the aesthetic expressiveness of certain stammering and contradictious forms of speech: they may bring out the packed richness of certain experiences which defy precise formulation. And there is a long and legitimate tradition, from Heraclitus through Hegel to the modern existentialists, of men who have given us their "sense of life" in a poetic, rather than a logically proper manner. But, if we are to set store by such works, we should do so from a consciously non-logical point of view.

If definiteness is the primary formal virtue in our speaking, there are other virtues, none the less fundamental, connected with the simplification and the unification of our diction. The first has traditionally been called *economy*: the second may be spoken of as *harmony* or *coherence*. The first may be said to secure unity in speaking by eliminating the superfluous, the latter by ironing out the anomalous, and by filling in connecting or explanatory links. Both virtues are seen at their best in artificial symbolic languages. Plainly we shouldn't get the best use from our linguistic devices, if they offered us a large number of needless, unequated alternatives, and so were full of unconfessed redundancies. We should be led by such forms of speech into drawing distinctions between more sorts of situations, and more sorts of entities, than it is profitable to postulate, and hence also into many puzzling and unnecessary questions. And it is this requirement of economy which leads us to build up language-systems with the smallest number of "basic notions," or of basic axioms and rules of inference. And it underlies the whole movement to replace "inferred entities" by "logical constructions," which was started by Russell in the early years of this century. And it culminated in the *Tractatus* of Wittgenstein who wanted us to build up a language so free from deceptive alternatives that it would be physically impossible for us to express anything in it that was logically absurd.[1]

Beside this virtue of economy, we may range the sister virtues of coherent unity and harmony in speaking. Plainly we shall be working in the interests of communicability and increased linguistic mastery, if we bridge the gap between distinct ways of speaking by continuous transitions, or look on them as limiting cases of each other, or as special cases of more general forms of speaking. And plainly it will serve the interests of linguistic mastery and communicability, if the necessary principles postulated in our language are, as far as possible, inferrible from each other. This virtue of formal unity in speaking coincides largely with the virtue of economy, for we generally increase unity by eliminating the superfluous. But there are times when we increase unity by adding new and unfamiliar notions to our speech, or by complicating it with axioms and rules of inference which don't, at first, seem evident or natural. The obvious case of such complicating unification is the introduction of the "stroke" or "not-both" notion into modern mathematical logic, and the consequent condensation of several logical axioms into one axiomatic principle. And Popper's rules,[2] which do away with any need for axioms, are a more modern instance.

[1] Such at least is my interpretation of some of the proposals of this treatise, which have not been sufficiently examined by philosophers.

[2] See "New Foundations for Logic," *Mind*, 1947.

Having thus set apart the formal virtues of definiteness, economy and unity, we now turn to those excellences of speech which lie in its relation to the empirical material that it describes and anticipates, and without which it would be wholly vain and empty. We have said that the proper objects of our logical approval were ways of speaking that afforded us mastery over empirical material; it is therefore truistic if *one* of the basic virtues of symbolic combinations is said to lie in their *conformity* to the combinations actually met with in experience. And this conformity may assume several forms, according as we consider different types of symbolic combination, and different aspects of experience. From one point of view this demand for conformity is a demand for an adequate *richness* in our various linguistic tools and devices: we must have enough names, predicates, relational terms and so forth, so as never to feel that we are "leaving out something" in our discourse, simply passing over some discriminable feature or factor in experience. This demand inspires our various philosophical and non-philosophical attempts at "analysis": we don't want any aspects of the real to slip unregistered through our linguistic nets. But there are times when our ideal of conformity to experience doesn't seem to call for such enrichment of diction, but rather for an impoverishment, and for the deliberate refusal to say something we might otherwise be tempted to say. Thus in trying to do justice to the nebulous contours, qualities and dimensions of our sense-data, or the shadowy contents of our thoughts, we must refrain, purposely, from saying all those definite things that would be quite appropriate in other contexts. And this demand for conformity to experience appears also in the special store we set on statements that have actually been *verified* by empirical data, or, if not verified, then continuously *confirmed*, and never refuted by such data. If the goal of our speaking be linguistic mastery over the detail of experience, we shall obviously be drawing nearer to that goal, in proportion as our statements square with all that has, or will come before us in experience. It isn't possible, at this point, to consider the many interesting questions connected with what are called by the modern logician "degrees of confirmation," a topic very much to the fore in recent discussion.[1] But it is obvious that a statement will have greater conformity to empirical data (and hence afford us greater linguistic mastery) the *more* empirical data it conforms to, and the *more exactly* it anticipates their character. And it is also obvious that the logical value due to such conformity with experience, will be greater as confirming data come from widely separated fields, since mastery of any sort would be said to increase with the *range* of material mastered. We master experience in our

[1] See particularly the articles of C. G. Hempel in *Mind*, January and April 1945.

speaking, in proportion as we wipe out wider and wider ranges of the merely possible, and replace them with the actual and the definite. And the more widespread our data, the wider are the ranges that are thus wiped out. And positive data have a much higher confirmatory value than negative, since the ranges of possibility wiped out by the former indefinitely exceed the ranges ruled out by the latter. More possibilities of natural law are, for instance, ruled out by a single hoopoe with a crest, than by innumerable cases where there aren't any hoopoes and also no crests.

The logical value of conformity to experience may however be blended with the two previously mentioned virtues of economy and unity, which then become, not purely formal excellences of our speaking, but of that speaking as applied to empirical material. And here economy takes the special form of demanding that the modes of speech in our language (with the exception of such as have a purely formal function) should be anchored to the firm ground of experience, and should have no meaning but in terms of what we *have* experienced, or what we *might* experience in conceivable circumstances. It may be an innocent pastime to weave symbols together without troubling to attach them to empirical points of reference: quite possibly such uninterpreted combinations may one day find most fruitful applications and interpretations. But, as Kant pointed out, notions without intuitive filling are empty: they yield us no mastery over anything we are capable of dealing with. While their logical value isn't simply *nil*, since they may still exhibit economy, unity and other logical virtues, they are none the less lacking in a most essential respect. We may say of them what Augustine said of the virtues of the pagans, that they were only examples of splendid vice. Even wholly untutored speakers and listeners crave for "solid significance," and detest nothing more strongly than a diet of "hot air."

And if we turn from concepts to statements, we shall find the demand for economy developing into a recommendation to exclude from our talk, as empty and unprofitable, all statements (not purely formal and linguistic) which aren't either empirically verifiable or falsifiable, or which aren't even empirically confirmable or disconfirmable. When we affirm something, we must make its truth entail differences somewhere in the course and content of experience. Otherwise it is an empty utterance, yielding no intellectual mastery over anything. Now in the last decades this ideal of economy has led men to say that the meaning of a statement is its manner of verification, that it means no more than the sum of those tests that would prove it true, or render it probable. It is well that the vogue of this confusing formula is passing. For not only is it contrary to established usage to identify the circumscribed *meaning* of a sentence, with the

countless circumstances that bear upon its truth, but it also sins against a fundamental logical requirement, which we may, by anticipation, call the demand for explanatory simplicity. For it is our constant practice, in dealing with the bewildering multiplicity of what we do or may experience, to import into our talk certain simplified objects, clothed only in the barest selection of the properties of things around us, or conceived only on some dim analogy with them, and to say of such simplified objects that they *underlie* the data of experience, and that they form the *ground* of their variety. Thus the ordinary speaker always puts a "real table," much more simple and constant than its varied appearances, "beneath" such appearances, and also makes the former *responsible* for the latter. And men of science are but carrying this process several stages further, when they place their much more rarefied electric particles beneath the same appearances. And in the same way ordinary speakers and the older unsophisticated psychologists always put simple flashes of insight, throbs of feeling, strains and stresses of the will, described in all the natural metaphors of our introspective diction, beneath that bewildering array of grimaces, gestures, words and deeds through which such experiences *might* evince their presence. To see the simple outlines of the "real" under its complex manifestations, to make everything merely possible an adjunct of the actual, all this is, for our natural understanding, to explain, elucidate and render intelligible. And there is nothing contrary to a true empiricism in the introduction of such entities, which aren't identified with anything to which we have direct access, provided that we conceive them on a clear analogy with experienced things, and, more importantly, *that we establish two-way bridges of deducibility between them and experienced data.* Thus we can raise no valid objection to the underlying entities of physics, since they are characterized on a definite (if remote and hesitant) analogy with experienced objects, and since we can always make inferences as to their state or character *from* the data of experience, and, *vice versa,* from their state or character *to* the data of experience. Because we have built such two-way bridges of deducibility, we can connect the complex detail of experience by such simplifying entities. The same applies, despite sophistical objections, to the explanation of our outward actions by the thoughts, feelings and decisions of the introspective psychologist. In fact, if we weren't intimately acquainted with such inner states, we should have had to invent them, and should probably have spoken of them in much the same metaphorical, analogical manner that we now actually employ.[1] And if there were reliable,

[1] That introspective talk *is* analogical is argued in my article "Recommendations regarding the Language of Introspection," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* December 1948.

two-way bridges of deducibility between either the monads of Leibniz, or the entelechies of Driesch, and actual data in experience, then it would be as unobjectionable and as unmetaphysical to introduce them into our talk as to make use of mental states or atoms. For it isn't the unobservability of such entities which renders them suspect, but only their uselessness from an explanatory point of view.[1]

It is, however, nothing but a very short-sighted passion for economy which has led to the modern *identification* of an underlying, explanatory entity with the outward signs of its presence. This is an act which brings the whole edifice of reason down in ruins. For it bids us build up a new way of speaking of a ramifying complexity[2] that would tax the capacities of a demigod, and which could never be more than a hollow programme for men. And it also leaves the vast array of our possible experiences hanging loose and unsupported in the air, with no simplifying tie to bind them, and no actual basis to explain their possibility. To turn talk about Cleopatra's nose into an infinite set of unintelligibly complex statements about what *might* have been observed, in circumstances requiring a formulation quite as complex, and as little intelligible, might be a diverting exercise for an unemployed archangel, but even he could derive from it none of that linguistic mastery which underlies our logical values. But though one may deplore these economical excesses, one must respect the ideal that they stand for, and recognize the abiding value of economy. And we should practise a most rigorous austerity in regard to all those underlying entities which can't be given a definite character, and are not linked by two-way bridges of deducibility with the data of experience. *Some* of the references called "metaphysical" need ruthless pruning, even if others are legitimate and indispensable.

We now turn from economy in relation to empirical material, to the cognate virtue of harmony and unity in relation to the same material. And here we are faced by so many logical duties and values, that we shall have to content ourselves with a very brief enumeration. Most of them are beautifully set out in Kant's appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. Plainly we want, in speaking, to subsume as many empirical predicates as possible, under more general predicates, for clearly our linguistic mastery will be augmented thereby. And we proceed regularly *as if* such general predicates were there to

[1] To take an illustration from chess, we might successfully turn what seemed a very anomalous game of chess into one that was perfectly orthodox, by postulating the presence of several invisible pawns, bishops, etc., which the players were moving "in their heads" (since the actual pieces had been lost).

[2] For this see Price: *Hume's Theory of the External World*, Chapter V.

find, for only by proceeding in this manner should we discover them if they were actually there. And we desire also, in our speaking, to connect the things spoken of by as many relationships as possible, and by such relationships, in particular, as *arrange* those things in orderly dimensions. We want everything to be "placed" in regard to everything else, and to be *reachable* from other things along continuous routes or transitions. The perfect instance of this sort of arrangement is the little appreciated order of time and space, as well as the order of transmitted causal influence which depends on this. And it is only since we speak in terms of such an order, that we can put the things we speak of in a single world or cosmos. But we must emphasize strongly at this point that our only justification for speaking in terms of such an order is the logical value that it embodies. Time and space are doubtless realities, but as such they are not fully present in our fragmentary experiences: they are in fact "nothing to us," and can never yield a reason for our saying anything whatever. But we must try to place the things we speak of in a single time and space order because, only if this is possible, can we achieve the needed measure of symbolic, cogitative mastery over experience and its detail. We speak of unbroken spatio-temporal transitions between the disjointed shows of our actual experience, and of continuous influences bridging such transitions, because, only if our data fit this verbal framework, can they be dealt with in a logically tolerable manner.

This quest for unity and connection is exemplified, also, in the way in which we *interpolate* and *extrapolate*, processes seen at their highest level of abstraction in the formal arguments of analogy and induction. We fill in gaps in experience, as well as all the unknown territories beyond experience, with whatever fits most smoothly on to data previously experienced, so as to yield the largest possible measure of linguistic mastery and of logical value. And here we may glance briefly at the historical puzzle of induction, which arises obstinately when men crave that assurance which they can only have from actually *seeing* things, in situations where their best available assurance is one resting on a logical value. For we can have no other reason for saying that what we *don't* see, will none the less follow on the lines of what we *do* see, than that it is logically proper to do so. For clearly we shall never achieve any verbal mastery over experience, if we prepare ourselves carefully for a situation in which such mastery will be totally impossible. Our obligation, in this regard, can probably be treated as a simple case of courage: here, as elsewhere, we should never enfeeble ourselves (except in spells of philosophic play) with desperate, paralysing and defeatist talk. No doubt nature will reward this "faith," if "faith" it is proper to call it: we may even say we *know* that she will do so. But here as else-

where we can give no other reason for our confidence but its logical propriety. There is, of course, no novelty in these contentions. We are merely saying rather frankly and proudly what is often said ashamedly, and as some desperate last resort. And we may add further that it is high time that the whole foundations of the theory of probability, whether in its abstract mathematical or more concrete branches, were removed from the incompetent hands of exaggeratedly empiricist philosophers, and given a firm basis in our logical values. There is much in the theory of J. M. Keynes, with its stress on "rational belief," that would fit in well with such an enterprise: not so all the writings of his critics and successors.

We have, for our purpose, picked out enough of the formal and material excellences in our speaking, and have linked them with that goal of linguistic mastery which is (for us) the end of speaking. We must, however, utter a warning at this point against one general misinterpretation of all that we have said. It might be imagined that our approach was, in some manner, covertly subjective or idealistic, that we were doing no more than recommend certain convenient postulates or *façons de parler*, without seriously claiming that "the Real" will conform to them. Against such an interpretation we must set our face. For to speak in a certain manner, and at the same time call it nothing but a mere postulate, or a mere *façon de parler*, is to take away with one hand what one grants with another. We haven't made the slightest suggestion that there may not be the most complete conformity between the "real nature of things" and our logical values: we have only said that our reason for speaking in a certain manner must necessarily be a logical value. We say what we say because it is clear, definite, economical, harmonious, and conformable to experience, and not because it corresponds with reality, which isn't, in any case, known to us completely, and isn't, thus far, anything to us at all. But when we speak carefully, and with due regard to our logical obligations, we may *also* say that we are approaching steadily to conformity with reality, if for no other reason than that it would be extremely silly to call anything "reality," and make it our ideal to conform to it, if we didn't (in addition to making it independent, "mind-transcendent" and what not) also make it *approachable* in our speaking. Reality *must*, in fact, fall in with our formal logical requirements, since they, being formal, impose no limitations on its content, and it also *will*, in fact, fulfil our various more material requirements. Nor do we need a better "justification" of this latter statement beyond the humble tautology that a world of which we can intelligibly speak, must necessarily fulfil the conditions of intelligible speaking. There is therefore no discrepancy between the most sincere realism and an approach through logical values.

It might now be profitable, if we had the time, to pass on to applications of our logical values, whether in the formal fields of mathematics or logistic, or in the various empirical sciences. This has, however, been, for years, the best cultivated portion of the logical field, and so we shall devote what time remains to us to the more neglected case of metaphysical speaking. Here is a field subject, in recent times, to much wilful misunderstanding, and it is also one that offers very great difficulties for a general characterization. We can't, unfortunately, work up to an argued characterization through accounts and instances, and so must say, at a hazard, that metaphysical speaking is a kind of talk where we endeavour to adjust our language to our logical values with a degree of thoroughness and passion which is never met with at the ordinary level, or even at the scientific level of speaking. The metaphysician is a man pursuing economy, systematic simplicity, conformity to experience and the other logical values, with far more devotion and consistency than an ordinary speaker thinks necessary or possible. And we must now try to show *how* he pursues these values in a few special cases.

We may say, in the first place, that metaphysics strives after conformity to experience in a much more sweeping, penetrating manner than is ever attempted in the market-place or in the laboratory. This is often denied, but is none the less the case. For the metaphysician doesn't merely apply established ways of speaking to new ranges of material: he will never merely tell us that a fountain-pen needs filling, that the barometer is rising, or that someone looks disgruntled. He attempts rather to *modify* our diction in various queer and searching ways, so as to bring out new aspects in familiar material, or to emphasize alignments and affinities that have so far passed unnoticed. No more than a great creative artist can represent nature in some merely hidebound and conventional manner, but must of necessity import his own style and emphasis into everything he depicts, so little can the metaphysician achieve conformity to experience in the blunted phrases that we ordinarily use. He will say of science that it is nothing but a series of plausible guesses, or that it rests on nothing but faith, thereby bringing out the analogy between a procedure which rests solely on a logical value, and one that has no foundation whatever. And he will say, with Heraclitus, that one can't step twice into the same river, thereby bringing out the close analogy between states of change where identity is said to be preserved, and states where we deny that there is any enduring identity. Or he will say, with Whitehead, that Cleopatra's needle is nothing but a stream of happenings, in which certain patterns are maintained, thereby bringing out the almost negligible difference between being and becoming. In such cases, he is altering language in what seems an arbitrary and paradoxical manner, but he is really

*adjusting* it to the richness of experience, so as to throw light on sides that have previously lain in shadow. And such procedures are as sober and empirical, in their own peculiar way, as any of the bald reports we ordinarily reckon as informative. And we may note further, that, although the metaphysical glove may often fit the empirical hand somewhat loosely, yet it nearly always does try to fit it: it isn't ever without some vague prospective reference to the detail of experience. And, for this reason, every metaphysical account is always undergoing slight confirmations or disconfirmations by everything that happens. Thus when Hegel said that everything in our world was but a stage in the development of "Spirit," or when Bosanquet called our world the "vale of soul-making," they were both certainly implying some general trend or drift in things towards wiser, kindlier arrangements: their views will accordingly be faintly confirmed by a meeting of friends, or weakened by a bicycle accident. And we are certainly more willing to accept their theories in the former kind of situation than in the latter. And though Bosanquet went a little far in saying that it should be impossible, on his system, for a town with the spiritual significance of London to be ruined by an earthquake, it is none the less clear that there is always some *general* relevance of a philosophical theory to the course and content of experience. The *long-run* expectations of monists, pluralists, atheists, theists, spiritualists, materialists, determinists, indeterminists, and so forth, are certainly different, and it is wilful myopia to ignore this fact.

And if conformity to experience is among the goals of metaphysical speaking, it is even more obvious that this form of speaking will pursue such goals as definiteness, economy and unity. We may illustrate the metaphysical pursuit of definiteness by the philosophic treatment of that vague, disturbing phrase "in the mind." For we are quite notoriously unsure, in many cases, whether to say or not to say of something—whether imaginary, abstract, dispositional or the like—that it is present "in our minds," and we experience very powerful impulses both to say and not to say such things. This is a situation that the ordinary speaker finds tolerable, while it is wholly intolerable to the philosophic lover of the definite. And our philosophic pursuit of unity may, at the same time, be illustrated by that idealistic form of speech in which *everything*, whether real or imaginary, concrete or abstract, is located "in the mind," or that equally extreme realism in which all these entities are given the most utter independence of our minds and their states. And a similar example, both of the pursuit of definiteness and unity, would be our philosophic unease with all the vague, anomalous talk about the *present*—for we say indifferently that this hour, this minute or this century are present—together with the attempts to remedy this anomaly by

saying, with one long tradition, that the "true present" is without length, or, following a less popular and more mystical route, and saying it embraces *all* the past and *all* the future. And if one wants instances of *economy* in philosophic speaking one has only to think of how Aristotle criticized the forms of Plato, or how the Renaissance criticized "occult qualities," or how some modern philosophers have criticized cruder formulations of the Freudian psychology. Metaphysicians have, in fact, throughout their history always been doing that simplifying and "debunking" work which is now thought to be the peculiar prerogative of the anti-metaphysician.

In all this philosophic pursuit of the best way of speaking, it may at time happen that *some* logical values are sacrificed to others, and this so completely as to lead to very warped and strange accounts of things. It may happen, in particular, that no place is left in some system for conformity to experience, as in that long, weird, interesting tradition which began with the Eleatics and ended with McTaggart and Bradley. And very often the one-sided pursuit of certain logical values and neglect of others, has led philosophers into much greater nonsense and confusion than are ever found in ordinary language. Only too often has the last state of a philosopher been worse than his first. Hence has arisen, both in ancient and in modern times, that deep *misology*, spoken of by Plato in the *Phaedo*, which makes men turn disgustedly from all philosophic enquiries. And this misology has, in recent years, taken the special form of looking on philosophy as a sort of a pathology of diction, which arises out of the misunderstanding or abuse of ordinary language. And it has been held that the only cure for our philosophic *aporia* lies in seeing all the deep-seated and unconscious confusions from which it arises, after which we can return tranquilly to our ordinary forms of speech. There can be little doubt that this modern misology has had a regrettable influence, even though its author was responsible, also, for some of the most profound and positive appraisals of the task of philosophy. There is, of course, much that is rotten in philosophy, as in all human products and achievements. But it is not the case that the difficulties of philosophy cannot be philosophically removed, nor is it the case that we cannot build up systems of philosophy which at once conform penetratingly to experience, as well as satisfying other logical demands. There is undoubtedly much soundness in some of the traditional systems, and there is no reason why we, with our modest and more conscious ideals, should not even be sounder. And we may note, at this point, that it would in no sense be a genuine reproach to philosophy if there weren't any single, absolutely *right* account of things, but rather a large number of alternative accounts, of varying excellence, which illuminate the "facts" from different angles. For where usage is settled, and we have only

to apply it to empirical material, it is impossible to talk very *differently* without also talking contradictorily. But where usage is unsettled and creative, as it always is and must be in philosophy, there are far fewer cases of such gross incompatibility. We should, perhaps, no more regret that things can be spoken of metaphysically in a large number of distinct manners, than that things can be painted in a large number of distinct styles, or life lived in a large number of distinct but excellent ways. All this does not mean, however, that all metaphysical schemes of speaking are merely on a level, and that there aren't some most decisively superior to others, as well as some of such tried soundness that it would be folly to reject them entirely. And I myself would place a certain moderate realism, which does full justice both to ponderables and imponderables, in the latter category. However that may be, a wildly metaphysical way of speaking may still be preferable, logically, to our ordinary accounts of things. For ordinary language is the breeding-ground of every metaphysical system: it is only innocuous because it holds them *all* in germ, in which state they may cancel out each other's defects, but do not develop any of their compensating excellences. And it is clear, finally, that to live and talk without philosophic examination is a mode of life not "liveable by a human being": it is much better, plainly, to be Socrates dissatisfied and confused than the ordinary speaker competent and satisfied.

We have now finished our survey of the field of logical values. We have tried to show that, although valuations in the logical sphere are emotional preferences, they are none the less not at all lacking in objectivity or validity. For all human emotions are essentially oriented to definite states of things, and will be justified or the reverse according as those states are actual or otherwise. And all our rational and social emotions, which arise out of the reflective integration of our own and other people's interests, must, of necessity, have certain long-term, higher order objectives, which all men must seek, and which philosophers must try to illuminate and develop. However little they may care to be either censors or mentors, philosophers are under a plain obligation to teach themselves and others how to act and feel and speak.

# MORAL INTUITIONS

The Very Rev. the Rt. Hon. Professor R. CORKEY, D.Phil.

In all ethical discussion there is an implicit assumption that in our everyday experience we are often able to recognize, as if by direct perception, that the situation confronting us is indubitably bad or unquestionably good in an ethical sense. If, *e.g.*, on a bright afternoon we meet a capable Scout leader with a troop of healthy-minded boys on a hiking expedition through a beautiful district, sharing with one another as they go botanical information, and all obviously happy together, we know without question that the situation, as we see it, is good. We are as certain about that fact as we are that the sun is shining and the grass green. If, however, on another occasion we witness an act of wanton cruelty perpetrated on a small boy by a bully, we immediately and indubitably see that the situation presented to us is bad. Here again we are as certain of the ethical character of what we see as we are of the fact that two people are involved in the mischief. It would be superfluous to quote illustrations to show that moral philosophers, in seeking to establish their conclusions, invariably rely on their judgment regarding the ethical character of situations such as these, the ethical character of which is so perspicuous that, to deny it would be, in Bishop Butler's phrase, "too glaring a falsity to need being confuted."

The physical facts of any such situation are revealed to us by our natural senses. Its ethical nature we recognize by that capacity of reason we call conscience. There are intuitional elements in both types of perception, but it is only with those that emerge in ethical perception that I am here concerned. By intuition I mean the immediate and direct knowledge we have of certain ultimate truths about things, and the direct and immediate apprehension we have of certain so-called "tertiary qualities" in things, the knowledge of which is not revealed to us by sense perception, but which our reason recognizes, as it were by an inner eye, with an immediacy and directness comparable to that of sense perception, or to the immediate knowledge we have of our own inner states of feeling. We know by the sight of our eyes that "a primrose by a river's brim" is yellow, but we know by intuition that the same primrose cannot be both yellow and not-yellow. It is also by the inner light of our minds that we know, if at all, that the primrose is an object of beauty.

The many theories advanced about the way in which conscience operates, and, in particular, the recent differences of opinion amongst philosophers regarding the nature of our intuitive moral convictions,

might well suggest to us that ethical perception is not such a straightforward, photographic process as it seems to be. It will help to clarify my account of the facts if I begin by pointing out that in two respects there is a close analogy between sense perception and ethical perception.

(*a*) In all sense perception a subjective mechanism is involved. The accuracy of the information conveyed to us in such perception depends to some extent on the efficacy of the mechanism involved. We are able, *e.g.*, to see the colour of objects in virtue of certain physiological changes initiated in our optic nerves by appropriate stimuli. By means of a complicated mechanism of vision these physical reactions to stimuli are transmitted to the brain where, in some mysterious way, they evoke in our minds an apprehension, not of waves in the ether or of chemical changes in the nerves, but of the colour of the objects around us. People, however, who suffer from "red-green colour blindness" cannot see some of these colours accurately. Their subjective mechanism of vision is defective.

A further fact, of some significance for the purpose of this inquiry, is that in some forms of sense perception—*e.g.*, in the perception of such qualities as moist and dry, hot and cold, hard and soft, rough and smooth—distinctive sensations are evoked, and are localized in the organ of sense itself; and these distinctive sensations become in turn part of the subjective mechanism whereby the objective qualities in question are recognized. If for any reason a person is incapable of having these subjective sensations aroused, he is thereby rendered unable to recognize the objective qualities which these sensations, in conjunction with requisite physiological reactions, reveal. His subjective mechanism is defective.

Similarly, as we shall see, there is involved in moral perception an analogous subjective mechanism, the efficacy of which, like that of the organs of sense, we cannot fully understand. Nevertheless, in simple and uncomplicated situations we accept, and are justified in accepting, the testimony of our conscience regarding the ethical character of these situations with an assurance equal to that which we place on the sight of our eyes.

(*b*) In another respect there is an analogy between sense perception and ethical perception. We establish particular laws of nature by observing particular events. There is always, however, more involved in such observations than meets the eye at a first glance. By noting the figures on a thermometer, *e.g.*, we learn that at sea-level water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit. But the testimony of our eyes would give us no such general information about the boiling point of water were it not for the fact that in our experiments we implicitly take it for granted that the same set of circumstances will

always bring about the same effects. In ethical perception we similarly and invariably take for granted the truth of certain ultimate ethical and moral principles; *e.g.*, that, when we have to choose between various alternatives of different worth, the greater good ought always to be chosen in preference to the lesser. It is with these ultimate implications of our ethical and moral thought and conduct that I am primarily concerned in this article.

It appears to me that we cannot satisfactorily interpret our assured ethical and moral judgments unless we recognize four distinguishable elements in our moral experience, the reality and value of which we recognize by intuition.

(*A*) There are certain qualities of experience which possess ultimate, intrinsic, ethical value, the intrinsic worth of which we recognize by intuition; and there are certain other qualities which correspondingly we recognize as possessing ultimate, intrinsic, ethical disvalue.

(*B*) We are conscious of a unique sense of moral obligation—a sense of ought—associated with these types of experience, but distinguishable from them. The authority of this "ought" we recognize by intuition.

(*C*) There is a worth in human personality in virtue of its ethical and moral potentialities, a worth distinguishable from whatever actual character, good or bad, a person may have achieved as the result of experience. This hidden worth we recognize by intuition.

(*D*) There are two supreme general moral principles, the absolute authority of which we recognize by intuition. These, following the terminology of Sidgwick, we may call, "The Principle of Rational Benevolence," or Good will, and "The Principle of Justice."

### (*A*) The Ultimate Intrinsic Ethical Values

It appears to me beyond question that certain qualities of conscious experience confer ethical value upon those who have them, and, indirectly, confer a similar value on the situation, thought of as a whole, within which they occur. I use the term "ethical" advisedly here, as distinct from the term "moral," which should, I think, be reserved to describe a special type of value.

When we consider our reaction to the happy hiking expedition, which I used earlier as an illustration of a situation which we immediately recognize to be ethically good, it is plain to me that the situation makes this favourable appeal to our conscience on various grounds. These "grounds of its appeal," if I may use the phrase, are all ultimately types of experience, which our analytic minds have detected, or surmised to exist, in the minds and hearts of the members of the troop encountered. In the scene, as it presented itself to

us, we recognize the presence of *happiness*. We discern also intelligence—a competent *knowledge of the truth* about things—and, in particular, a desire for a fuller acquaintance with the *beauties of nature*. In addition, we sense the presence of *good will* in the wise and benevolent spirit of the leader, and, indeed, in the happy fellowship of the whole group. These four qualities of experience are, in my opinion, the values which lend *ethical* worth to the characters of people, and indirectly to the situations, or conditions of life, in which these people are found. Good will, however, lends an additional distinctive moral worth to people who have it.

We shall reach analogous conclusions if we examine the judgment we spontaneously make when confronted with an act of obviously wanton cruelty. We discern in the situation unnecessary pain and cruelty of will, and we intuitively recognize both of these qualities of experience to be intrinsically bad. When we consider them in and by themselves we invariably think they ought not to be. When we do approve of their presence in any situation, it is not because we think them good in themselves but because we believe that, in the circumstances, they will be "atoned for" by their serving as means to some adequate counter-balancing good. This is by hypothesis not so in the case of wanton cruelty we are considering.

Several observations are called for in justification of this first fact in my interpretation of our moral experience.

(1) These four "good" qualities of experience are, in my opinion, *intrinsically good* because any of these qualities, when it emerges in a human situation hitherto devoid of it, invariably and solely by its presence, improves the ethical character of that situation considered as an organic whole, other things remaining equal; and because, in addition, the ethical character of any such situation varies in proportion to the extent or intensity of this quality, other things remaining equal. No normally minded observer, who had given thought to the matter, would, in my opinion, deny that if, in the course of the hiking expedition referred to, the spirit of happiness, *e.g.*, were to emerge, and were to dominate increasingly the minds of more and more of the boys in the party, the situation would become better and better in an ethical sense, other things remaining equal.

Since the publication of Moore's *Principia Ethica* there have been few moral philosophers who would deny that intrinsic ethical value can on similar rounds be affirmed of the other three qualities of experience I have named as possessing it.

I have not been convinced by the arguments of Sir David Ross that fidelity to promises is an ultimate intrinsic value. If it were so, it would seem to me to follow that we ought, other things being equal, to make as many promises as possible, since we would thus have increased opportunities for manifesting fidelity, and increasing

our contribution to the greatest possible good. But to me it does not seem reasonable to make promises merely because it is (generally) meritorious to keep them. We make promises for other ulterior reasons, and, unless in very exceptional circumstances, we keep them for similar reasons. The four qualities of experience I have grouped together as ultimate, intrinsic, ethical values are intrinsic in their nature because they possess ethical worth in themselves, and confer such worth by their very presence, and apart from any other ulterior results.

(2) These qualities of happiness, knowledge of the truth, appreciation of the beautiful, and good will are *ultimate* intrinsic ethical values, because, when we scrutinize them, we can discover no other component factor common to them all in virtue of which they are good. There are a multitude of intrinsic values whose worth is not ultimate in this sense. They owe their value to the presence in them of some more ultimate component value. Any situation, real or ideal, which we recognize to be "good on the whole," even though not "wholly good," has intrinsic value, but it owes its worth to the dominance within it of its component value-factors. Similarly, emotions are ethically good or bad according to whether they are pleasant or painful, or are fraught with good will or ill will.

(*c*) The qualities we call virtues, again, are such because of an element of good will latent in them. Alleged wisdom, *e.g.*, that was purely malicious in its aims, would not be worthy of the name.

(3) Some writers reject the view that pleasure is an ultimate intrinsic ethical value. They do so on the ground that the pleasures of malice seem to be intrinsically evil, and to be increasingly evil in proportion to their pleasantness. Others, however, do not regard this as an accurate account of the facts (V. Ewing, *Definitions of Good*, p. 163). That also is the opinion of the present writer.

The impression that the element of pleasure in a malicious mind is intrinsically evil arises, I believe, from the difficulty we have in separating in imagination this element of pleasure from the element of ill will, which is also present, and present in a high degree as evinced by the pleasure. When, however, we envisage a situation in which we are able in some measure to distinguish the pleasure from the ill will and its evil results, we are able to see that it is these latter elements that contaminate the situation and not the pleasure in itself. Suppose a malicious individual were absolutely incorrigible and incapable of being further confirmed in his evil ways by any pleasure he may find in them. Suppose further that the range of his activities were so limited that he could injure no one. In that case, it would seem to me to be the humane duty of other good people to allow this wretched creature to derive what joy he could from his impotent spasms of spite! Here the presence of the pleasure of

malice does not seem to worsen the situation. It rather tends to make a bad situation a little less bad.

At the same time, I should add that I think it is desirable, as a rule, when referring to pleasure as an intrinsic value, to use the phrase "innocent pleasure," so as to call attention to the fact that the value of some pleasures is small compared with the heinousness of any ill will that may accompany them, or with the misery that their pursuit may entail.

(4) Some philosophers put forward the views that beauty in objects can exist by itself, whether there is anyone to appreciate it or not, and also that, as so existing, this unrecognized beauty has ethical value (V. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, and Prof. Laird, *A Study in Moral Theory*, p. 100). I am not concerned here with the doctrine that beauty in things can exist by itself; but assuming it for the moment to be true, it seems to me that such beauty existing unobserved could have no ethical significance. Aesthetic qualities it might possibly have, but it could only have ethical worth in so far as it entered into someone's conscious experience. My ground for this opinion lies in the fact that such isolated objects of beauty, when thought of as possible objects of creation by us, evoke no sense of obligation in us whatever. Suppose it were in one's power to have beautiful gramophone music broadcast on a barren, uninhabited island, would the dissemination of such futile music to the rocks and trees and stones be better than the creation of nothing at all? Ethically I can see no difference. Beautiful things add to the ethical worth of a situation only in so far as they add to the worth of people's experience.

(5) It is often suggested that religious faith, when it is ethical and theistic, ought to be regarded as an ultimate intrinsic value, on a par with those I have mentioned. It seems to me, however, that the chief value of such faith lies, not in any new type of value-experience, or "numinous feeling," but in the additional significance it gives to the values, aims and ideals that men already accept on the ground of their moral intuitions, and in the additional vindication it affords for *the pursuit* of these ideals. In the light of such a faith these ideals and values can be thought of as part of an infinite and abiding purpose, in the triumph of which we all may share.

(6) Instrumental values have ethical worth just in so far as they are means to the realization of intrinsic values. It is important, however, to point out that there are some instrumental values which though ethically neutral in themselves, are essential to the existence of situations in which any intrinsic values can exist. Life, and consciousness, *e.g.*, are factors of this character. In our social ideals there are many such essential constitutive factors, whose necessity arises, not from their own intrinsic value, but from the factual

characteristics of human nature. Amongst such social principles I would give a high place to: (*a*) democratic freedom, and (*b*) to the rule of just law, so as to prevent the misuse of freedom by passionate or unprincipled men.

In the light of all these facts I am satisfied that our moral thought is based on the assumption that there are certain qualities of experience which we recognize by intuition to possess ultimate, intrinsic, ethical worth.

### (*B*) The Moral "Ought" and its Authority

So far I have generally spoken of our knowledge of ethical values as if it were a purely intellectual apprehension of a hidden, non-natural quality in some kinds of conscious experience; an apprehension comparable in all respects to our intuitive knowledge of the fact of entailment in a logical argument. That, however, is not an adequate account of the matter. The recognition of an intrinsic ethical value is invariably accompanied by a unique sense of moral obligation, either *prima facie*, or categorical; provided, of course, that we are normal, rational beings, and not morally myopic. (The criterion of a "normal, rational mind" is, in principle, the same whether we have in mind sense perception or ethical preception.) The moral obligation thus laid upon us we recognize by intuition.

This sense of obligation is, in my opinion, a fundamental fact in all moral experience, and an ultimate conception in ethics. At the moment no phase of the subject stands in greater need of clarity of thought and expression. I shall try to state my views about it as succinctly as I can.

(1) When the nerves on the surface of our hands are stimulated by the heat of the fire, we invariably and involuntarily become aware not merely of these subjective sensations. We also, and just as directly, are made aware of an objective quality of the fire. We recognize its heat, provided, of course, that our nervous and mental apparatus is normal and efficient for the perception of the qualities of hot and cold. In an analogous fashion, when we perceive, either in actuality or as an element in an envisaged ideal, any of the four types of experience possessing ultimate, intrinsic ethical value, there is invariably and involuntarily evoked in our minds a unique sense of moral obligation, a sense of "ought," and in virtue of this sense of ought, we obtain an immediate and direct apprehension of a "non-natural" quality of ethical value, provided, again, that our psychological mechanism is efficient for the perception of such things. We do not, as is generally supposed, first perceive intuitively the intrinsic ethical value in these value-experiences, and then in consequence have evoked in us a sense of moral obligation. On the

contrary, this sense of moral obligation awakened in us by our perception of a value-bearing type of experience is itself the mechanism, or, more accurately, an indispensable part of the mechanism, whereby there is revealed to us the "non-natural" quality we call its ethical value, Our sense of "ought" does not create, or infer, or project the value. It immediately and directly *reveals* it.

(2) This involuntary sense of obligation may, in the first instance, be hesitating in its demand, or, in Ross's phrase, "prima facie" obligation. In virtue of our rational and moral nature, however, this *prima facie* obligation may become a categorical obligation, *when considered by us in the light of the facts of the situation* as we see it. This difference in the character of the demand, after reflection, is due partly to the fact that our minds in weighing an obligation take into account not merely the ethical values, actual and potential, that have become apparent to us, but also the factual circumstances that may make it possible, or perhaps impossible, for us to actualize these values. The difference is also due in part to the fact that our minds in reflecting on an apparent obligation, are always influenced by our sense of the authority of certain moral principles, *e.g.*, that the greater good ought to be preferred to the lesser. It is by such a process of reflection, in response to the involuntary sense of obligation aroused in us by our apprehension of certain kinds of experience, that we arrive at a knowledge of our *duty*; and the obligation felt towards our duty is "categorical." We may, of course, disregard its command, but that is another matter.

(3) The specific character of our *duty* thus depends to some extent on circumstances. For example, if the value-bearing experience that has awakened our sense of obligation is already actually in existence it obviously cannot be re-actualized, and the "appropriate" response is recognized to be an attitude of moral approval. Such approval is neither a mere emotion nor an act of mere intellectual assent. It is the adoption by us of a *distinctive* pro-attitude, an attitude demanded by our sense of "ought."

Again, if the situation is such that its dominant values could be realized by several possible, but mutually incompatible, lines of action, it may be our duty either to defer action in the meantime, or to choose one of the possible alternatives in the hope that it may prove to be the best. "Il faut parier." If, however, we recognize on reflection that the potential values in the situation could be realized by us without any appreciable sacrifice on our part, or on the part of anyone else, we hear the call of duty. We recognize a categorical imperative.

(4) The difficulty in the alternative doctrine (that we first apprehend a "non-natural ethical quality" in these experiences and in consequence recognize an obligation) is that it can give no adequate

account of this "non-natural" quality that is common to all these four types of experience, and that is present in all situations where any of them is recognized. These experiences must have some positive, distinctive, recognizable, ethical characteristic in common. What is this?

(*a*) It may be argued that these experiences possess value because they are congruous with our ethical ideals, and our ethical ideals, in turn, are valid in so far as they are coherent. "To be good," says H. J. Paton, "is to will coherently." This doctrine is reminiscent of Kant's theory that the only good is the good will, and for reasons that apply in both cases, it must be regarded as inadequate. Since we are rational beings our ideals certainly cannot be regarded as sound if they are not coherent, or self-consistent. But our ideals derive their validity not merely from the fact that they are coherent but because they display in the fullest practicable measure certain qualities of experience which we assume to be good in themselves, and which we think people ought to have. Similarly, since we are rational, any specific aim which a man feels to be a duty must be consistent with any wider ideal of life that he already accepts. But here again, both the end imposed on him as a duty and the wider ideal, create obligations because in both there are certain qualities of experience which he intuitively recognizes to be good in themselves. A man's duty is thus linked with his moral ideal by a two-fold "ought," the "ought" of logical entailment—they must be consistent; and the moral "ought"—they must possess ethical value. It is the presence of this two-fold ought that lends plausibility to the coherence theory of value. Our ideals derive their value from value-experiences that are good in themselves, not *vice versa*.

(*b*) A more satisfactory account of the "non-natural" ethical quality, common to some types of experience, is put forward by W. R. Sorley. He sums up his discussion of the meaning of value by stating that, "Value always implies a claim upon, or postulate of, existence" (*Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 79). The ought, on this assumption, derives its significance, not from a relation between the ultimate value-experiences and our ideals, but from a unique relationship between these value-experiences and the world of actuality. They are experiences which in their own right "ought to be." They make a claim upon existence. A. E. Taylor concludes an examination of the matter in the same vein. After indicating that it is unsatisfactory to describe ethical value as merely "a quality" of something else, he goes on to say, "The only alternative way of expressing all that I mean when I call a thing good, I believe, is to say that the thing in question is what it ought to be . . ."(*Philosophical Studies*, p. 405).

This doctrine, however, while it is a vital part of the truth, does

not seem to me to be an adequate account of the facts. The statement that "Value always implies a claim upon existence," can only mean that value-experiences, when they are recognized by us, impose a claim upon *us*. An objective value-experience, such as happiness, cannot itself, in a literal sense, "make a claim." In itself it is a mere impersonal object of thought. It is only a rational intelligence that can either make a claim, or recognize a claim. The claim to existence apparently made by happiness, *e.g.*, is not literally made by this value-experience itself, nor is it literally a "quality" of the experience. This claim to existence is part of the truth about it, brought to light by the unique sense of obligation it invariably evokes in an observant, normal, rational mind.

To put the matter in another way, the idea of "ought" in an ethical or moral sense, is, in my opinion, indissolubly associated with, if not indeed identical with, the idea of moral obligation. Now when we say that an experience of happiness "ought to be," we cannot mean that the experience of happiness itself is under a moral obligation. "Ought," Ross contends, "properly asserts an obligation," but he adds, "It would be absurd to assert of a state of pleasure . . . that it is under an obligation to be" (*The Right and the Good*, p. 104). The moral obligation, inevitably present when happiness is apprehended, is an obligation imposed on, and recognized by, the rational observer, who, because of the obligation indissolubly associated with the experience, recognizes *that* the experience itself is something which in itself ought to be. The so-called "non-natural" ethical quality in certain types of experience is thus an objective fact, but a fact discoverable only by a rational mind capable of experiencing a sense of moral obligation. In other words, our sense of obligation is the organ whereby we apprehend ethical value.

(5) Some conclusions follow which ought to be briefly indicated.

(*a*) These ethical values may exist without being recognized, as, *e.g.*, in the innocent happiness of a group of unselfconscious children; but they are never recognized as values save by an observer who can sense moral obligation.

(*b*) Further, ethical values, like physical qualities, may sometimes be imagined to exist, when they are not really present at all. Fanaticism, *e.g.*, may blind men to the truth. When this happens the faculty of moral vision is to some extent deranged. We have moral hallucination. But hallucination is not a phenomenon peculiar to moral vision. It can derange any of the senses.

(*c*) Again, even when the moral faculty is not actually deranged, an individual may manifest a lack of sensitiveness to ethical and moral facts which become obvious enough to him when they are pointed out. In this respect also the moral faculty is not peculiar. The keenness of the sense of hearing, the capacity to appreciate

music, even the accuracy of the sense of vision, differ greatly in different people. Although our moral faculty reveals to us objective truth, it is no more infallible than any of our other senses.

(*d*) Further, the objective reality of ethical value in each of these four qualities of experience which I have called "ultimate value-experiences," is verifiable in the same way as other truths about objects are verified. These qualities of experience always function in the same way, whatever be the situation in which they are observed. An intrinsically good quality always tends to make the situation obviously better and better, as it increases in extent, other things remaining the same. An intrinsically bad quality, on the other hand, always vitiates to some extent any situation in which it emerges, other things being the same. We do not verify the truth of our elementary moral judgments by merely counting the number of people who agree with our views, but by noting that these elementary judgments are implied in a multitude of other ethical judgments, the denial of which would be a falsity "too glaring to need being confuted."

(6) The doctrine regarding the nature of the moral ought that I have advanced commends itself by the fact that it enables us to justify the distinction we rightly make between "*ethical*" value and "*moral*" value, in the strict sense of the latter term. Ethical value is the "non-natural quality," or relation, belonging to certain types of experience and revealed to us by an *involuntary* sense of moral obligation. Moral value, in the other hand, is a distinctive quality that belongs to the will of an agent who *voluntarily* complies with a moral obligation when it is categorically imposed on him by his perception of ethical values. Moral worth cannot therefore be conferred on any one by any agency other than his own will. Its achievement may, however, be indirectly encouraged in others by various means, as, *e.g.*, by the example of a consistent loyalty to one's own ideals; and thus the moral good of others may be recognized as a possible and proper end to pursue. When so considered, *moral* value (in spite of its distinctive volitional character) is recognized to possess also *ethical* value. Our apprehension of it as an excellence capable of encouragement invariably evokes a *prima facie* sense of moral obligation.

(7) The account of the ought, which I have put forward, has this further advantage that it enables us to reconcile the element of truth in the theory of the deontologists with the truth advanced by the teleologists. The view of the teleologists (that "the good" is the ultimate ethical notion) is sound, so long as we restrict ethics to a consideration of the objective rightness of acts. An act is recognized to be objectively right or wrong in proportion as its results are good or bad. The deontologists, on the other hand, are right in insisting

on the fact that we only know that results are good, in an ethical sense, in virtue of the sense of ought which their apprehension automatically awakens in a normal, rational mind.

(8) Further, this doctrine of the ought seems to me to enable us to avoid the pitfalls of both ethical naturalism and ethical subjectivism. The doctrine is not naturalistic, in any peccant sense, since it insists that the sense of "ought" evoked by our apprehension of certain kinds of experience is not a mere subjective effect, but is directly and immediately revelatory of an objective and verifiable non-natural "quality" in those experiences, just as truly as the sensations of warmth are indicative of the objective quality of heat in the fire, or as the sound of a song reveals a melody to one who has a musical ear.

For the same reason the doctrine cannot be condemned as being subjective. Objective good is acknowledged as being capable of recognition, albeit by means of a singular mechanism. The singularity of the organ involved is, however, a characteristic of all direct perception.

(9) Finally, it is a further merit of this analysis of ethical and moral experience that it enables us to appreciate the element of truth in the view that ethics is an autonomous science, and at the same time to recognize the limitations of that view. So long as in ethical studies we restrict our inquiries to questions concerning the nature, variety and relationships of the purely ethical values revealed in and by our sense of "ought," ethics may properly be regarded as an autonomous science. It is concerned solely with objects discovered by direct observation, as are other autonomous sciences. But when inquiry is made regarding the ultimate reasonableness, or rationality, of the notion of categorical imperatives, in the light of other facts which seem to belie the possibility of any genuine moral obligation, we are soon involved in the consideration of problems that are metaphysical rather than ethical. If, *e.g.*, a genuine moral obligation implies freedom to accept or reject its claim, is the idea of such an obligation ultimately reasonable in the light of the fact, or seeming fact, of the uniformity of nature? In other words, if the doctrine of Behaviourism is true can there be any such thing as a genuine moral obligation? Or again, if "ought" implies "can," can the realization of any moral ideal be a genuine categorical obligation, in the light of the apparent transience of all human affairs and all human achievements? Does the certainty of the obliteration of the results of all moral effort not trivialize our moral obligations? The consideration of such questions as these seems to me to carry us beyond the limits of an autonomous science of ethics. Such writers as Kant, Sidgwick, Sorley, and many others seem to me to be right in assuming that these are philosophical questions that concern

the nature of the world of reality within which our ideals call for realization.

### (*C*) Personality as a Value

There is little space left for the consideration of the fact that our most assured moral judgments assume the reality of a unique worth in human personality as the potential bearer of all our higher ethical and moral values. The practical implication of this truth is expressed by Kant in what he regarded, rightly I think, as a categorical imperative, "Treat humanity, whether in thyself or in another, always as an end, never merely as a means."

It must be admitted that the idea of an absolute worth in personality, in virtue of its hidden potentialities as the vehicle of ethical and moral values, is a somewhat elusive notion. But then the idea of a hidden potentiality in any living thing is always somewhat of a mystery, whether it be the potentiality hidden in the fibre of "the meanest flower that blows" or the moral potentiality in the "deep heart's core" of human personality, whatever its actual characteristics achieved up to date may be. But in both cases we know that "the potentiality is not the same thing as nothing at all."

### (*D*) Ultimate Moral Principles

I have assumed all along the truth of two supreme moral principles that are universally binding in their authority.

(*a*) The first of these, the Principle of Rational Benevolence, or Good Will, is that the greater good, when known, ought always to be chosen in preference to the lesser. This principle implies that we are able in some measure to evaluate the worth of the various value-factors recognized in the results of our actions. Occasionally we are able to say without any misgiving that one course of action is right and another wrong. Frequently, however, the path of duty is far from clear. "We have often," as Ross says, "to rely on our very fallible apprehension of the degree of goodness belonging to each" of the elements of worth in the various envisaged results (*Foundations*, p. 284). This practical difficulty, however, does not justify a sweeping repudiation of this principle. There are few people whose musical ear is sufficiently keen to enable them to distinguish accurately the difference in pitch between two musical notes when the difference is very slight. There are few who can estimate accurately the comparative brightness of two lights that are almost equal in brilliance. But there are differences in magnitude in all of these types of objects that are patent to all who have the requisite faculty of perception.

(*b*) The Principle of Justice affirms that the good of one man

ought to be regarded as equal to the like good of any other man, other things being equal. It forbids us, in seeking to comply with the principle of benevolence, to ignore the interests of any one who to our knowledge will be affected for good or ill by our action. The principle of justice thus cannot, in my opinion, be satisfactorily defined without taking for granted the principle of rational benevolence, or good will. Justice cannot, *e.g.*, be identified with mere equality. It would be quite unjust to all to establish equality (in any sense) for all, at the cost of making all miserable and poor. The spirit of justice is the spirit that seeks the greatest practicable good of each, so far as that is compatible with the greatest common good. It would thus appear that the spirit of justice is not different in its ultimate aim from the spirit of rational benevolence. The difference seems to be one of emphasis. The principle of justice focuses our attention on the individual and his potential worth; the principle of good will on the maximization of those qualities of experience and conditions of life that give actuality to that worth, in the lives of each and all.

Difficult problems often emerge when we seek to apply these principles in arbitrating between individuals and groups whose different demands may be irreconcilable. I repeat, however, that such difficulties do not justify us in rejecting either of these two interlocking principles, which, as I think, are implied in all our most assured moral judgments.

In conclusion may I say that the greatest misfortune that can befall an individual, or a nation, is not the worry created by intractable moral or social problems, but the moral scepticism which assumes that there is no objectively right solution to such problems, which believes that nothing in itself is really good or veritably bad, and which acquieces in the doctrine that nothing is objectively right or indubitably wrong. A scepticism of that sort seems to me to be the menace that threatens mankind in our day. It is for that reason I am interested in all attempts to clarify our basic moral convictions, and in all efforts to strengthen the hold of these convictions on the minds of men.

# A REASONABLE THEORY OF MORALITY

## (ALEXANDER AND WHITEHEAD)

SYDNEY E. HOOPER, O.B.E., M.A.

DURING the later years of his life, the late Professor Alexander devoted much of his time to the study of our aesthetic and moral experience. In regard to the latter, Alexander was impressed by Adam Smith's treatment of the Moral Sentiments and especially with what he considered his sure insight in seeking for the ground of obligation in the *causes* of conduct, rather than in its effects. These causes were the passions. In this he was in sympathy with his contemporary Hobhouse, who asserted with conviction that action rested on impulse feeling, and that it was useless to look for anything whether it was called Practical Reason or anything else, that stood outside the body of impulse feeling and controlled it. I think it was the considered opinion of Alexander, as it was that of Hobhouse, that if Psychology had anything to teach us bearing upon Morals, it was that the springs of human conduct must be looked for in our inherited tendencies with their associated emotions. Fear, sorrow, joy, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-assertion, the sex instinct, and (in some species) acquisitiveness and constructiveness, are present, not only in men of all living races, but also in most of the higher animals. These specific tendencies and emotions, with certain complex passions such as admiration, reverence, scorn and the rest; together with one or two general tendencies such as sympathy and imitativeness, arising out of the nature of mental processes, must have played a leading role in the determination of human conduct, both in its lower and higher grades. And so, both to Hobhouse and to Alexander, it was clear that if we desire to get to the roots of action and not merely to the issues, we must go to these inherited impulses.

It is true that it is an empirical fact that in the higher vertebrate animals and in man, few instinctive modes of behaviour remain purely instinctive. As we should expect, they become modified by intelligence and by habits acquired under the guidance of intelligence or by imitation. But with this qualification, it can be said that inherited innate tendencies are the roots of conduct.

Since the appetites and instincts are the same in every man, they clamour for satisfaction in every man. No doubt this led to much conflict in primitive human life, as, indeed, is still the case in civilized communities. One person's instinctive claims would conflict with another's, and the claims of one family with those of a second. It must have vaguely dawned upon the human consciousness very

early that to escape anarchy, some "order" regulating the satisfaction of these competing claims must be established, and some rules laid down prescribing when, where, and in what manner their satisfactions could be enjoyed. The foundations of this order were probably laid in the family, since the family "sentiment" would itself generate a "relative ethic" of its members, imposing loyalty and co-operation upon them. *Between* families, "custom," slowly evolved and blindly followed, brought order into a wider field; and later "intelligence," disclosing still wider possibilities, must have played a part in extending the boundary of order and also of purging custom of some of its inconsistencies.

I propose in this paper to give an account of Alexander's approach to a theory of morality with this background, and to link it up with the metaphysical notion of "Order" to be found in Whitehead's philosophy. Under the influence of Adam Smith and the science of Psychology, Alexander arrived at the view that morality could be rescued from mystery, firstly by treating the passions as the roots of conduct, and secondly, by modifying the notion of the "impartial spectator" so that it took on the meaning of a certain harmony of human wills bent upon a satisfying way of life.

We begin, then, our consideration of this theory with the assertion that morality, in its foundations, is concerned with the passions of men. It is concerned with desires for material objects or ideal objects, and the problems which morality has to solve is the appropriate satisfaction of those desires both within the individual himself, and within the society of which he is a member. Human desires are focussed on food, clothing, shelter, sex, office, property, knowledge and the like, which individuals endeavour to secure and make their own. Alexander maintained that morality is a certain "adjustment" of human wills in respect of the objects after which individuals strive and which satisfy them. It is not sufficient to say that morality is adjustment to the environment which men share in common. The environment is secondary, since "Goodness" is what morality is concerned with, and "Goodness" is exclusively an affair of human wills. This being the case, "virtue" in an individual will consist of a certain adjustment and harmony in that person of his various passions with their claim for satisfaction, with the wills and claims of others like himself. Briefly, it may be said that it is the "order" established that constitutes virtue. This "order" is the attunement of human wills, created or established by the experiment of living in society, and it prescribes what passions may be satisfied, in what degree, at what time and place, and in what circumstances. In plain words, it is a "moral" order, a new state of affairs in the world achieved by man, compelled by his nature not only to live but to live well.

We may say, if we like, that morality came into being because man was essentially "social." Man has a need that must be satisfied, of living with others. Not only does he need others to satisfy his friendly impulses, but he needs others to satisfy his impulses for power and domination over others, and even for the satisfaction of vanity. It is this social need that makes an individual interested in the conduct of others and causes him to pass judgment on their conduct. Human beings alone of all animals have the power of conceptual thought, which enables them to form the ideas of self and others; and the social impulse compels them to direct their attention to the actions of their fellow men and to think about such actions as they have a bearing upon themselves. This emergence of intelligent social interest in the actions of others is significant, for it has the result that from now onwards, sociality can direct and control the other innate passions, and labour both for a harmony within the individual soul and for a harmony of wills in society which, in the end, issues in a moral order. No doubt in this gradual process of imposing an order upon the recalcitrant wills of men by the social impulse, a good deal of "thought" arises as to ways and means of accomplishing its attainment. But thought or "reason" is not the driving force in this movement, but the social impulse whose harmonious functioning is a prerequisite for the realization of human values.

It is important to note that both in the higher animals and man we find the emotions of resentment against ills inflicted and gratitude for help in distress. Where these emotions are socialized on the human level, thereby becoming *disinterested*, they are sublimated into disapprobation and approbation. But it needs the play of intelligence to effect this sublimation, since it is only through ideas that the "self" can be distinguished from other "selves," and until this discrimination is achieved, no genuine social relations are possible.

So far it has been suggested that the problem of morality is to secure an approved distribution of satisfactions of the innate tendencies of man in the realm of practice. In order that this state of affairs should be achieved, human beings must attend to each other's wants and establish an equilibrium among them. This end is never perfectly but only roughly attained. There never has been, and probably never will be, a perfect attunement of all human wills, even of those wills constituting a tribe or a "nation." But what measure of harmony either in the past or in the present has been secured, has been won, so it is maintained, by the operation of the social impulse warmed by the glow of a common sympathy.

In any given society, the members desire to achieve certain ends which they regard as "good." In striving to attain these ends, they naturally come into conflict with others who, for the most part,

make similar, but sometimes diverse, claims. Clearly, if men are to co-operate in the maintenance of their society, and if anarchy is to be avoided, a harmonious adjustment of these claims is necessary. Now Alexander's theory is that such a harmonious adjustment is "Goodness." He says "Goodness is the mutual adjustment of these claims, and is founded on the interplay of the impulses from which men act." This mutual adjustment of claims arising from the innate impulses, embodies the harmonizing of the wills of individuals, and is discovered in the effort to obey the social instinct and effect solidarity. If "Goodness" then is the attunement of human wills in respect of the claims made by the inherited impulses of human nature, it follows that "badness" will be a state of non-adjustment and disharmony: it is the recalcitrant will which is excluded as impracticable, and as such, ostracised. The "bad" are ostracized and not necessarily destroyed, because, since they are human, there is always the hope of their ultimate redemption. They may, as we say, come to see the error of their ways.

If it is agreed that morality is a certain adjustment of the claims for satisfaction of human impulses, it is obvious that there can be no moral rules of right and wrong until such an adjustment has been effected and a corresponding harmony of wills achieved by the slow and persistent action of the social instinct in its human form. Moreover, since morality is a "discovery" by this process of experiment, and the special form it assumes depends upon the mode of life adopted by a community in the given conditions of its environment, it is unlikely that any law can be named which is invariable absolutely. We might be disposed to think that the "Golden rule" is such a law. But, as Alexander points out the golden rule is not so much a moral law, as the definition of morality itself.[1] It is a definition "because the satisfaction of the social instinct means that nothing can be good for me which would not be good for another in my place, or good for another which would not be good for me in his place." The same statement applies to the "Categorical Imperative." The imperative is empty "because it defines the social instinct that offers a key to the actual details of virtue."[2]

The theory that goodness is a harmony of wills achieved by men through the operation of the social instinct, encouraged at every stage by the sympathy men have for one another in virtue of their common nature, provides a place for the beneficent talents of the moral innovator. Men are by no means equal either in their intellectual or moral gifts. It may be that one with superior moral insight perceives the real good of his fellows more perfectly than they; and because he possesses the true spirit of sociality, succeeds in persuading them to adopt a scheme of practice at first regarded as para-

[1] *Beauty and other forms of Value.* [2] *Ibid.*

doxical and quixotic. Such innovators are the moral geniuses, who through faith in their deeper insight, lift human morality to a higher level, sometimes sacrificing their own lives for the boon conferred. In Alexander's words, "The prophet of a new order is rejected by men of the old one, but maybe he wins his way to acceptance of his ideal hereafter. His singularity is thereby attested to be the truly Universal."

Let us now consider the roots of moral "Approbation" and "Disapprobation." Readers will recall that Adam Smith sought to discover the roots of moral approbation and moral disapprobation, and that he came to the conclusion that they lay in "sympathy." Alexander also adopts this view. We approve actions that are right and disapprove actions that are wrong. These attitudes are determined primarily by sympathy with the impulses from which actions proceed, rather than consideration of the *effects* of actions. If we ask why does anyone regard stealing as wrong, the answer is that he disapproves because he himself feels the resentment of others (through sympathy) at being disturbed in the exercise of their determination to retain their possessions. Or, again, if we ask what is the ground of the individual's horror of murder?, the answer is that primarily it is his sympathy with the victim's claim to life and horror at the attempt to disturb his claim. Consideration of the pain of the victim also enters as a factor in determining his attitude towards the murderer, but only as a secondary constituent. In the case of gratitude evoking our approval, a compound sympathy is involved: (*a*) a direct sympathy with the motives and act of the agent, and (*b*) an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of those who recieve the benefit of his action. For example, a well-to-do godfather offers to pay the larger part of the school fees in respect of the son of a young struggling artist. We sympathize both with the parents of the boy and with the godfather's generosity. Thus it can be said that although the element of "utility" constitutes a factor in our states of approbation or its reverse, utility is a secondary and not a primary determinant. The real ground of our feelings of approval or disapproval is sympathy with the impulses which are the springs of action, that is to say, with actions in their origin rather than in their outcome. But, though this is so, there is not, generally speaking, any incompatibility between the impulses in which our feelings of approbation or disapprobation are grounded and utility, since actions which promote harmony among persons are, on the whole, identical with those demanded by utility.

We are now in a position to deal with *obligation* and to consider its nature. It has been contended that morality is the more or less harmonious equilibrium of wills achieved by the play of the social

instinct and sympathy, in respect of the claims made by our innate impulses for satisfaction appropriate to an orderly life in society. The "good" man on this view is, as it were, the incarnation of the spirit of the harmonious community of wills, and what the good man approves is "right." It is "right" because the good man, who passes judgment as a moral agent, is not merely an atomic individual, but a will in tune with the wills of all other good men, who between them constitute the moral order, and who consequently may be said to be the incarnate spirit of this order, impartially contemplating and judging the ends and acts of men. This order is not derived from the subjective feelings or judgment of an individual in his separateness, but from a society of individuals in their mutual attunement aiming at a certain "quality" of life. It pleased Alexander to call this quality a "tertiary" quality, by which term he meant a new "value." Whether we adopt this term or not, we can at least say that a new "character" was introduced into life when man by the harmonization of wills determined at what time, in what place, and in what manner primordial impulses should be satisfied. By this achievement morality was established.

Alexander would have us take note that the judgment of the good, the moral man, is itself the work of art or craft created or made by a co-operative effort of human wills. It is a new fact created or discovered by men in their experiment of living together, and is directed to the discovery of the circumstances, manner, time and place in which the claims of the innate springs of action can be satisfied. Such a fact is a value, but it is first a new order of *fact.* What is the nature of this new fact? Alexander thinks we can get light in this question by considering first what beauty is. In his view, "beauty" is the blending of mind with material so as to satisfy disinterestedly the constructive impulse. Morality is also a blend, only here we have the blending of the will, impelled by the need of sociality, with the passions which are its material. That is to say, something new is brought into being both by the work of the creative artist, and by the creation or discovery of the moral order by the social spirit of man.

This new fact brought into being by the harmonization of human wills in respect of a certain way of life enables us to say how the "ought" so fundamental in morality should be regarded. What is the nature of "ought" and what is its relation to "is?" Or, in other words, what is the relation between obligation and fact? If the preceding discussion has been sound, it is clear that "ought" stands for the moral order, a new sort of reality which has been created out of natural impulses "by the introduction amongst them of another natural impulse, which dominates, regulates and harmonizes them."[1]

[1] Alexander. *Beauty and other forms of Value.*

The humanizing impulse which has done this work is, of course, the social instinct, helped by sympathy and perhaps later by the force of religious aspiration. "Ought is not the prescription set to the natural passions by some supposed non-natural element in our nature, not even by reason,"[1] says Alexander. Indeed we may say that "reason" as applied to morality is little more than a name given to an "order" which has been created by forces more dynamic than it. It is true that once morality has been brought into being certain rules are laid down and a certain ideal set up as a pattern. The concepts expressing these rules and this ideal are projections on the plane of intelligence of the instinctive force which constitutes primitive morality, and of the force of aspiration coming later from a religious source. As Bergson has, I think, demonstrated, on this intellectual plane the precepts of morality take the form of a system of concepts mutually supporting and implying one another. When the elements of the moral life are thus transposed on the intellectual plane, the moral life appears as the "rational" life. But it does not follow that morality has its origin or even its foundation in reason. The moralist who considers that reason is self-sufficient to explain morality only succeeds in his demonstration because he tacitly re-introduces forces of a different order which are already in charge. As Bergson puts it, "Real obligation is in possession before reason begins its play."[2]

It would seem then that Alexander is on sure ground when he says that "ought" stands for the new order of fact created by the mutual attunement of the wills of men in pursuit of a satisfying way of life. It is equivalent to what we have called the moral order, has its being in the hearts of men, and is reflected in their traditional institutions. It is both a fact and a value. Its creation was begun in the distant past by our early ancestors who felt the insistent urge to adjust themselves as individuals to a mode of life in which the comparative separateness of each was transcended by an intimate membership of a deeper unity. The actualization of this unity carried with it the sense of obligation. It could not be otherwise, for the new order of "ought" depended for its very being and continuance upon the support of its creators. Without this support, this new emergent but fragile plant must inevitably fade, wither and cease to be. And so members of this new order felt "obliged" to conduct themselves after a prescribed manner, or pay the penalty of remorse and anarchy. If then the "ought" is the moral order itself which claims authority over all the members of a community in which it has won acceptance, it will be clear what obligation is. Obligation is the relation of any element to the system as a whole: that is, the relation

[1] Alexander. *Beauty and other forms of Value*, p. 251.
[2] Bergson. *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality*.

of any particular act of conduct to that "order" that has been won by man's achievement of (at least) a partial harmony of wills. We are "obliged" to be virtuous because any single act of virtue is needed to maintain the system of sociality. Perhaps it will help the reader to understand Alexander's view of "ought" as a new kind of reality, and "obligation" as a *relation* between an element and the system as a whole, if it is slightly elaborated. Suppose we substitute "what ought to be" for "ought." Then in the first place, according to Alexander, "that which ought to be" is a new sort of reality (as compared with a set of unorganized natural impulses), namely, a certain system of co-ordinated and subordinated natural passions, ordered in a certain way by another natural impulse (namely, that of sociality) which regulates and harmonizes them. It is a new system or order achieved by the unified willing of men living in society, and is therefore a "fact" which is also esteemed as a value. In the second place, to assert that I am *under obligation* to act in a certain way on a certain occasion is to say that to act in that way on that occasion, is what is there and then needed in order to maintain this system of organized natural impulses which is what ought to be.[1] It would seem that this new fact or order—"what ought to be"—is sustained by the united wills of all those members of a society who desire to be good. Consequently, individual members, when they have a sense of "obligation" in respect of a particular act of conduct, will experience, what I think may be called, an awareness of "pressure" (the term is Bergson's), emanating from the harmonized willing of their society *which includes their own willing*, and is felt as "impersonal."

Critics will no doubt point out that to say "I ought to do acts commonly called duties, because anarchy will follow if I don't, whereas the system of sociality, called the moral order, will be maintained if I do" is to resolve the *categorical* "ought" into the *hypothetical* "ought," i.e. "you ought to do $x$ if you desire $y$." It must be admitted that moral obligation in this theory assumes the form of the hypothetical imperative, since it is derived from an order achieved by a unification of human wills, which is matter of fact as well as a value. In reply to this criticism, Alexander remarks that the Kantian categorical imperative is in reality merely a *definition* of the social instinct, "for the satisfaction of the social instinct means that nothing can be good which another might not do in my place, or I in the place of another." Hence the categorical imperative is "empty" because it is a definition only of the social instinct, and, therefore, offers no key to the actual details of virtue.

In the creative experiment which issues in the making of a moral order, there are some who fail to co-operate in the good work. These

[1] I am indebted to Professor Broad for his kind suggestion as to the interpretation of Alexander on these two points.

failures in the social experiment are declared "bad." Although, except in extreme cases, they may be kept within the society in the hope of reformation, their acts are condemned and they are deemed vicious. Thus, says Alexander, "virtue is maintained by the tyranny of the majority which wants to be good over the minority which desires courses of conduct which cannot be adjusted to the social whole, and so the virtuous cast out the vicious and seek to redeem them."

If this theory is sound, we can discern the source of what we call "the standard of right or good." The standard of right or good is that which is embodied ideally in the good man, and "conscience" in any person is the vicegerent of the good man's impartial judgment. The statement that the right or the good is a "standard" right or good implies that it is objective, and to this topic we now turn.

The term *objective* means what is external and actual apart from the sensations or emotions of the individual, and is opposed to *subjective*, which means that which is ideal or exists only in thought. When, therefore, the assertion is made that morality is objective, it means that the moral order transcends the individual and does not depend for its existence upon the thoughts and emotions of *his* mind.

The reader, I think, will agree that the account of morality just given justifies us in saying that it is objective; for we have seen that it is created by the *adjustment* of individuals and the harmonizing of their wills. This "order" is the work of many generations of men. As the ages have succeeded one another, it has been modified, extended, improved; and since it is never complete, but always imperfect and fragmentary, morality is always in the making. New conditions of life which inevitably arise from the very nature of creativity itself, necessitate changes of outlook and even changes in values formerly regarded as unalterable. But, though subject to change and modification like everything else, morality is a solid creation and from the nature of the case objective. It is objective because it is not an individual but a social creation, and society transcends the individual, although, of course, there could be no society without individuals as its members. Because it is objective, it has authority over the individual, and the moral good which this order enshrines is shareable by the members of the community. This moral order allows certain variations in good conduct as between different members of society. It does so because society itself demands different functions from persons according to their position and capacity for service. But some of our passions and impulses are common to all, and in so far as this is the case, the same or similar conduct will benefit all. This is the reason for the elementary rules of morals, truthfulness, respect for life and such like. In Alexander's

words: "The elementary rules of virtue correspond to the identity in the situation which call them forth."[1] But there is no moral rule which does not admit of exception since "the universality of moral rules means only that a law which holds for one person holds for another under the same circumstances,"[2] and these circumstances may differ even within the same community.

Morality, then, is objective because it has been created not by the will of an individual, but by what we may call the "standard" will of the community, and a "standard" is by its very nature objective. But, although morality is objective in the way explained, it is at the same time relative to the conditions and circumstances in the world in which it has arisen. We are not justified in saying that there is one, and one only, "absolute" law of goodness applying to every possible kind of society with the widest divergence in environments and conditions of living, since "the absoluteness of a law lies in its being the satisfactory solution of the problem of distribution,"[3] and this will be different for man in various times and places according to his environment. Conduct which, in one environment and at one stage, produces its measure of harmonious satisfaction, in other surroundings at another stage may well be destructive and degrading. Consequently, in the language of Whitehead, "the notion that there are certain regulative notions, sufficiently precise to prescribe details of conduct for all reasonable beings on earth, on every planet and in every star system, is at once to be put aside."[4] The idea that the Universe has but one type of perfection at which it aims is parochial. What, however, can, I think, be said, is that in whatever environment man finds himself living in relations with others, there is an ultimate principle demanding a moral order of some sort. That is to say, intelligent beings living together, whose conduct is not in detail determined by instinct, must at least frame a rule. But we can be more definite and say that the various codes of morality, and their interpretation by seers of various races throughout history, bear witness to the aim at social perfection, which, in its realization, is conceived, not as a mere romance of thought, but as an abiding perfection in the nature of things. In terms of the individual person, morality provides an ideal beyond personal limitations, and thus enables a man to face his fate and be captain of his soul.[5]

This is the stage at which I propose to link up Alexander's Empirical Theory of Ethics with Whitehead's philosophy. Whitehead has somewhere said that the laws of nature are nothing but the communal ways in which the ultimate elements have agreed to live

1 Alexander. *Beauty and other forms of Value.*
2 *Ibid.*
3 *Ibid.*
4 Whitehead. *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 376.
5 Cf. Whitehead. *Adventures of Ideas.*

together. This perhaps is the reason for their being "statistical." And it would seem that the "moral law" is the way human beings, with the special gift of intelligence, have agreed by unified willing to live together. If we are looking for an "absolute," it would appear that it is to be found, not in the *specific* form of order of any of the multitude of societies of organisms, whether animate or inanimate, that constitute the Universe, but in the metaphysical principle of *order as such*; and in this principle there may be found a constituent of "concern."

How are we to think of this metaphysical principle of "order?" In Whitehead's organic philosophy, "creativity" is the pure notion of the activity of the universe, which is always conditioned by the existing state of the actual world. It is the ultimate notion of highest generality at the base of actuality. Its attributes are two: that of pluralizing itself into a multiplicity of finite individual actual entities, and the realm of possibility—the realm which supplies forms of definiteness to the creative process. The second attribute has a character which is called "the primordial nature of God." The "primordial nature of God" is a non-temporal actual entity envisaging the realm of eternal forms in such a way that each is given its appropriate relevance for actualization in the temporal world. This envisagement provides for all realizable basic conditions. In this sense, God is the principle of concretion; that is to say, He is that entity from which each temporal concrescence receives the initial aim from which its self-causation starts. This initial aim supplied by God's ideal envisagement of the infinite wealth of potentiality, is always the best for that *impasse*. It may of course happen that "the best" for any given set of circumstances turns out to be bad. Then, says Whitehead, "the ruthlessness of God can be personified as Até, the goddess of Mischief."[1] Nevertheless, it was the best for those circumstances. The principle can be stated in these words: "What is inexorable in God is valuation as an aim towards 'order,' and 'order' means society permissive of actualities with patterned intensities of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts."[2] Thus the primordial nature of God is the supreme ground for limitation in the universe, and the timeless source of all order. It constitutes the metaphysical stability of the universe, and allows the ends proper to specific types of emergent order.

One other character of the "primordial nature of God" must here be mentioned. The appetitions of God, which jointly constitute His purpose seek intensity and depth. In the foundations of His being, His aim is for depth of satisfaction in the actual entities constituting the world, as an intermediate step towards the fulfilment of His own being. Thus in the evolution of the cosmic process, His tenderness

[1] *Process of Reality*, p. 345. [2] *Ibid.*

is directed to each actual occasion, as it arises. Therefore, there is "concern."

In the Organic philosophy, the universe is portrayed as through and through "social." In the background, there is the vast society of inorganic occasions, inter-related in a bewildering complexity. In terms of human life, the soul is a society of occasions, and transcendence begins with "the leap from the actuality of an immediate occasion to the notion of *personal* existence which is a society of occasions."[1] Indeed, it can be said generally that it is the nature of the present that it should transcend itself by reason of the immanence of the "other." Beyond the soul, there are other societies—the animal body, families, nations, species, associated in the joint enterprise of living. All these various societies, each in its measure, claim loyalties and loves. If it be asked what is the reason for this social structure of the universe, Whitehead replies that it is the exemplification of the principle of order, and that by means of "order" there is the attainment of value experience.

Thus it would seem that, although morality is a human achievement, it can be regarded as a special exemplification of the ultimate metaphysical principle of "order" which involves "concern." There must be "order," since otherwise there could be no actualities whatsoever: for the world is a world of finite actual entities and societies of actual entities formed out of the infinite potentiality of creativity by the imposition of specific definiteness for the purpose of value experience. The merely possible and unlimited has no value. Value arises only with the actualization into finite entities, and limitation has been imposed as the price of such value. The individuals which arise from creativity through this principle of limitation claim that importance and concern for their values which is their due, and this involves the social structure of things. In human history, the various responses of these claims disclose the essential transcendence of each individual beyond himself. True a person possesses stubborn individuality, but this is bound up with a relativity which it issues from and issues into; and this relativity is but one example of the general social structure of the Universe in this epoch.

Concerning the many particular codes of morality, it can be said that they reflect, more or less imperfectly, the special circumstances of social structure concerned. But, as Whitehead remarks, it is natural to look for some highly general principles underlying all such codes, which should reflect the notions of (*a*) "the harmonizing of harmonies" and (*b*) "of particular individual actualities as the sole authentic reality." These are the principles of the generality of harmony, and of the importance of the individual. The first means "order," and the second means "love." But at this point there seems

[1] Whitehead. *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 379.

to be a difficulty, which can be put as follows. Is there not a suggestion of opposition between "order" and "love," since order is "impersonal," but love intensely "personal?" Whitehead replies to this question by saying that the apparent antithesis is solved, firstly by rating types of order in relative importance to their success in promoting the strength of individual experience; and secondly, by rating the individual, partly on the intrinsic value of its own experience, and partly on its influence in the promotion of a high-grade type of order. He concludes his discussion of this question with the words, "the individual whose strength of experience is founded upon this ultimate intuition is thereby extending the source of all order."[1]

Let it not be thought, however, that this metaphysical principle of order disposes of the problem of evil, or makes it illusory. In Whitehead's philosophy, the principle applies to all the empirical facts that there are, and, since there are evil facts and wicked men, the principle embraces these as well as good facts and moral men. The evil of the world consists in conflict, or in Whitehead's own words: "the nature of evil is that the characters of things are mutually obstructive." There is no perfect pre-established harmony between the many societies of actual entities seeking their own ends and values, and hence there is conflict—evil. Evil may be finally resolved or transcended in God, as certain metaphysicians have affirmed, but it is very real in the temporal world, and much tragedy seems inevitable from the nature of things. Nevertheless, although there are many societies of actual entities which bring conflict into the world through mutual incompatibility, each in its own way is the bearer of some kind of order, whose function it is to elicit whatever value experience is possible in the circumstances. Thus the metaphysical principle has application throughout the entire realm of fact.

There does not, however, seem to be any justification for the assumption that all societies of actual entities may claim equality of worth in respect of their values. From our human perspective at any rate, there are *grades* of worth in the scheme of things, some of the values of actuality being esteemed "important," whilst others are dismissed as trivial—trivial because they obstruct the realization of greater values. In human life, morality is precious and consists of the control of process so as to maximize importance. In the language of Whitehead: "it is the aim of greatness of experience in the various dimensions belonging to it."[2] In other words, the moral code is that pattern of conduct which will promote the development of that environment for which it was designed towards its appropriate perfection.

[1] Whitehead. *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 377.
[2] Whitehead. *Modes of Thought*.

# A REASONABLE THEORY OF MORALITY

The purpose of this paper is to show, in the first place, that morality, studied empirically, leads us to the conception that it is a novel order achieved by man under the impulse of sociality for the realization of values which could not otherwise be enjoyed. In the second place, it is suggested that this unique achievement is one specialized exemplification of the metaphysical principle of order pervasive throughout the universe, whose function is the eliciting of value experience. I suspect, however, that the mere mention of a metaphysical principle in connection with a theory of morality will to many be a rock of offence and an occasion of stumbling. To these I tender a sincere apology, accompanied by the humble reminder that man is, nevertheless, a part of Nature, even though he be much more complex than a molecule, a stone, a tree or a dog; and that in Whitehead's philosophy Nature is throughout its domain teleological and the principle of order fundamental in the structure of the universe and all-pervasive.[1]

[1] "When we examine the structure of the epoch of the Universe in which we find ourselves, this structure exhibits successive layers of types of order, each layer introducing some additional type of order within some limited region which shares in the more general type of order of some larger environment. Also this larger environment in its turn is a specialized region within the general epoch of creation as we know it." *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 256–7.

# DISCUSSION:

## A MODERN CONCEPTION OF TIME[1]

I think that to Lord Kelvin is attributed the saying that the scientific attitude to a thing, if you can't do anything else with it, is to *measure* it. This is the attitude I propose to adopt towards *Time*. The situation is to some extent analogous to the situation with regard to *electricity*. Science is unable to say what electricity is, and so it almost denies the word any entrance into a treatise on the subject. It replaces it by the word *charge*, which is something that can be measured. It is important to avoid hypostatizing time into a thing-in-itself. Instead of trying to say what time is (*e.g.* Plato's description of it as "the moving image of eternity") we try to find a way of measuring it.

At first sight, from a fundamental point of view, this seems difficult. We cannot use an ordinary clock without further thought, because we have no guarantee that in a repetitive or periodic phenomenon successive periods take "the same time." Indeed, at this stage of our argument we cannot even say what we mean by equal times or equal intervals of time. A similar situation arises in the problem of the measurement of length. To measure a given length, given a standard of length, we have first to subdivide our standard. To do this we use an instrument appropriately called "a pair of dividers." But of course this name is a question-begging one. We cannot say what we mean by equal subdivision, even if made with a pair of dividers, because we cannot be sure that the dividers themselves have not altered their span during the act of transporting the dividers. The subdivision of a scale thus turns on the transport of a rigid body, and we cannot say what we mean by the transport of a rigid body, even if we carry it round a cycle and test whether, under a repetition of the same conditions, it has the same "length" at the end as at the beginning. We shall see later that we can in the end define a rigid body once we are agreed on a measure of time. But we cannot even catch the fleeting "minute" and put it back alongside another "minute" that is past and so test for even equality of intervals, leave alone, at this stage, subdivide them. Therefore we have in principle to begin with an *arbitrary* graduation of a time-interval. Nevertheless, the subdivision of a time-interval proves in the end to be a less difficult process than the subdivision of a length-scale. This is because the concept of "two points at the same time," required in subdividing a length-scale, is in principle more difficult than the concept of "two times at the same point." The former involves the setting-up of a standard of simultaneity at a distance, which is essentially arbitrary.

Every mind possesses an awareness of the passage-of-time—regarding this as one indissoluble phrase and not "time" as something which "passes." For this to be so, our consciousness must contain a series of events; otherwise there would be a stretch of "nothingness" in the mind, and the mind would consequently be aware of nothing. We can then use this series of events, and since they will form a well-ordered series, we can correlate them with the members of any other well-ordered series. In particular we can correlate some of the events in our consciousness with the real numbers. For between any two members of the set of real numbers there exists the ordering relation "greater than," "equal to," or "less than." Similarly, the events in our con-

[1] Half-hour address, delivered to the Royal Institute of Philosophy at its Twenty-fourth Ordinary General Meeting, July 20, 1949. The original work on which this address is based was joint work by the author and Dr. G. J. Whitrow.

sciousness are ordered by the relation "later than," "simultaneous with," or "earlier than."

It is not necessary to suppose our consciousness of the passage of time can be built up out of *instants* any more than that the continuum of real numbers is built up of points. But just as we can define points in the continuum by means of sets of partially-overlapping intervals, so Russell has shown in his *Human Knowledge*, and Whitehead has also shown in his treatment of durations, that we can obtain the concept "instant" by the use of an infinite set of partially-overlapping "intervals-of-time," the ultimately common elements in which converge on the instant to be defined. I shall not pause over this technique, but accept it, and I shall suppose in consequence that the instants of our consciousness have been correlated in some arbitrary fashion with the real numbers, in the sense that if of two real numbers one is greater than the other, then of the two corresponding instants we can by a direct judgment say that one is later than the other. Such a correlation I call a *clock*. It may be pictured indeed as a hand running over a dial. The real number corresponding to any given event at myself is called the *epoch* of that event on this particular clock. So far the clock is arbitrarily graduated.

Our ultimate object is to effect a regraduation of this clock, such that in a well-defined sense the newly graduated clock can be described as keeping *uniform time*. Before we can make an acceptable measure of what we wish to call uniform time, we must first set up what I call *congruent* clocks at a distance. That is to say, we consider a distant observer, moving with respect to ourselves in any way, who also possesses a clock, arbitrarily graduated; and we wish to dictate to him such a mode of regraduating his clock that it may be said to be a copy of our own clock, keeping the "same time." For this to be possible there must be symmetry between myself (observer A) and the distant observer (B); for any difference in physical circumstances might have an effect on the clock "carried" by B. We could allow for that later, if we subsequently discovered any such physical effect, but in the first instance we want to set up a copy of our own clock under the same physical conditions.

Now let A make observations of B's clock in the following way. Let A strike a light at himself, at some instant $t_1$ by his own clock, and let him note the time $t_2$ at which he sees B's clock-face illuminated and also the clock-reading $t'$ of B's clock at the instant at which he sees B's clock illuminated. Let B also note the time $t_2$ which A's clock is reading at the moment of first visibility of B to A. Let this be repeated a great many times. Then B's clock will be said to be congruent to A's if when A plots $t'$ against $t_1$ he gets the same graph as B gets when he plots $t_2$ against $t'$. In the language of physics, we should say that $t_2$ is the instant at which a light signal from A, emitted at epoch $t_1$, and having proceeded to B, and been reflected at B, has subsequently reached A.

If B's plot of $t_2$ against $t'$ is not the same as A's plot of $t'$ against $t_1$, A must seek to derive from the discrepancy between the two graphs instructions which he can dictate to B so that when B has re-graduated his clock in accordance with these instructions, the revised graph is identical with A's graph. This is a purely mathematical problem, and we shall be content here to say that it is capable of solution.

When B has been thus endowed with a clock congruent to A's, we write $B \equiv A$ and say that B is equivalent to A. Suppose now we take a third observer C also standing in a symmetrical relation with A and in line with A and B, and let A dictate instructions to C so that C can re-graduate his clock so as to make it also congruent to A's. Then $C \equiv A$. The question now arises, is C equivalent also to B? In other words, do $B \equiv A$ and $C \equiv A$ imply $C \equiv B$?

This again is another mathematical problem. The answer is that in general C $\not\equiv$ B. Only if C's motion relative to A is one of a class defined by the relative motion of A and B, is C's clock also congruent to B's.

The relative motion of A and B may be of any type whatever. The observations which A is supposed to have made on B's clock are sufficient to enable A to describe B's motion. For if $t = \frac{1}{2}(t_2 + t_1)$, $r = \frac{1}{2}C(t_2 - t_1)$, where C is an arbitrary constant, and $t$, $r$ are called respectively the epoch and distance of B at the moment A's light-signal reaches him, according to A's arbitrarily graduated clock, a graph of $r$ against $t$ exhibits B's motion relative to A. *E.g.* if A and B are in uniform relative motion, and A's and B's clocks are congruent, the condition that C's clock, when congruent to A's, shall also be congruent to B's, is that C's motion relative to A or B shall also be one of constant velocity; in addition C must have parted company with A at the same instant as B parted company with A. The same applies to any further observers, D, E, . . . For it to be possible to equip the aggregate of observers with congruent clocks, they must in this case all be in uniform relative motion, and must all have parted company at the same instant. Such an aggregate of carriers of congruent clocks is called an *equivalence*. The idea of an equivalence is readily extended to three dimensions. An equivalence is a kinematic entity. The members of an equivalence exhibit relative motions which have something in common. In the uniform motion equivalence, that *something* is their being in uniform relative velocity—of course with different relative velocities for the different members. Another equivalence is the relatively stationary equivalence, in which all the members are at relative rest. Any number of other equivalences can be constructed—*e.g.* Leigh Page's equivalence of observers moving with *constant* accelerations (in a certain sense), relative to one another. In all cases, the members of an equivalence can be equipped with congruent clocks, and may be said therefore to enjoy a common system of time-keeping.

The clocks of the members of an equivalence may be re-graduated, and if the rule of re-graduation is the same for all, the aggregate of observers concerned remains an equivalence. It can now be shown that by a suitable re-graduation-rule, any equivalence can be transformed into any other equivalence. Thus the original arbitrarily-graduated set of clocks forming an equivalence, with which we started, can be transformed by a suitable re-graduation into the equivalence in uniform relative motion; or, again, into the relatively stationary equivalence.

The question now arises, do any of these modes of graduating the clocks of an equivalence correspond to the time of physics?

The time of physics is Newtonian time, in which the first law of motion holds good, namely, that a free test-particle moves with constant velocity. It is therefore necessary to determine the law of motion of a free test-particle in the presence of an equivalence. Before we can do this, it is necessary to pay attention to the spatial distribution of the members of an equivalence. In the case of the equivalence in uniform relative motion, we can arrange the spatial distribution of the particle-members in such a way that it is described in the same way from each particle-member when taken as origin. This is the nearest we can get to a *homogeneous* equivalence. Once this has been done, it is possible by purely logical processes to determine the equation of motion of a free test-particle in its presence. It is then found that though the equation of motion contains no "constant of nature," it is markedly non-Newtonian in form.

It follows that the mode of clock-graduation which corresponds to the uniform relative motion equivalence does not correspond to Newtonian time. But when we re-graduate the clocks of this equivalence so as to convert it into

the relatively stationary equivalence, the equation of motion becomes of Newtonian form. It thus follows that Newtonian time is that mode of clock-graduation which reduces an equivalence to relative rest. This mode of clock-graduation is called $\tau$-time, whilst the mode of clock-graduation which reduces an equivalence to uniform relative motion is called $t$-time. The relation between the two is expressed by the formula

$$\tau = t_0 \log (t/t_0) + t_0,$$

where $t_0$ is a normalization constant, equal to the present age of the universe reckoned from the natural origin of time; $t_0$ is introduced to make the $\tau$-scale agree with the $t$-scale at the present epoch $t = t_0$.

Thus Newtonian time, the time-scale of mechanics, is $\tau$-time. There are other indications that this is the time of mechanics. For example, the Newtonian equations of motion are unaltered in form by a change of time-origin and a linear change of scale. This property holds good in $\tau$-time, but not in $t$-time. Again, the Newtonian equations of motion are unaltered in form when the sign of the differential of time is reversed. That is to say, if we reverse the velocity of a material particle in Newtonian mechanics, it retraces its path with all the circumstances of motion reversed. This is not true for the equation of motion in $t$-time. The reason is not far to seek. The motion of any one particle in the universe, when reversed, can only be expected to give the reversal of the complete motion when the motions of *all* the particles in the universe are reversed at the same time. This condition is automatically fulfilled in $\tau$-time, for then the fundamental particles are relatively stationary, and reversal of their motion makes no difference, so that the reversal simply of the velocity of the free test-particle will carry with it the reversibility of its complete motion.

The epoch of any event on the $\tau$-scale, unlike its epoch on the $t$-scale, is independent of the particular fundamental particle which assigns the epoch. Its value is thus an invariant, the same for all fundamental observers, and there is a world-wide simultaneity, an absolute simultaneity, between events possessing the same $\tau$-values. This restores to Newtonian time the absolute character which was given to it by Newton, an absolute character which it appeared to have lost with the coming of Einstein's "special" relativity. The reason is that the famous Lorentz formulae, which gave a non-objective simultaneity to events of the same $t$ (this apparent simultaneity being destroyed by change of observer), employ $t$-time, not $\tau$-time. The world-wide simultaneity in $\tau$-time is of course intimately bound up with the relative stationariness of the fundamental observers in the equivalence graduated to give $\tau$-time.

It was mentioned that any equivalence can be re-graduated so as to make it identical with any other equivalence, so that essentially there is only *one* equivalence. This makes the unique entity, *the equivalence*, suitable as a description of that other unique entity, *the universe*. The representation of the universe by an equivalence is possible if consistent time-keeping is possible throughout the universe. It is then natural to identify the nuclei of the extra-galactic nebulae with the fundamental particles of an equivalence. When this equivalence is graduated to read $t$-time, the universe of nebulae is expanding with uniform relative velocities; the more distant nebulae are accordingly the more swiftly moving, with distances proportional to velocity. When the equivalence is graduated to read $\tau$-time, the universe of nebulae is relatively stationary. In the $t$-description the nebulae diverged from a point-singularity at epoch $t = 0$, and the system has the appearance of having come into existence at $t = 0$; on the $\tau$-scale, this "epoch of creation" is relegated to

minus infinity. On the $t$-scale, certain so-called constants of nature like the constant of gravitation and Planck's constant vary proportionally to the time $t$; on the $\tau$-scale they return to being constants, but with a value proportional to the normalization constant $t_0$. Thus inherently, the two "constants" mentioned are variable, and have only an apparent constancy in classical mechanics.

We see that there is no unique scale of time which is entitled to be called *uniform*. Either the $\tau$-scale or the $t$-scale may be regarded as uniform, according to the context. Each time-scale carries with it its own definition of a rigid body, for the "distance" between any two particles of the body depends on the time-scale chosen as uniform. Dynamically repetitive phenomena, such as the swing of a pendulum or the rotation of a rigid body (rigid on the $\tau$-scale), which occupy equal intervals of $\tau$-time, justify us in regarding the $\tau$-scale as the "uniform" scale for all the purposes of mechanics; but other phenomena, such as the disintegration of a fixed fraction of radioactive atoms per "unit" of time, may correspond to the unit of time on the $t$-scale.

That there seem to be just two time-scales relevant to physics is an empirical fact, not a logical proposition. We have arrived at it by avoiding any initial decision as to which is meant by "uniform" time. That we are not entitled to regard any one time-scale, *a priori*, as uniform is another example of those principles of impotence to which Whittaker has drawn attention, and from which, owing to their generality, such a wealth of consequences follows.

E. A. Milne.

# NEW BOOKS

*The State and the Citizen.* By J. D. Mabbott. (Hutchinson's University Library. Pp. 180. Price 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Mabbott's book is an excellent introduction to political philosophy. It is short, clear and readable. Almost all of it should be intelligible to readers without previous training in philosophy, though it must be admitted that one chapter, which is naturally the most important philosophically, will probably be rather too much for them. But that is on the whole a good thing. Philosophy is not an easy subject and those who want to know about it had better realize this early and avoid disappointment later on.

The plan of the book is "to work through partial and one-sided theories of political obligation towards a more complete view," and we therefore begin with a statement of the central doctrines developed in the recognized classics from Hobbes to T. H. Green and Bosanquet. These are expounded with great lucidity and as much detail as can be expected in such a brief survey. The summary of the Hegelian position (pp. 34–54) is particularly valuable as a sympathetic introduction to this method of approach to the subject, though I think it expounds the position of the British Hegelians of the second half of the nineteenth century rather than that of Hegel himself. For these purposes, however, the difference is not very important.

Mr. Mabbott's general view is that this Hegelian synthesis really is an improvement on the abstract monism of Hobbes and the equally abstract pluralism of Locke, and that it can overcome at least some of the difficulties to which Rousseau's conception of a general will gives rise. Indeed, at this point one expects the conclusion that it is the right answer, though perhaps a few minor modifications will be needed. Mr. Mabbott carries out very fully his promise to make the view as clear and as plausible as possible, leaving all misgivings and qualifications to a later stage.

They are all there in the following chapters, however, and the conclusion drawn from them is that the Hegelian notion of moral action as identical with the service of the State is fundamentally wrong. It is wrong, and this is Mr. Mabbott's main contention throughout the book, because it insists on regarding the State as essentially different from other forms of association. Admittedly there are some important functions, especially under modern conditions, which only the State can carry out. The germ and the internal combustion engine, whether we like it or not, have made health and road maintenance public and not private affairs. But this is incidental. The State, like other forms of association, subserves ends beyond itself, and its legitimate activities are circumscribed by those ends. It is therefore a complete mistake to regard it either as a moral agent (Rousseau) or as above morality (Hegel).

This seems to me to be entirely correct. I agree, too, with Mr. Mabbott's sharp criticism (pp. 79–84) of the attempts of some theorists to escape from the unpleasant implications of Hegel by adding "Society" and "the Community" to political terminology. They bring nothing but confusion to it. All that we need, as he correctly says, is the general word "association" with "State," "Church," "Trade Union," etc., as its specifications. This contention leads naturally to a discussion of the position of the State in its relations to other kinds of association, including other States, and to the conclusion that no rule of thumb method for settling disputes on such matters can be produced or ought to be demanded. The proper status of Trade Unions and

Churches is an empirical question which must be solved by consideration of the ends which they and the State respectively subserve. There is no theoretical solution to it. Thus in practice Mr. Mabbott is on the side of the syndicalists in that he refuses to subordinate such associations completely to the State, but he does not consider that the functions of the State can be dissolved or distributed among other associations.

All this appears to me to be true and I have little to offer in the way of criticism. I do not believe that Locke was such a fumbler as Mr. Mabbott makes him out to be, and the importance attached to the work of T. H. Green and Bosanquet strikes me as excessive. But these are minor points. More important is the almost complete absence of serious statement or criticism of the Marxist position. This certainly needs more than the slender discussion of the idea of a classless society, which is all that it gets. The eventual withering away of the State is not even a very important part of what Marx and Engels had to say. The class struggle and economic determinism are much more essential to their doctrine. However, this is a short book and it is unfair to demand everything.

I now turn to Chapter XIV, and to the argument of pp. 83–85 which supplements it. Here Mr. Mabbott ceases to be introductory and undertakes a piece of difficult philosophical analysis. He has to do this in order to complete his criticism of the general idealist position, for it is essential to the view he is putting to deny the existence (and *a fortiori* the pre-eminence) of super-personal entities called States, Societies, Communities, and so on. Hence he needs to show that sentences in which such words occur can be translated without change of meaning into other sentences referring to individuals. The argument is so condensed that I shall not attempt to summarize it. As I said at the beginning, I doubt whether it can be appreciated by readers who do not know about recent philosophical thought, but if it leads beginners to find out about what has happened in the last twenty years or so, it has done an important job.

What I want to do is to state briefly why I do not think that as it stands it is a conclusive logical argument against Hegelian and totalitarian doctrines. The crucial point is that made on p. 84 and repeated on pp. 158–9. It is this. "Fear and love and hate are feelings which ought to have objects, but sometimes have none. 'Jones fears ghosts' means that Jones believes that certain noises, etc., are caused by disembodied yet localized spirits, and Jones is afraid. The fear would be reasonable if the belief were true and the object existed." And so on. Now I do not think that this will do. No sensible believer in the concrete State would accept the analysis of "Smith loves England" into "Smith believes that certain sights, smells, etc., institutions, etc., are the visible manifestations of a super-person called 'England,' and Smith has a feeling of affection—*but his belief is false.*" Obviously, he would maintain that the belief is true. How, then, does one prove that it is false? There are two methods: (*a*) we can take a tough positivist line about "metaphysical entities." But the idealist is bound to dispute the initial assumption of this and anyway it would not be Mr. Mabbott's line since he certainly wants "Smith loves God" to be significant. (*b*) we can say that some transactions which individuals can carry out cannot be carried out by associations. England doesn't go to the polls in the sense in which Smith does so. But need this worry the totalitarian very much? Certainly, if he claims that his State is literally another individual such that it makes sense to talk about Smith, Jones, and England going to the polls, he will soon be in a mess, but he need not be quite as naïve as that.

To put it shortly, I am not convinced that it is logically necessary to accept

the unity of the individual as basic and fundamental and to maintain, on the strength of this, that the personalities of associations are merely fictions: and, of course, Mr. Mabbott does not think that the *unity* of associations *is* fictitious. In an important sense it is perfectly genuine, though it is difficult to justify this. It can be argued that loyalty should be felt not to an association as such, but to the ideals to which it is devoted. This, however, would need a lot more working out before it would be quite convincing. For it looks as if "the ideals to which the association is devoted" could be replaced by "the results which all or most members are trying to achieve." I doubt whether that is what most people are loyal to—and I am sure Mr. Mabbott doesn't think it is.

In fact, I think that Mr. Mabbott is here trying to have his cake and eat it as well. He wants a positivist analysis of the State in order to refute totalitarianism, and he also wants to limit his liability and to reject the "subjectivist" conclusion to which his method tends to lead. He is anxious to avoid, "Well, the Germans do it one way and the English another—and that's all there is to be said about it." But I do not think he has quite succeeded.

T. D. WELDON.

---

*A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*. By FUNG YU-LAN. Edited by Derk Bodde. New York: Macmillan. 1948.

Serious interest in Chinese Philosophy in Europe began in the seventeenth century. The first thinker of note to comment at length upon it was Leibniz. In his Preface to *Novissima Sinica* (1698–99) he says "If we surpass the Chinese in logic, metaphysics, mathematics and military art, they are better than we so far as the principles of moral life and practical philosophy are concerned." Leibniz depended for his understanding of what Chinese philosophy said, on the interpretation of it, by a remarkable group of Jesuits who were working in China at the time. Since Leibniz's day, the denominational basis of interpretation to the West has broadened, but it has remained almost exclusively in European hands.

The publication of this book therefore is notable, as being the attempt at interpretation for European readers of a Chinese philosopher unhindered by the peculiar difficulties that beset the occidental student. It enjoys the further distinction of being, as its editor observes, "the first in English that attempts to give a really comprehensive and systematic account of Chinese thought as a whole, from its beginnings with Confucius to the present day."

The book is comprehensive in the sense that it takes into consideration all the major periods of thought from classical times to the present; it is therefore of necessity selective and personal to the author in its points of emphasis. It is systematic in that it represents an interpretation of philosophical history, made under the impact upon the author of what he describes as "the permanent contribution of Western philosophy to Chinese philosophy, namely, the method of logical analysis," which he explains "gives the Chinese a new way of thinking and a change in their whole mentality." It has therefore a two-fold interest. From the European point of view, it is a Chinese rather than a European interpretation of Chinese philosophy, and from the Chinese point of view (and this book is based largely on the author's original and more comprehensive work written in Chinese) it is a presentation in the Western manner, of his own native philosophy.

From the fact that the "method of logical analysis" has "changed their whole mentality" it will have been gathered already that Chinese thought was conceived and developed in an intellectual climate quite different from that of Europe. What may not be so generally appreciated is the fact that it

was written in a language fundamentally distinct in organization and method from that of the Indo-European group. A Western mind bringing his native critical criteria to bear upon the content of this philosophy, may miss its essential genius. The author, no doubt with something of this in mind, has devoted a useful introductory chapter to explaining the major differences between Chinese and Western thought.

According to Dr. Fung the philosophy of a Chinese "required that he lived it, he was himself its vehicle." "Philosophy is not something to be *known*, but is also something to be *experienced*." "With him philosophy was hardly ever merely a pattern of ideas exhibited for human understanding but was a system of precepts internal to the conduct of the philosopher, and in extreme cases might even be said to be his biography." Within this definition the author continues "if a man were educated at all, the first education he received was in philosophy." To be educated was to be a philosopher, which in turn for long periods was usually coincidental with being a government official, "it follows," continues Dr. Fung, "that philosophy must be inseparable from political thought." This to a European surely is philosophy of a different *genre*.

It has in the past been confused with religion, but Dr. Fung makes it quite clear that his conception of philosophy is quite different from religion. "They (the Chinese people) have not had much concern with religion, because they have had so much concern with philosophy." "In philosophy they satisfy their craving for what is beyond the present actual world. In philosophy they have the super-moral value expressed and appreciated, and in living according to philosophy, these super-moral values are experienced" (*sic*). The Chinese "Sage" is the corollary of the European "Saint," but the terms are not an equation. "The Chinese Sage is not one who does not concern himself with the business of the world. His character is described as "Sageliness within and kingliness without." That is to say in his inner sageliness he accomplishes spiritual cultivation; in his kingliness without he functions in society . . . ." "The task of philosophy is to enable a man to develop this kind of character." Such is the "philosophy" of which this book is the history.

Its interpretation (and translation) is a complicated matter, for according to Dr. Fung there were in China "no professional philosophers, and non-professional philosophers did not have to produce formal philosophical writings. . . ." "Disconnectedness or even inconsistency between them . . . is to be expected," and further "the sayings and writings of the Chinese philosophers are so inarticulate that their suggestiveness is almost boundless" (*sic*) and "when words are used it is the suggestiveness of the words, and not their fixed denotations and connotations that reveals. . . ." The conditions which the author suggests are imposed generally on the understanding of these writings and sayings, must therefore apply equally to his own interpretation and translation of them. It follows then that this book reflects a highly subjective and personal view, although in consideration of the author's position and qualifications it must represent a significant one. The "suggestiveness" he describes must be puzzling to the logical mind, it is nevertheless the secret in China itself of the constantly topical character, of the most ancient writings.[1]

As the author insists that "inconsistencies" are to be expected in the material that forms the subject of his book, it would be irrelevant to seek for and point them out. Rather must the book be taken to be an interpretation of the thinking that has nurtured and sustained a remarkable people and their culture,

[1] Even what are ostensibly commentaries on the Classics, are often reformulations of them in a contemporary mood, or the distinctive thoughts of the commentator himself "sheltering" under the text and title of a writer whose antiquity and therefore acceptance, is beyond dispute.

uninhibited by notions of "consistency." But when it comes to adducing *reasons* for the differences that exist between European and Chinese thought Dr. Fung is on less sure ground. The differences for example in the geography and economic organization between Greece and China are of course matters of fact, but do they necessarily explain the differences in thought processes that the author points out? Can the contention of Dr. Fung that "Epistemology has never been developed in China" be explained simply in these terms? and need he have posed the question "Will the new Chinese philosophy cease to confine itself 'to concept by intuition'" in view of the changing economic structure of its society? Would it not have been sufficient to remark that the thinking of man in this part of the world has taken an independent line, uninfluenced by the peculiar conditioning that European thought has had from its constituent parts, and yet has been responsible for notable technological advances, and the evolution of a system of social organization, that was the marvel of medieval European travellers, without attributing it to an accident of geography or to the effects of a set of economic circumstances? Similarly Dr. Fung's theory, explaining the genesis of the "hundred schools" is hardly more convincing. He rightly condemns a Han "systematizers" explanation, that they derived from the nature of the offices their founder supposedly held; but in substituting classes in society for those offices, he merely reorientates an ancient theory based upon the "systematizing" that coloured Han scholarship, without avoiding the very weakness that inhibited it.

He is at his best, however, in reducing to a small and coherent compass, the "disconnected" thoughts of the philosophers he discusses in turn. For some of the philosophers and periods, indeed Dr. Fung's writings are the sole representative in European languages. He is conservative in his acceptance of traditional history, but not obdurately so, and he adopts a chronology that connects his discourse. He leaves a number of terms tantalisingly undefined, but as this is the genius of his authors, he is simply remaining in character. Perhaps this latter fact will assist the reader to appreciate the effect of the reading of this philosophy on minds to whom "logical analysis" proved to be a novelty.

A contemporary has complained that one looks in vain in Chinese philosophy for a "flash of Athenian questioning." That may well be, but is it not remarkable that the cultural achievements of the Chinese people could be of such a high order, and that those achievements could be initiated and sustained by a philosophical outlook, that has demanded none? And is it not of contemporary interest for Western Europeans to enquire in what consists that essential ingredient of Chinese thought and culture—viability?

W. A. C. H. Dobson.

---

*Socialism and Ethics.* By Howard Selsam. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1947. Pp. 224. Price 10s. 6d.)

It is part of the communist case to maintain that Marxist philosophy includes a system of ethics which is different from and superior to all other moral theories. This claim deserves serious consideration and Dr. Selsam's exposition of it may presumably be regarded as expressing the official view. Unfortunately, like all Marxist authorities, he has to keep to the party line and makes no secret of his contempt for liberal intellectuals who prefer to do their thinking for themselves. Hence we are given the familiar selection of half truths and misrepresentations about philosophy, politics and economics which every statement of the communist view has to contain. There is for

instance a lot of talk about the origin of the war and the wickedness of appeasement, but no mention of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. On the other hand, as the book appeared first in the United States in 1943, the author pulls his punches at the American way of life a good deal more than he would be permitted to do to-day. It is odd to read now in a communist authority (p. 174) that "such statesmen as Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin" regard the attainment of victory over fascism and the security of a just and lasting peace as the greatest moral problem and challenge that man has ever faced. But fairness and consistency are of course bourgeois prejudices.

We may pass over all this silliness, ignore a lot of contentious mis-statement of the views of non-Marxist philosophers and get down to business.

What is the Marxist analysis of ethical statements? Essentially it is simple and totally inadequate. There are, we learn, three basic propositions (p. 47). 1. Moral values change. 2. They change in accordance with changes in society's productive forces and its economic relations. 3. The dominant moral values at any given time are those of the dominant economic class.

As it stands this is not very helpful. It is elucidated somewhat by the statement (p. 59) that man is a moral animal, and in all societies and civilizations he creates ideals of what he wants his life to be and judges things and events as good or bad in so far as they help or hinder him in pursuing those ideals.

This sounds very naturalist and "subjective" though it is none the worse for that. On the face of it, it means that "This is good" is equivalent to "This is what the majority of the ruling class approve." But Marxists, unless they happen to live in Russia or Eastern Europe, do not mean that at all. So further elucidation is needed. This is indeed foreshadowed in Dr. Selsam's introduction. He says, "Marxism has elements of both relativism and absolutism. Marx maintains that 'Right can never be higher than the economic structure and the cultural development of society thereby determined' and yet at the same time he believes absolutely in the right and justice of the modern proletariat" (p. 12). This rather mysterious pronouncement is later explained by the doctrine that modern economic development inevitably leads to the substitution of the idea of a common or social good for the earlier conception that the interests of the individual are of paramount importance. It is in fact obvious or self-evident to every right-thinking or rational man that a constantly rising standard of material comfort for all is what every individual *ought* to want and to promote. Under modern conditions of mass production this can be done. But the capitalist economic system is inherently incapable of permitting it, even if individual capitalists approve of it. Therefore capitalist methods of production are a bad thing and all *rational* men ought to strive to abolish them (pp. 88–92).

Now this, while it may have something to be said for it on other grounds, is obviously a non-naturalist and "objective" view. It does not square at all with what was said earlier. How then is the gap to be bridged? Surprisingly enough, by the well-known method of assuming that in a rationally organized society there can be no conflict between the interests of the individual and those of the group. "It cannot be too much emphasised that Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and others, while generally not talking about moral values, humanity, and so forth, were constantly guided and inspired by the ideal of a rational, classless human society, in which the good of each was the good of all" (p. 92). Of course they were. So were Rousseau, Kant, Mill and all the other discredited bourgeois intellectuals. In fact as far as theory is concerned, Marxism has nothing to offer which has not been said and said more clearly many times before. It has merely a panacea which may or may not be effective for doing the trick and producing Utopia.

And so we are not surprised when in his concluding chapter on the meaning of "freedom" Dr. Selsam, like Rousseau and Hegel, is not content with freedom *from* want, fear, etc., but talks at length about freedom *to* achieve this and that. And then, of course, it makes sense to talk about forcing people to be free. Totalitarianism always gets there in the end. This is not a profound book. It contributes nothing to the solution of any question about ethics. All the same, it deserves attention because it is an authoritative statement of what purports to be a new and revolutionary moral theory, and as such it reveals only too clearly that there is nothing in that theory but old-fashioned confusions and mistakes, asserted in pretentious, dogmatic, and rather bellicose language.

T. D. WELDON.

---

*Certainty, Philosophical and Theological.* By DOM ILLTYD TRETHOWAN. (London: Dacre Press. 1948. Pp. viii + 170. Price 15s. net.)

This book deals primarily with the nature of the act of faith, though the first part treats of "philosophical certainty." The author, who is a monk of Downside Abbey, gives ample evidence of his reading in modern philosophical and theological literature. Indeed, the argument tends to proceed by way of a consideration of different philosophical and theological opinions. Thus the author starts with a delightful quotation from Professor Price and ends with one from the Belgian theologian, Père Aubert. But this does not mean that the book is a "patchwork." The author has obviously devoted a great deal of reflection and close reasoning to his theme, and the line of argument is, in general, clear enough.

The problem of the precise nature of the act of supernatural faith is a theological problem; and I do not feel competent to discuss it. Suffice it to say that Father Trethowan takes an original line and postulates a supernatural intuition or awareness of God as authenticating His objective revelation. No Catholic theologian would say that the act of faith is either simply the conclusion of a process of interference or a blind leap in the dark; something more is involved. What this "more" is constitutes the problem. The author develops an interesting thesis.

In the philosophical part of his book Father Trethowan maintains the existence of, for example, an intellectual intuition or direct awareness of bodies, so that any problem of the existence of the external world is ruled out as, to use Professor Price's words, "not only unnecessary but also misleading." I should agree that the Cartesian problem is an artificial problem, following only from certain gratuitous assumptions. There is a section on distinguishing waking from sleeping. For my own part, I do not see how the problem, if it were a real problem, could even suggest itself to us; and I am inclined to think that, in so far as it can be called a problem, it can be settled by an analysis of meaning. As to the existence of God, the author recognizes the difficulties which can be brought against the traditional proofs, and he maintains, partly under the influence of Maréchal, that every affirmation is implicitly an affirmation of God's existence. The subject of analogy, however, is much too difficult and obscure to be susceptible of treatment in a few paragraphs. One could hardly expect the author to devote much more space to it, given his purpose in writing; but it is none the less one of the crucial points of theistic metaphysics.

Father Trethowan writes as a Thomist; but he does not hesitate to depart from St. Thomas' teaching when he considers it wrong or inadequate. In doing so, he is only doing, of course, what Aquinas himself would approve. I imagine that the latter would react towards certain Thomists in much the

same way that the historic Aristotle would have reacted to his Renaissance disciple who refused to look through a telescope lest his astronomical ideas might be disturbed. But even though the author understands "following St. Thomas" in a wide and generous sense which would presumably permit of including Suarezians and Scotists as followers of St. Thomas, it is rather startling to read the statement, even with the qualifications given it, that "Catholic professors of theology and philosophy are obliged to teach the doctrines of St. Thomas." Surely Father Trethowan does not mean to imply that a university professor of philosophy who happens to be a Catholic is obliged to teach Thomism. I can think of several Catholic professors of philosophy who could scarcely be called Thomists; and I know of no ecclesiastical pronouncement binding Catholic professors in, say, a French or German university to be Thomists. And it would be odd to call every philosopher a "Thomist" whose philosophy was compatible with dogmatic theology.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

---

*The Ethics of Ambiguity*. By SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR. Translated from the French by Bernard Frechtman. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1948. Pp. 163. Price $3.00.)

The chief difficulty of dealing with a "new philosophy" such as French existentialism is to do it justice, but no more than justice. Using to some extent an unusual vocabulary to describe novel (or apparently novel) conceptions, it confronts the reader with the task of differentiating between the originality of the ideas and the mere novelty of the terminology before he can proceed to assess the value of these ideas themselves. When the work is translated from one language into another, that task becomes even more difficult. Madame de Beauvoir, whose philosophical writings are only partly homogeneous with those of Jean-Paul Sartre, does little to help the reader in this respect when she is expounding her arguments. She adores paradox. "Thus I can not genuinely desire an end to-day without desiring it through my whole existence, in so far as it is the future of this present moment and in so far as it is the surpassed past of days to come." "There can be a having-to-be only for a being who, according to the existentialist definition, questions himself in his being, a being who is at a distance from himself and who has to be his being." It would be easy, by quoting enough sentences of this character out of their contexts, to make nonsense of the book.

But in explaining the implications and applications of existentialist ethics, Madame de Beauvoir writes more clearly and effectively. She shows the close affiliations of her philosophy with that of Kierkegaard, and its connections with the ideas of Hegel, Kant, and Fichte. She shows how it opens up a new critique of Marxist determinism, and how it can claim affinities with liberal democratic conceptions of freedom though not with utilitarian conceptions of the individual.

How do existentialist ethics survive these more specific tests of value? By "ambiguity" the author means recognition of the tension between good and evil, between the urge to create and respect certain human values such as freedom and equality and the haunting sense of individual futility and helplessness in the modern world. Her descriptions of "the serious man" and "the sub-man," both denying the value of human personality as an end in itself, throw considerable light on the political implications of her beliefs. It is a creed for our times and therefore, perhaps, temporary. The basic claim of existentialism to attention is not that it provides any definitive "answer" or final "solution" to the moral predicament of our times, but that at least it

recognizes, as few of the older philosophies recognize, the urgent reality of our moral predicament. It presupposes no natural or automatic harmony of interests, no "invisible hand" ensuring that "somehow good will be the final goal of ill." It confronts man with the duty of answering his own predicament. And since the immediate political and economic problems are stated in terms of moral and human dilemmas, it can claim to be seeking a more realistic moral philosophy. Ultimately, the predicament is seen as the twin facts that if, on one hand, "existence is consumption," it is spending and using up, so that "every living movement is a movement towards death," yet on the other hand "every movement towards death is life." Its answer is that "man fulfills himself within the transitory or not at all." It is, in one aspect, a philosophy of time. And, as Mr. J. B. Priestley discovered before the war, such philosophies lend themselves well to dramatic interpretation. It is no accident that Madame de Beauvoir, like Sartre himself, finds in drama one of her most apt forms of self-expression.

The book can be recommended, therefore, as a stimulating and concise exposition of the ethical implications of existentialist beliefs, though as a coherent philosophical explanation of those beliefs themselves it fails at times through obscurity of expression, at others through inadequacy of logic.

DAVID THOMSON.

---

*An Introduction to Ethics.* By WILLIAM LILLIE. (Methuen, London. 1948. Pp. 324. Price 12s. 6d.

The ethics to which Mr. Lillie's book serves as an introduction is the sort of ethics that was taught at Oxford in the twenty-one years between the two world wars.

The titles of his chapters are *Rights and Duties, Virtues,* together with *Law, Intuition, Pleasure, Value, Perfection* and *Evolution* considered as Moral Standards. In his preface, the author acknowledges his debt to Mackenzie's *Manual of Ethics* and his own book is clearly intended as a more modern form of that work, and especially as a primer for first year university students.

Mr. Lillie writes very clearly and I think it would be hard to find a more useful summary of the several theories which he discusses. He has, of course, his own point of view in ethics and in one or two chapters he allows his opinions to obtrude themselves. Still, he is admirably detached at all times and conspicuously fair to those authors with whom he does not agree. I have only one thing to say against this book. However well it may serve as an introduction to ethics as the author understands this field, it can provide very little help to the student in his approach to the many ethical questions which are nowadays in the forefront. Mr. Lillie makes a very short passing reference to the emotive theory of ethics, but, apart from a cursory consideration in a section devoted to logical positivism, the problem of ethics and language is not explored even in the most general terms. The names of Broad, Moore, Ross, Rashdall, Laird, Sidgwick, Paton occur frequently and there is even some reference to the views of Mr. C. S. Lewis, but Mr. Lillie has not thought it worth his while to give the same consideration to the views of Stephenson, Wisdom, Ayer and Wittgenstein.

I am not criticizing this book because its author's interests are unfashionable. That would be unfair and absurd. My point is, on the contrary, that Mr. Lillie could have been criticized fifteen years ago for being *too* fashionable. Here is an example of Mr. Lillie's writing (from p. 301).

". . . many may hold . . . that there is a special moral value in doing an action simply because it is a duty, and not because it appeals to any other

motive. It is through such acts of willing what is contrary to a man's own inclinations that a strong character is developed. The sense of duty does have a place in the moral life, but it is not the only motive to good actions. The aim of the good man is to form such habits of doing his duty . . . that he may do good automatically. . . ."

Surely, all this question-begging talk about "acts of willing," "the moral life," "the sense of duty" and "actions appealing to motives" needs to be translated into the currency of ordinary speech? Mr. Lillie wants ethics considered in the context of life and experience. Yet in his writing he uses a special language which is not merely woolly, but often moth-eaten, too.

Perhaps it is too much to hope for an ethics book which is free from jargon—and, assuredly, there is no-one more prolix in jargon than the currently fashionable Professor Stephenson—but at least we have come nowadays to expect a certain self-consciousness, a certain caution in the *expression* of ethical notions.

Mr. Lillie's great fault—and it is one that exists together with several outstanding merits as a critic and expositor—is his insensibility to language. His book may give its best service to the student who has already learned to be critical when Mr. Lillie is most assured and unquestioning.

MAURICE CRANSTON.

---

*George Sylvester Morris.* By MARC EDMUND JONES. (Philadelphia: David McKay Co. 1948. Pp. xvi + 430. Price $3.75.)

To attempt to rescue from oblivion some minor philosophical figure is a somewhat hazardous undertaking—unless one is absolutely certain that he has a significant message which we cannot afford to overlook to-day. Dr. Jones believes that his fellow-countryman, George Sylvester Morris, has such a message and is hence worth rescuing. He has therefore made Morris the subject of a full-length study, blending details of his life with an exposition of his philosophy.

How welcome this essay in resuscitation will be in the United States, is a matter of conjecture; it is true that Morris was the "teacher and patron" of John Dewey, but Dewey himself has diverged so sharply from his erstwhile mentor that we can gain no new insight into the origins of instrumentalism from a study of Morris's theistic idealism.

Morris, we might say, is typical of a certain period in Western philosophy. Having rebelled against Scottish intuitionalism and English empiricism alike, his idealistic leanings (fortified by a period of study in Germany under Trendelenburg) impelled him towards that Neo-Hegelianism which became so popular during the latter part of last century. It was this philosophy which he adopted and endeavoured to modify along "experientalist" lines. At the same time he was obsessed with the idea of accommodating his philosophy to Christian orthodoxy, and conversely of adequately rationalizing his passionately held religious faith. This led him to declare that "Christianity, in its Scriptures, either directly contains, or else immediately and obviously presupposes, a theory of knowledge and of the objects of knowledge—of the Absolute (or God), of the finite world, and of man—which is not only confirmed by the results of philosophic inquiry, but also has positively contributed, in the most marked way, to the enrichment of philosophic science itself." With these remarks St. Bonaventure would have been in complete agreement—but few would feel the same way about them to-day. And Morris, despite his anxiety to keep within the limits of experience, found himself, as a philosopher,

involved in (what must appear to us) the inevitable confusions consequent on mixing philosophy with positive theology.

Dr. Jones's biographical details are skilfully presented, and his exposition of Morris's philosophy is, on the whole, easy to follow. At times, however, his phraseology and style leave much to be desired—as for instance: "(Morris's) idealism is dynamic because the ideater (or any given reality becoming a point of attention in mind) is indomitably central in all possible ramifications of the corresponding experience or relationship" (p. 321). There are other examples of such linguistic opacity.

My general impression is that the reader will find that Morris has little of value to offer him to-day. The philosophical problems that have come to the fore in recent years require for their solution an essentially modern approach; and although metaphysics, at present reeling under positivistic attack, may (and no doubt will) eventually come into its own again, this will scarcely be by way of Neo-Hegelianism. J. HARTLAND-SWANN.

---

*The Crisis of the Human Person.* By J. B. COATES. (Longmans, Pp. 256. 12s. 6d.)

Personalism, as the name of a school of philosophy, is not yet familiar in England. But there is a flourishing Society of Personalists in France, with a monthly journal called *Esprit*, and there is a Personalist group in London of which Mr. J. B. Coates is the secretary. As the name of the author is perhaps not very well known, your reviewer wishes to express his decided opinion that he has written an extremely able work, which ought to be widely read. It deals with some of the latest trends in contemporary thought.

Mr. Coates confines himself rightly to contemporary philosophy. His choice of representative men may certainly be criticized. Bertrand Russell, Santayana, Lippmann, Von Hügel and Radhakrishnan are more considerable names than Mannheim, Laski, Herbert Read, and C. S. Lewis. But the author, though he hates Marxism, is rather afraid of it, and writes with Communist propaganda always in his mind. The head of the French Society of Personalists, Mounier, though he rejects Marxism decidedly, is none the less, as Mr. Coates says, "in the Marxist tradition." This cannot be said of the London group.

Personalism is closely related to Existentionalism, a fine long word, as the Cambridge Platonists said when they were called Latitudinarians, which they pronounce as glibly as if they understood it. Some existentialists are religious, others are atheistic. As a reviewer in the April number of *Philosophy* says, it is impossible to foresee whether existentialism is simply a passing form of reaction or protest against the over-estimate of the objective universal in philosophy, such as inevitably tends to recur in the history of philosophy, or whether it will succeed in making a permanent and constructive contribution to philosophy.

But the best part of Mr. Coates' book is his exposition of the philosophy of three men whom he acknowledges as his chief teachers, Berdyaeff, Kierkegaard, and Buber. He also speaks with great respect of the Catholic writer, Maritain, and of Lewis Mumford. He admires Aldous Huxley and Gerald Heard, but blames them for what he calls "defeatism," because they have no constructive programme for the present. These writers would no doubt answer that we have struck a very bad patch in history, which may even be a prelude to another dark age, and that the best thing we can do now is to make sure that oases of the higher culture will survive, perhaps in the communal institutions which are likely to supply an urgent want. The monasteries of the dark age very imperfectly discharged this function when Western Europe was a welter of violence and barbarism. We may hope that if the new communities attempt

this duty, they will do it more intelligently than the age which solemnly burnt the Odes of Sappho and preserved the filthy Petronius and Apuleius, which allowed most of the great tragedians, and parts of Livy and Tacitus to perish, while they preserved Cornelius Nepos and tons of worthless theology.

It is sometimes the easiest way to understand a philosophy by naming the schools of thought to which it is strongly opposed. Mr. Coates' Personalism rejects scientific or dialectical materialism, primarily because it denies spiritual values, interprets history in terms of economism, and repudiates the very ideal of free creative personalities. Here he finds full support in Berdyaeff and Koestler, both of whom have had personal experience of Soviet Russia and have reacted violently against it. Stalin "has planted reaction firmly in the saddle." Koestler tells of immense increases in economic privilege, of directors who receive 300 times the minimum wage, of colonels who receive 140 times the pay of privates, of capital punishment as the official penalty for strikers, of the complete destruction of political democracy, of the revival of public hangings, film close-ups of strangulation being provided, of the iniquitous trials with their extorted confessions, and of the notorious labour camps where prisoners live under unspeakable conditions. "Men cannot be transformed by making them walk shoulder to shoulder." Collectivism binds liberty hand and foot to the dictatorship of a party or of a group of functionaries." "God is a Spirit, and spirit knows nothing of the relation of domination and slavery." Berdyaeff condemns sovietism in no measured terms. It seeks to enslave the higher powers of the soul to one of its subordinate faculties in the interests of what are called practical activities.

Personalism rejects totalitarianism in all its forms, including the authoritarian legalism of the Western Catholic Church, which Berdyaeff thinks is more inimical to spiritual freedom than Eastern Orthodoxy. The East, he thinks, in making the Holy Spirit central, is more favourable to freedom than the Church of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.

Berdyaeff agrees with Bosanquet that one of the worst evils of modern thought is its tendency to project its hopes into the future. Recent events, we may hope, have given a deathblow to the secularized apocalyptism which in the last century was a ridiculous substitute for Christian eschatology.

Berdyaeff believed that what he calls the new middle ages (should we not rather call the present time the meddle and muddle age?) will see a great revival of mystical religion. Mr. Coates agrees, but he has a distrust of the growing vogue of Indian religion and philosophy. Asceticism, if it goes beyond the hard training of the Christian athlete, is based on the belief that our lower instincts and desires must be simply rejected, not sublimated. Eastern mysticism also tends to depersonalize both man and God. The annihilation of the will, which is sometimes recommended—leave nothing of myself in me, as Crashaw makes St. Teresa pray—means the annihilation of the personality; the saint who has attained Nirvana has ceased to be a creative force for good in the world, has ceased to be an agent with God in the achievement of His purposes.

The author also rejects "humanism," which he uses "almost in the sense of positivism or agnosticism." But the words have not the same meaning, and "humanism," as used by many writers, has its place in ethics and philosophy.

Lastly, he rejects capitalism, on the ground that the shareholder as such has no longer any necessary function in society. He gives a chapter to Burnham's *Managerial Revolution*, which shows that all big businesses are now conducted by salaried managers and their staffs.

We may now turn to the positive teaching of Mr. Coates' Personalism. It owes something to Lotze, who finds reality in the concrete existence of the

personality in its movement towards ultimate value; and also to Scheler, who emphasizes the independence and creativeness of personality. One great merit of Kierkegaard and Berdyaeff is that both of them have lived their philosophy. The depth of personal convictions in both these writers is most impressive. Martin Buber's little book, *I and Thou*, should be better known than it is. Man, he says, forms two relationships, that with the world of objects, which he indicates by the combination *I–It*, and the relationship of *I–Thou*, with nature, with persons, and with God. Reality and meaning belong only to the second type. There are three pathways to reality, by art, by love, and by mystical experience. But the life of Spirit is always one of relations, and of relation not to a world of objects, an *It*, but to a single object. False mysticism, by obliterating the distinction between subject and object, makes love impossible. Buber emphasizes the true freedom and spontaneity of the spiritual life.

We must distinguish between the individual and the person. Individuals are monads shut up within themselves, *solida pollentia simplicitate* as Lucretius says. Personality, though its centre is never lost, may expand till all experience is within its circumference. "In *I–Thou* relationships, in the world of pure effective action, man escapes from causality." In all real prayer, as in all love, the *I–Thou* relationship is never transcended. Prayer is never a soliloquy nor a spiritual dumbbell exercise.

Personalism then believes that we are not fully personal to begin with. There must be a change, a growth, a transformation of *psyche* into *pneuma*, of soul into spirit. This, it need not be said, is no new doctrine. The Platonic *Nous*, the Indian *Atman*, are the universal self which the individual may win without losing his identity. It is really the central doctrine of St. Paul, of whom the author once quotes without disapproval a superficial and disparaging estimate. It is the only blot in the book. The soul is an Amphibium, having relations both with a higher and with a lower level than its own. In order to become "spiritual" I must die to the lower self. What asceticism there is in St. Paul is part of the severe struggle to get free from "the old man" with his deceitful lusts. What distinguishes St. Paul's psychology from the similar schemes which have been mentioned is the emphasis on love as the fulfilling of the law, and the fine words that "love is the energy of faith." St. Paul doubtless remembered the words of Christ that only he who is willing to lose his *psyche* can keep it unto life eternal.

The book ends with a declaration of faith in theism. "It seems to me indisputable that this experience of God can re-energize human souls, can make possible a degree of personal integration and detachment from self-regarding impulses otherwise unattainable, and can lead to that capacity for heroism, that cheerful acceptance of tragedy, that willingness to take on oneself the sufferings of others, that is the basis of the highest human virtues and achievements."

W. R. Inge.

---

*The Moral Law, or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.* By H. J. Paton. (Hutchinson's University Library. Pp. v + 151.)

This book is a new translation by Professor Paton of Kant's *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*. The translation is preceded by an analysis of the argument, which occupies forty pages, and it is followed by eleven pages of explanatory notes.

So far as I am aware the only English translation hitherto available has been that of Dr. T. K. Abbott of Trinity College, Dublin. This is not published separately, but is the first item in a set of translations of all Kant's main

ethical works, issued in one volume by Messrs. Longman under the title of *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and other Works on the Theory of Ethics.* Most of us were brought up on this book, but I do not know whether it is still in print.

I do not think that Professor Paton's book will supersede Abbott's, because anyone making a serious study of Kant's ethics will need the other works and will find it handy to have them all together. But even such students will find Professor Paton's translation a valuable supplement to Abbott's book, and they might be well advised to substitute it for Abbott's translation of the *Grundlegung.* Undergraduates beginning the study of Kant's ethics will find Professor Paton's excellent analysis a most valuable first-aid in struggling with a rather difficult and very important philosophical classic. For a critical account and a sympathetic defence of Kant's ethical doctrines by the greatest living English Kantian scholar they may be referred to Professor Paton's companion volume *The Categorical Imperative.*

In his preface Professor Paton stresses the absolutely fundamental importance of this work of Kant's to anyone who proposes to philosophize about morality. I agree with this judgment. If Kant was mistaken, his mistakes are generally more enlightening and original than other men's correctitudes. It is important that Kant's work in ethics should be available in a good and easily obtainable translation, not only for its intrinsic importance, but also because it has been peculiarly exposed to unfair criticisms based on ignorance or misrepresentation of what he said. A recent glaring instance of this is to be found in the chapter on Kant in Earl Russell's *History of Western Philosophy,* from which I extract the following gem. "Kant gives as an illustration of the categorical imperative that it is wrong to borrow money, because, if we all tried to do so, there would be no money left to borrow." Kant was not a fool; he never taught or thought that it is wrong to borrow money; and nothing remotely resembling this nonsense is to be found in his writings. What he did discuss is the case of a man who borrows money and is tempted to evade repaying it because it would be inconvenient for him to do so. So long as it is possible for an eminent philosopher to misrepresent Kant's ethical doctrines to this extent and to "get away with it," translations and analyses such as this of Professor Paton's will not be superfluous. C. D. Broad.

---

*Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion.* By Reidar Thomte. (Princeton University Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1948. Pp. viii, 228. 18s. net.)

"It is the purpose of this book to furnish an introduction to the religious thought of Kierkegaard, and to stimulate interest in the study of his works." Mr. Thomte takes the reader through the three "stages" described by Kierkegaard; and he shows clearly the latter's pre-occupation with the question how one becomes a Christian or what it means to be a Christian. He is perfectly right in saying that Kierkegaard's "existentialism is religious through and through." Adopting this point of view he is able to expose Kierkegaard's thought in the proper light, in the light, that is to say, in which Kierkegaard himself saw it.

My chief criticism of the book is that there is too much Kierkegaard and too little Thomte. Kierkegaard wrote much that was beautiful, especially in his purely religious works, and the author rightly quotes therefrom; but Kierkegaard sometimes rivals Hegel for obscurity, and I question the wisdom of copious quotations, especially in an introductory work designed to send the reader to the original. Mr. Thomte's elucidations of Kierkegaard's ideas

often throw light on a somewhat murky background; and I wish that there were more of them.

Can Kierkegaard be regarded as a philosopher of religion? Well, it all depends, of course, on what one understands by "philosophy." That he can prove a most salutary gadfly, especially perhaps to those of us who are Christians, I willingly admit; but if all attempts to prove the reasonableness of accepting God's existence and the Christian revelation are deliberately discarded in favour of "an objective uncertainty held fast in the most passionate inwardness," I do not see how a philosophy of religion based on these premisses can amount to more than a phenomenology of the religious consciousness. Kierkegaard's writings can certainly appeal, by what he called "indirect communication," to the individual's "subjectivity" and "inwardness"; but can such a procedure be called "philosophy"? It is at least a debatable question. However, it is true that in his aesthetic works Kierkegaard gives "a comparative morphology of life attitudes"; and it is also true that his analysis of the stages implies a theory of the hierarchy of values.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

---

*Aquinas Selected Political Writings.* Edited with an Introduction by A. P. d'Entrèves. Translated by J. G. Dawson. (Basil Blackwell. Price 9s. 6d.)

This is a further volume in the valuable series of Political Texts which Mr. Blackwell has made available to readers in the last few years. It is fitting that St. Thomas should find a place there, and Professor d'Entrèves is a most suitable interpreter of his thought. Not, indeed, that all admirers of St. Thomas will be entirely satisfied with some of the things he says about his author in the Introduction. In particular, his remarks on the subject of intolerance and religious freedom are misleading. It is true that St. Thomas says all that is here attributed to him; but there are certain general principles which must be stressed if we are to understand the whole mind of Aquinas and of the mediaeval Church. Surely the passage in the *Summa* (II. IIae: 10, 12) should have been included, beginning with the striking words: *Injustice should be done to no man. . . .* And, in this context, II. IIae, 11, 4, ad i is surely important. I add this, to take away the unfortunate implications of "a thorough, totalitarian intolerance" (p. xxii). But it would be ungracious to end on this note. Professor d'Entrèves and his collaborator, Mr. Dawson, have produced a useful volume, which should be of real value to the student of political philosophy.

THOMAS CORBISHLEY.

---

*The De Primo Principio of Duns Scotus.* A revised text and translation by Evan Roche, O.F.M., Ph.D. (The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York.)

Father Roche has done a useful work in editing this text of what he rightly describes as "the greatest of the shorter works of Duns Scotus." Textual criticism of Scotus is notoriously beset with almost insoluble problems, but Fr. Roche seems to have done his work conscientiously and scientifically. It is not possible, alas, to speak so highly of the translation, which in the difficult passages does little to shed light on the obscurities of the original, and is at all times marked by a literalness which produces such infelicities as "Something visible is a more perfectly knowable than something non-visible, which is only abstractively intelligible"; or, "Therefore the intellect understanding every intelligible according to every meaning of positive intelligibility understands distinct positive entities of many individuals,

which entities posit greater perfection in an intellection than the intellection of one of them; because the intellection of every positive absolute entity, inasmuch as it is an intellection of that, is some perfection. . . .'' Doubtless Scotus himself is responsible for much of the difficulty of comprehending such a passage: but the translation can be understood only by referring back to the Latin. THOMAS CORBISHLEY.

---

*The Renaissance Philosophy of Man,* edited by Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman Randall, Jr. (The University of Chicago Press. 1948. Pp. viii + 405. Price 27s. 6d.)

This volume provides the reader with translations of philosophic writings by leading figures of the Italian Renaissance. The writers chosen are Petrarca, Lorenzo Valla, Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, Pomponazzi and Vives. A general introduction traces the features of the philosophy of the early Renaissance in Italy and there are also introductions to the several translations. Among the passages translated are Valla's *Dialogue on Free Will,* Ficino's treatise, *Five questions concerning the Mind,* and Pico's *Oration on the dignity of Man.* A majority of the works included in the series have not before been presented in English versions.

The extracts show the rise in Italy of three lines of intellectual culture, humanism, Platonism and a revived Aristotelianism. At the head of the movement stands the enchanting genius Petrarca, whose poems and treatises express the new interest in personal life and the revolt from scholastic logic. The introduction to his writings in this volume performs the feat of describing his outlook without mentioning the Canzoniere. In the polemical treatise *On his own ignorance and that of many others,* composed in 1367, he ridicules with bewitching eloquence the dogmatism of the Aristotelians and indulges his passion for the three beloved masters, Cicero, Augustine and Plato. There is little philosophical discussion. Nor can Valla be accounted a philosopher. He expressed the strongest aversion to the enquiries of the ancients and to the dialectics of the schools; the *Dialogue on Free Will* describes philosophy as the seed-bed of heresy, and the problem of reconciling God's foreknowledge and man's free will is abandoned to the wisdom of God. The translations and speculations of Marsilio Ficino bring us to the strongest force in Renaissance Platonism. The treatise included here manifests his dominant interest, the reconciliation of philosophy and religion. Although the argument relies on Neo-Platonic doctrines it employs also typical positions of scholastic metaphysics, such as the conceptions of *appetitus naturalis* and the hierarchy of species under God. Other influential sides of Ficino's writings, his mysticism, his doctrine of love and his Platonic view of beauty are not touched on in the introduction to the translation. But the theory of the soul is well described.

The other eminent figure of the Platonic Academy, Pico della Mirandela, contributed vital ideas to the literature of the Renaissance. The highly rhetorical *Oration* proclaims the unique liberty of man and opens more widely than had ever been proposed before the range of philosophical enquiry. It is an astonishing display for a youth of twenty-four. In Pomponazzi we meet at length a genuine and a daring philosopher. He was the commanding thinker in the Aristotelian humanism of the early sixteenth century, though, as Mr. Randall points out in his admirable introduction, this departure must be seen in relation to the scientific naturalism of the school of Padua. The whole of the famous treatise *On the Immortality of the Soul* is here translated. It is one of the most refreshing treatises of late scholasticism. Pomponazzi refutes in detail not only the arguments in favour of the immortality of the individual

mind but also those supporting the fashionable belief in the collective immortality of Averroism. Of the latter view he writes that "it is not only in itself most false; it is unintelligible and monstrous and quite foreign to Aristotle. Indeed, I think that Aristotle never even thought of such nonsense, let alone believed it." The points made against Averroism are largely borrowed from St. Thomas. But he rejects the Thomist arguments for the immortality of the intellectual soul, pressing everywhere the Aristotelian principle of the organic relation of form to matter. The human material form ceases with the death of the body. The objections from morality and religion are met by the answer that "the essential reward of virtue is virtue itself." Pomponazzi's declaration of the double truth is not discussed, and indeed it is secondary to his reassertion of naturalism. The series of translations concludes oddly with the artificial *Fable about Man* by the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives. There is a comprehensive bibliography for the student.

The collection assuredly brings the reader more closely to the thought and manner of the leading humanists of Italy than the usual summaries; and the passages are fully annotated. Inevitably, some important parts of their doctrines are left unnoticed. It must be admitted that most of the great humanists used Platonism and the philosophies of the schools to supplement their literary, artistic and mystical interests. The diverse relations between the new moral prospect of the fifteenth century and academic philosophy are exhibited in living tones in this volume. M. H. Carré.

---

*The Psychology of Imagination*. By Jean-Paul Sartre. Philosophical Library. (New York. 1948. Pp. 285. Price $3.75.)

This book is an English translation of *L'imaginaire* (1948). M. Sartre starts with a description of the image as known to reflection. There is no image in a consciousness which contains it; the image is itself a complete consciousness. What the imaginative consciousness of Peter "intends" is Peter himself; but it is not a faint or vague perception; the characteristic of its intentional object is that the latter "is not present and is posited as such, or that it does not exist and is posited as not existing, or that it is not posited at all." The author then proceeds, on the basis of evidence provided by observation and experiment, to form an hypothesis concerning the nature and components of the psychic factor which functions as an "analogue" in the mental image.

M. Sartre goes on to discuss the role of the image in mental life. The image is not an illustration or support for thought; imaginative consciousness represents a certain type of thought. "Thought takes the image form when it wishes to be intuitive, when it wants to ground its affirmations on the *vision* of an object. In that case, it tries to make the object appear before it, in order to *see* it, or better still, to *possess* it." This means that the act of imagination is a "magical incantation" designed to produce the thing desired, with a view to possession. But the image has the character of unreality; and consideration of this fact leads the author to consider human behaviour towards the unreal. Under the heading "the imaginary life" he includes the subjects of schizophrenia, hallucination, and the dream.

Finally it is asked what characteristics must be attributed to consciousness in general in view of the fact that it is capable of being an imagining consciousness, that it is able to posit successively real objects and imagined objects. "It must be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality and it must be able to posit the imagined object as being out of reach of this synthetic totality." It could not do this, M. Sartre argues, if psychological determinism were true;

but, on the other hand, being-in-the-world is a necessary condition for imagination. Are these conditions, freedom and being in the world, a contingent specification of the essence "consciousness"? No, they reveal the essence of consciousness: "imagination is the whole of consciousness as it realizes its freedom." It is "absurd to conceive of a consciousness which would not imagine." The book ends with a section on the work of art, in which we are told that "beauty is a value applicable only to the imaginary."

In spite of his sometimes difficult and "Germanic" style, which reaches its culmination in *L'être et le néant*, M. Sartre writes interestingly on philosophy, and his phenomenological descriptions are often acute and enlightening. His treatment of imagination will probably fail to satisfy the reader who is primarily concerned with the epistemological role of the image; but it is interesting to see how the author develops his theme of what one might call the life-role of imagination. It is also interesting to observe how M. Sartre, starting out to give a phenomenology of imagination, ends by presenting us with an implicit metaphysic. Man is portrayed as a being-in-the-world and as free. But is freedom really a necessary condition for imagining? So far as observation from outside enables one to judge, dogs at least appear to imagine and to dream; but we do not think of them as free in the sense in which M. Sartre uses the word "freedom." And if imagining means creating images at will or freely, it would be superfluous, though true, to say that freedom is a condition.

M. Sartre also presents us, by an implication which is clear to every intelligent reader, with atheism. He contends that it is absurd to conceive a consciousness without the power of imagining. This is tantamount to saying that it is absurd to conceive a non-embodied consciousness. If being-in-the-world is a necessary condition of imagining; and if the power of imagining necessarily belongs to all consciousness; it follows that being-in-the-world is a necessary condition of all consciousness. I fail to see how all this is revealed in the *cogito*, as M. Sartre seems to think it is. Of course, the linguistic problem, or rather the problem of meaning, crops up at this point; but the author does not discuss this matter, and I shall follow his example.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

---

Books also received:

W. Y. EVANS-WENTZ. *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*. London: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 1 + 248. 18s.

F. A. VOIGT. *Pax Britannica*. London: Constable & Co. Ltd. 1949. Pp. viii + 576. 25s.

LAWRENCE HYDE. *Spirit and Society*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1949. Pp. viii + 246. 10s. 6d.

THOMAS HYWEL HUGHES. *The Atonement (Modern Theories of the Doctrine)*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1949. Pp. 328. 15s.

JOHN A. O'BRIEN. *Truths Men Live By*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1948. Pp. xiv + 427. 17s. 6d.

DR. JADUNATH SINHA. *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*. Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal. 1949. Pp. iv + 314. 8 rupees.

J. D. MABBOTT. *The State and the Citizen*. London: Hutchinson's University Library. 1948. Pp. 180. 7s. 6d.

EDWARD WALES HIRST. *Morality and God*. London: Epworth Press. 1949. Pp. 86. 6s.

G. H. LANGLEY. *Sri Aurobindo*. London: Christopher Johnson Publishers Ltd. (David Marlowe Ltd.). 1949. Pp. 135. 10s. 6d.

LEWIS WHITE BECK, Editor. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*. U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1949. Pp. xv + 370. 27s. 6d.

GEORGE HUMPHREY. *On Psychology To-day* (*An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford*). Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1949. Pp. 24. 2s.

ELIE HALÉVY. *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism*. London: Faber & Faber Ltd. 1949 (Reprint). Pp. xvii + 554. 25s.

MARTIN BUBER. *Paths in Utopia*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1949. Pp. 152. 15s.

FELIX KAUFMANN. *Methodology of the Social Sciences*. New York: Oxford University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1944. Pp. viii + 272. 20s.

W. D. ROSS. *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics—a Revised Text and Commentary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1949. Pp. x + 690. 42s.

THOMAS MUNRO. *The Arts and their Interrelations*. New York: Liberal Arts Press. 1949. Pp. xv + 559. $7.50.

NATHAN ISAACS. *The Foundations of Common Sense*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1949. Pp. vii + 208. 15s.

TROY WILSON ORGAN. *An Index to Aristotle*. U.S.A.: Princeton University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1949. Pp. vi + 181. 27s. 6d.

W. B. GALLIE. *An English School*. London: Cresset Press. 1949. Pp. 162. 7s. 6d.

ROY WOOD SELLERS, V. J. MCGILL AND MARVIN FARBER, Editors. *Philosophy for the Future—the Quest of Modern Materialism*. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1949. Pp. xiv + 657. 37s. 6d.

D. J. B. HAWKINS. *The Essentials of Theism*. London: Sheed & Ward. 1949. Pp. 151. 7s. 6d.

HENRI DE LUBAC, S.J. *The Drama of Atheist Humanism*. London: Sheed & Ward. 1949. Pp. x + 252. 15s.

E. F. CALDIN. *The Power and Limits of Science*. London: Chapman & Hall. 1949. Pp. ix + 196. 12s. 6d.

OTIS LEE. *Existence and Inquiry*. U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1949. Pp. ix + 323. 22s. 6d.

D. LUTHER EVANS. *A Free Man's Faith*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. ix + 194. $3.00.

JACQUES DE MARQUETTE. *Introduction to Comparative Mysticism*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 229. $3.75.

SWAMI AKHILANANDA. *Hindu View of Christ*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 291. $3.00.

RUDOLF KAYSER. *The Life and Time of Jehudah Halevi*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 176. $3.75.

WALTER MCINTOSH MERRILL. *From Statesman to Philosopher—A Study in Bolingbroke's Deism*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 284. $3.50.

KALI PRASAD. *The Psychology of Meaning*. India: University of Lucknow. 1949. Pp. iii + 209. 15s.

RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE. *The Social Function of Art*. Bombay: Hind Kitabs Ltd. 1948. Pp. xxiv + 355. Rs. 25.

SHRI KUMARASWAMIJI. *Religion of Humanity, The Virashaiva—Philosophy and Mysticism* and *The Veerashaiva Weltanschauung*. Dharwar, India: V. R. Koppal, Tontadarya Press. 1941–8. No prices stated.

DAGOBERT D. RUNES. *Letters to My Son.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 92. $2.75.

G. J. WHITROW. *The Structure of the Universe.* London: Hutchinson & Co. (University Library). 1949. Pp. 171. 7s. 6d.

L. P. JACKS. *Sir Arthur Eddington—Man of Science and Mystic* (*The Second Memorial Lecture*, 1948). Cambridge University Press. 1949. Pp. 33, 2s.

G. H. VON WRIGHT. *Form and Content in Logic* (*An Inaugural Lecture*). Cambridge University Press. 1949. Pp. 35. 1s. 6d.

PAUL SIWEK. *The Mechanical Theory of Life.* Reprinted from the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. 1949. Pp. 9.

H. L. STEWART. *Dante and the Schoolmen.* Reprinted from *Journal of the History of Ideas.* June 1949. Pp. 17.

DEFERRARI, BARRY AND MCGUINESS, Editors. (See October PHILOSOPHY.) *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas. Fascicle II.* Washington, U.S.A.: The Catholic University of America Press. 1949. Pp. 232. $12.50.

GEORGE ADAMS AND OLIVE WHICHER. *The Living Plant and the Science of Physical and Ethereal Spaces.* Stourbridge, Worcs.: Goethean Science Foundation. 1949. Pp. 77. 8s. 6d.

S'RINIVASADASA. *Yatindramatadipika.* Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math. 1949. Pp. xliii + 212. Rs. 5.

RICHARD N. BENDER. *A Philosophy of Life.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 250. $3.75.

G. W. KEETON AND G. SCHWARZENBERGER, Editors. *Current Legal Problems* 1949, *Vol.* 2. The Faculty of Laws, University College, London: Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1949. Pp. ix + 288. 21s.

BENEDETTO CROCE. *My Philosophy—Essays on the Moral and Political Problems of Our Time.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1949. Pp. 240. 15s.

ARTHUR N. PRIOR. *Logic and the Basis of Ethics.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1949. Pp. xi + 111. 8s. 6d.

T. E. JESSOP, Editor. *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Volume* 2. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons. 1949. Pp. 294. 30s.

GILBERT RYLE. *The Concept of Mind.* London: Hutchinson & Co. 1949. Pp. 334. 12s. 6d.

SATISCHANDRA CHATTERJEE. *The Problems of Philosophy.* Calcutta: Das Gupta & Co. Ltd. 1949. Pp. xvi + 345. Rs. 6/8.

HANS REGNÉLL. *Symbolization and Fictional Reference.* Lund, Sweden: C. W. K. Gleerup. 1949. Pp. 221. Kr. 9:50.

SIR LESLIE STEPHEN, K.C.B. *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century.* Vols. I and II. New York: Peter Smith. 1949. Pp. xvii + 466 and xi + 469. $12.50.

ALEX COMFORT. *The Pattern of the Future* (four broadcast talks). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1949. Pp. 53. 6s.

ANANDA K. COOMAROASWAMY. *The Bugbear of Literacy.* London: Dennis Dobson Ltd. 1949. Pp. xiv + 130. 7s. 6d.

VINCENT A. MCCROSSEN. *The New Renaissance of the Spirit.* New York: Philosophical Library. Pp. x + 250. $3.00.

MORITZ SCHLICK. *Philosophy of Nature.* New York: Philosophical Library. Pp. xi + 136. $3.00.

J. M. THOMPSON. *The Spider's Web.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1949. Pp. 61. 6s.

J. W. DOORLY. *God and Science.* London: Frederick Muller Ltd. 1949. Pp. 227. 10s. 6d.

JOHN DEWEY AND ARTHUR F. BENTLEY. *Knowing and the Known.* Boston, Ma.: The Beacon Press. 1949. Pp. v + 334. $4.

WILBUR MARSHALL URBAN. *Beyond Realism and Idealism*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1949. Pp. v + 226. 18s.

JULES VUILLEMIN. *L'Etre et le Travail* (*les conditions dialectiques de la psychologie et de la sociologie*). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1949. Pp. 181. No price stated.

JULES VUILLEMIN. *Essai sur la Signification de la Mort*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1948. Pp. 318. No price stated.

SIMONE WEIL. *L'enracinement* (*Prélude à une déclaration des devoirs envers l'etre humain*). Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1949. Pp. 250. Fr. francs 360.

PAUL GRENET. *Les Origines de l'Analogie Philosophique dans les Dialogues de Platon*. Paris: Boivin & Cie, Editions Contemporaines. 1948. Pp. 300. No price stated.

JULES MONNEROT. *Sociologie du Communisme*. Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1949. Pp. 508. Fr. francs 700.

A. FOUCHER. *Le Compendium des Topiques* (*Tarka-Samgraha*) *d'Annambhatta*. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve. 1949. Pp. xxiii + 184. £1 14s.

L. JUGNET. *Pour Connaitre la Pensee de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: Bordas. 1949. Pp. xiv + 265. No price stated.

SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR. *Le Deuxième Sexe, II. L'Expérience Vécue*. Paris: Gallimard. 1949. Pp. 577. Fr. francs 590.

CHARLES WERNER. *La Philosophie Grecque*. Paris: Payot. 1946. Pp. 299. No price stated.

ENRICO CASTELLI. *Introduction à une Phénoménologie de notre Epoque*. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1949. Pp. 7–88. No price stated.

E. HOCHSTETTER, Editor. *Leibniz zu seinem* 300. *Geburtstag* 1646–1946—*Leibniz' Mathematische Studien in Paris*. von Joseph E. Hofmann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1948. Pp. 70. No price stated.

HANS WELZEL. *Vom Irrenden Gewissen*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1949. Pp. 28. DM. 1.50.

LUIGI STEFANINI. *Platone*. Padova: CEDAM Casa Editrice Dott. Ant. Milani. 1949. 2 Vols. Pp. xi + 368 and 10–491. L. 1,600 and L. 1,800.

TADEUSZ CZEZOWSKI. *Logika—Podrecznik dla Studiujacych Nauki Filozoficzne*. Warsaw: Panstwowe Zaklady Wydawnictw Szkolnych. 1949. Pp. 273. Z. 600.

H. Z. ULKEN, Editor. *Sosyoloji Dergisi* 4–5 (*Sociological Review*). Istanbul: Pulhan Matbaasi. 1949. Pp. 552. Kurus 840.

LUIGI PAREYSON. *El Existencialismo*. Also: JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. *El Concepto de la Teoría de la Ciencia*. Buenos Aires: Instituto de Filosofía, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aire. 1949. Pp. respectively, 33 and 56. No prices stated.

TEODORO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE. *Cartas Filosoficas a Lisa* and *El Infinito*. 2 Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad. 1949 and 1941. Pp. 31 and 30. No prices stated.

DOMENICO SCOLERI. *Uomo e Cosmo* (*nella Filosofia di Domenico Antonio Cardone*). Rome: Edizioni Pagine Nuove. 1949. Pp. 10. No price stated.

P. MATEO LANSEROS. *La Autoridad Civil en Francisco Suarez*. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos. 1949. 45 pesetas.

ENRICO CASTELLI, Editor. *Umanesimo e Machiavellismo* (*Archivio di Filosofia*). Padua: Editoria Liviana. 1949. Pp. 202. 530 lire.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## THE "PARMENIDEAN DOGMA"

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

Professor Stace's very interesting article on "The Parmenidean Dogma" in the July issue of *Philosophy* prompts me to suggest that, however true his contention may be of Philosophy in the narrow sense of the word, it does not hold good for Science. Science has not, in fact, presupposed the dogma, nor do Professor Stace's examples really indicate that it has. This may be seen in two ways: first, in the existence of non-conservation laws, and second, in the steps by which conservation laws were reached. The outstanding example of the first is, of course, the law of increasing entropy; entropy is as much a physical "existence" as mass or energy, and it is always being formed out of nothing. This has been orthodox physics for a hundred years. Secondly, the law of conservation of mass arose as a generalization from very careful and exact *ad hoc* experiments from which the possibility of the opposite conclusion was by no means excluded at the beginning. Finally, "potential energy" is not merely a name created to preserve the illusion that something inapprehensible actually exists; it is a name given to something quite as apprehensible as any other form of energy. In Professor Stace's example, in which a stone is thrown up and lodges on a roof, two distinct quantities are involved. When it starts ascending with mass $m$ and velocity $v$, there is the quantity $\frac{1}{2}mv^2$. When it is resting on the roof with weight $W$ at a height $h$, there is the independently determined quantity $Wh$. All the necessary measurements can be made at the appropriate times, and it is then discovered that the two quantities are equal to one another. It is therefore convenient to call them by names that suggest both their difference and this equality, and they are therefore called respectively "kinetic energy" and "potential energy." There is not the slightest appeal to the Parmenidean dogma in all this.

Yours sincerely,

University College, London, W.C.1. HERBERT DINGLE.

*July* 11, 1949.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

Professor Stace has set up his own ninepins on your p. 195 in order to knock them down again on p. 202 by proving that what he calls the "Parmenidean Dogma" is not an analytic *a priori* truth. It is not Parmenides but Empedocles (frgm. 12, 1) and Melissus (frgm. 1) who taught that "something cannot come out of nothing" and that "something cannot become nothing." It is contrary to all our evidence that Parmenides's starting-point was the experience that you cannot get a rabbit or indeed anything out of an empty container. Had he started from such a proposition he would have been guilty of the confusion of "empty space" with all its geometric and physical relational characteristics with "nothing" which led Democritus (who needed the notion of empty space for his atomic theory no less than we need it for ours) to the assertion (fr. 156) that "the Naught exists as much as the Aught."

What Parmenides really taught is the axiom: "the nothing" or "not-being" does not and "cannot be" (or "exist"). "The view that 'THAT WHICH IS NOT exists' can never prevail." This, however, is beyond doubt an irrefutable, logical *a priori* truism, because the contrary assertion "the non-being is" (or "exists") is manifestly self-contradictory.

If this is conceded, as it must be, it follows that Reality, "that which exists"—an all-embracing concept—synonymous with "the All," the "Universe"—the "All" which "is one" cannot be surrounded in space, preceded or followed in time or enclosed, pierced or holed in space-time by the Nothing, the Naught or Not-Being.

It follows that nothing can enter Reality from an outside Nothingness, Naught or Non-Being. This excludes "creation," "bringing into existence out of a preceding or surrounding Nothing"; "annihilation," "reduction to nothing" as well as "coming into" or "going out of existence." It follows that the decisive influence of the Parmenidean axiom on European thought was wholly beneficial and legitimate.

Bertrand Russell has the undying merit of having shown—in 1901—on the basis of Weierstrass's banishment from mathematics of the use of infinitesimals, that "we live in an unchanging world and that Zeno's arrow in its flight is truly at rest"; that "motion consists merely in the fact that bodies are sometimes in one place and sometimes in another, and that they are at intermediate places at intermediate times"; but that it is a fallacy if "philosophers tell us that it changes its position within the instant."

Aristotle's concept of "potentiality" does not follow, but is excluded by the Parmenidean axiom because there is no realm of potentialities or possibilities outside of reality. What *is*, is "actually," not "potentially" real. The principles of the conservation of matter-energy are legitimate deductions from the Parmenidean principle. If Professor Stace will read Dr. G. J. Whitrow's admirable new Book *The Structure of the Universe* he will learn how much of physics has become, since he studied it at school, a purely deductive, epistemological system, mainly thanks to Eddington and E. A. Milne.

There is no space, sir, to discuss here Professor Stace's ghost-story of "seeing" kinetic

energy disappear "into nothing." But I must point out the simple Parmenidean, Eleatic explanation which I have given in "Appearance and Reality," *The Philosopher*, N.S. I, 1949, p. 79, of Whitehead's apparently paradoxical illustration of the quantum theory of electrons "jumping" through Time-Space—which does not "traverse" but shows the necessity of the Parmenidean axiom.

ROBERT EISLER.

# NOTICE

## "A LEXICON OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS"

A GENERAL lexicon for the works of St. Thomas of Aquin is being published by the Catholic University of America Press. It is based on the *Summa Theologica* and selected passages of his other works. The work is being prepared by Professor Roy J. Deferrari, Sister M. Inviolata Barry and Professor Ignatius McGuiness. It is to include all the words in the *Summa Theologica* and such other words from the remaining works as seem in the judgment of the authors to be of great importance.

The method followed will be the traditional procedure for all special lexicons of the work of any individual author. Each word, as it appears, will be followed by the different English meanings with which it is used, followed in turn by some illustrations of its use in each meaning taken from the works of St. Thomas.

The authors consider it important for a thorough knowledge of St. Thomas's thought to understand his language generally, and not its philosophical and theological aspects exclusively. All words and phrases of syntax contribute to St. Thomas's expression of opinion and doctrine, and so may be said to have importance for the understanding of his thought. In these days, the study of Latin has declined almost universally, and it can no longer be assumed that a student is so well-informed on the fundamentals of the Latin language of the classic period that he can readily adapt himself to the very different kind of Latin which he finds in St. Thomas. Consequently, the authors plan in the near future a small hand edition of this lexicon for students who wish to read the works of St. Thomas in their original language.

The authors wish to state that this work is a lexicon in the general sense of the term. It is not a philosophical dictionary, claiming to give a complete treatment of the philosophical implications of every word. It should, however, be a useful instrument to that end. The text used is the so-called Leonine edition published at Rome, 1888–1906, for the *Summa Theologica* and the edition of *Vives* for his other works.

# INSTITUTE NOTES

The following lectures have been arranged for the Lent Term:

*University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, at 5.15 p.m.*

A Course of four lectures by Karl Britton, M.A., on
*The Philosophy of Human Nature*

January 27 *The Philosophy of Human Nature and the Science of Human Nature.*
February 3 *Ways of Knowing and Kinds of Knowledge.*
February 10 *Morality: Tradition and Reason.*
February 17 *Truths of Reflection and Imagination.*

*University College (Anatomy Theatre), Gower Street, W.C.1, at 7.30 p.m.*

March 22 *The Gates of the Future.* Professor J. W. Harvey.

## OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology. These lectures are free to members.
(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).
(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.
(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield.

Students of philosophy are reminded that they may become associates of the Institute at a reduced fee of 8s. 6d. per annum, provided they are full-time students studying for a degree or diploma at a university or university college and not engaged in a gainful occupation. Present or past Members of the Institute are not eligible to become Associates.

**Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.**

[*Suggested*]

## FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

# CONTENTS


PAGE

I. SOME COMMON FALLACIES IN POLITICAL THINKING. Professor C. D. Broad . . . . . 99

II. THE CLAIMS OF REASON. Professor C. A. Campbell . . 114

III. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER PERSONS. J. R. Jones, D.Phil., M.A. . . . . 134

IV. OBJECTIVITY IN MORALS. William Kneale, M.A. . . . 149

V. DISCUSSION: LIBERAL MORALITY AND SOCIALIST MORALITY . . . . . 167

VI. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY . . 172

VII. NEW BOOKS . . . . . 174

VIII. INSTITUTE NOTES AND NOTICES . . . . . 192


---

## THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

### APPEAL FOR NEW MEMBERS AND DONATIONS

The Council is willing to receive applications for membership of the Institute from all those who are interested in philosophy.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussions in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from annual subscriptions. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
WOKING AND LONDON